Stocking v. Semple
| Decision Date | 10 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CV155017038S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Gary Stocking v. Scott Semple |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On November 25, 2015, the plaintiff, Gary Stocking, filed his complaint, [1] alleging violation of state law and federal law by the defendant, Scott Semple, the Commissioner of Correction. The plaintiff's complaint does not clearly separate, identify, or number the various distinct causes of action, and it is thus difficult to identify these claims. Nevertheless, it appears that the plaintiff has brought five separate causes of action: (1) a state tort claim for medical malpractice; (2) " Fraud and Discrimination" in violation of both federal and state law; (3) violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution; (4) a constitutional claim for the denial of access to the courts and (5) violation of the first amendment to the United States constitution.
As to the claim for medical malpractice, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. On June 20, 2011, the plaintiff was misdiagnosed with Hepatitis C while in state custody. The plaintiff was not offered any treatment or psychological counseling for the potentially fatal viral infection that causes terminal liver disease. The plaintiff received the diagnosis on November 15, 2011, shortly after his mother died, and he became depressed and suicidal. On April 9, 2015 at the Osborn Correctional Institution, the plaintiff was informed by a female nurse, Rodriguez, that he does not have Hepatitis C.
As to the " Fraud and Discrimination" claim, the plaintiff alleges that, at the Osborn Correctional Institution, he was informed by Counselor Smith that the plaintiff would not be reviewed for a halfway house because his sentence is less than two years. The plaintiff claims that this is false because the Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.2[2] states that the plaintiff must be within eighteen months of the end of his sentence to be eligible for the halfway house.
As to the claim for the violation of the eighth amendment, the plaintiff claims, in part, that the allegations of medical malpractice and " Fraud and Discrimination" are also a violation of the eighth amendment. The plaintiff further alleges the following violations under the eighth amendment. On August 27, 2014, the plaintiff was denied access to toothpaste and an envelope despite requesting these items in writing. On September 12, 2014, the plaintiff was crammed into a 300 square foot room that was locked at night so that inmates were forced to wait for hours before being given access to the bathroom or to water. On March 9, 2015 the plaintiff was moved from Cheshire Correctional Institution to Osborn Correctional Institution, where he was housed in a one-person cell with another inmate, and was forced to sleep in a top bunk with no ladder. In addition, the plaintiff was provided contaminated water and was exposed to improper ventilation. More specifically, as to ventilation, there was no smoke detector or sprinkler in case of fire, and " the vent was clogged with caked on dust." As to the water, the water from the sink in the plaintiff's cell turned his cellmate's sock into a " dark rusty brown color, " which meant that the water was contaminated. Finally, the department of correction has an unconstitutional policy in regard to Department of Correction Administrative Directive 6.10, [3] because an inmate is not considered indigent until ninety days from the time that the inmate's account balance is less than $5. This means that the inmate is deprived of basic human rights such as soap, shampoo, toothpaste, and envelopes during that ninety-day time period.
As to the claim that the defendant failed to provide him with proper access to the courts, the plaintiff alleges that he was denied envelopes which he requested " to notify the courts because [he] had become indigent." The plaintiff further alleges that, while at Cheshire Correctional Institution, he was continually denied access to the library to make legal copies, and was also denied access to notarial services to authenticate his documents. Moreover, the plaintiff was restricted to filing only one grievance per month while at the Osborn Correctional Institution, and was thus not able to grieve all his issues.
Finally, as to the violation of the first amendment, the plaintiff alleges that the Department of Correction has continually denied him access to religious services since December 23, 2012. The plaintiff further alleges that he has filed four separate grievances on this issue, and that this constitutes deliberate indifference.
As to relief, the plaintiff requests punitive monetary damages against the defendant.[4] The plaintiff states that he has brought the present action against the defendant in both his official and individual capacity, for $10 million.
On December 21, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.[5] On December 29, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion.[6] The matter was heard at short calendar on May 23, 2016.[7]
" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " In general, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006). Moreover, " [c]laims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). Thus, " a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity [or statutory immunity] bars the action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).
In addition, " [t]he doctrines of sovereign immunity and federal qualified immunity also implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Chapman v. Chapdelaine, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-12-5005693-S, (October 17, 2013, Graham, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 932, 933), citing Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011), and Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 747, 763, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005); see also Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 308-09, 124 A.3d 977 (2015) (affirming the court's dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claims against the defendants in their individual capacities for money damages even though federal qualified immunity was raised sua sponte).
Finally, the doctrines of standing and mootness both implicate subject matter jurisdiction, and are properly raised by a motion to dismiss. See Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 310 Conn. 265, 270, 77 A.3d 113 (2013) [8]
" Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case . . . [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651.
" In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence. . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional...
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