Stocker v. Boston Mut. Life Ass'n
| Decision Date | 11 January 1898 |
| Citation | 49 N.E. 116,170 Mass. 224 |
| Parties | STOCKER v. BOSTON MUT. LIFE ASS'N. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H.R. Bailey, for plaintiff.
W.H Niles and George J. Carr, for defendant.
The question in this case is whether St.1887, c. 214, § 21 applies to an assessment insurance company incorporated under St.1890, c. 421. Section 21 reads as follows: "No oral or written misrepresentation made in the negotiation of a contract or policy of insurance, by the assured or in his behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching, unless such misrepresentation is made with actual intent to deceive, or unless the matter misrepresented increased the risk of loss." The question now before the court was not raised in Rainger v. Association, 167 Mass. 109, 44 N.E 1088, nor was it passed upon in other cases in which this section has been construed. Durkee v. Insurance Co., 159 Mass. 514, 34 N.E. 1133; White v. Society, 163 Mass. 108, 39 N.E. 771; Levie v. Insurance Co., 163 Mass. 117, 39 N.E. 792; Hogan v. Insurance Co., 164 Mass. 448, 41 N.E. 663. The provisions of St.1887, c. 214, § 21, are first found in St.1878, c. 157, which was re-enacted in Pub.St. c. 119, § 181. Statutes passed since the Statutes of 1887 are St.1894, c. 522, § 21, and St.1895, cc. 271, 281.
Beneficiary corporations were first authorized to do a limited life insurance business, by St.1877, c. 204, but it was provided by section 2: "The provisions of the general laws relating to life insurance companies shall not be held to be applicable to such beneficiary corporations." A similar provision is to be found in St.1880, c. 196, § 4. This provision was re-enacted in Pub.St. c. 115,§ 10. While beneficiary corporations were authorized, by the statutes above referred to, to insure the lives of their members, the first recognition of corporations doing a general business of life insurance on the assessment plan is found in St.1885, c. 183. Section 13 of this act, after providing for returns to the insurance commissioner, and giving him the power of visitation and examination into the affairs of any such corporation, conferred upon him in the case of life insurance companies by Pub.St. c. 119 (), concludes as follows: "Provided, always, that nothing herein contained shall subject any corporation doing business under this act to any other provisions or requirements of said chapter one hundred and nineteen, except as distinctly set forth therein." St.1887, c. 214, entitled "An act to amend and codify the statutes relating to insurance," by section 2 exempts from the provisions of the act corporations formed under Pub.St. c. 115, and corresponding statutes, and companies formed under or subject to St.1885, c. 183. If, therefore, the defendant had been organized under the statutes of 1885, it would not be subject to the provisions of St.1887, c. 214, § 21. The defendant, however, was organized under St.1890, c. 421, which is a re-enactment, with some changes, of St.1885, c. 183. The question is as to the construction to be given to St.1890, c. 421, § 27. This section reads as follows: "The provisions of chapter two hundred and fourteen of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and eighty-seven shall not apply to corporations organized under or transacting business in conformity to this act; but except as specifically provided herein, and in the chapter defining the rights and privileges of fraternal beneficiary corporations, all insurance or benefit contracts within the commonwealth, or with residents thereof, shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of chapter two hundred and fourteen of the acts of the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven." The latter part of this section must be held to qualify and limit the general words contained in the first part, and the act contains no specific provision touching the subject. While the requirements of many of the provisions of the general statute relating to insurance differ from those relating to assessment insurance, there are some provisions of the general statute which might well be applied to assessment insurance; and we are of opinion that it was the intent of the legislature, by the language used, to incorporate into this chapter all such general provisions as were not repugnant to the express provisions of the act.
It is however, contended by the defendant, that the legislature, by St.1894, c. 522, has...
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