Stockton v. Leeke

• Decision Date: 05 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 20522,20522
• Parties: Don STOCKTON, Appellant, v. William D. LEEKE, Respondent. Franklin DENNISON, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 896

237 S.E.2d 896

269 S.C. 459

Don STOCKTON, Appellant, v. William D. LEEKE, Respondent.

Franklin DENNISON, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.

No. 20522.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Oct. 5, 1977.

Roy T. Stuckey, Vance L. Cowden and John L. Davidson, Columbia, for appellants.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Attys. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and Kenneth L. Childs, Columbia, for respondents.

PER CURIAM:

In unrelated cases, the appellants were convicted of safecracking with tools and each received a ten (10) year sentence on that conviction.

These cases have been consolidated on appeal from denials of post-conviction relief because each contains the common question of whether the ten (10) minimum sentence for safecracking committed with tools provided by Section 16-11-390 of the South Carolina Code (1976), formerly Section 16-337 of the 1962 Code, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The basic rule for an attack on a sentence in South Carolina was laid down in State v. Conally, 227 S.C. 507, 510, 88 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1955), where this Court stated "This Court has no jurisdiction to disturb, because of alleged excessiveness, a sentence which is within the limits prescribed by statute, unless: (a) the statute itself violates the constitutional injunction, Article 1, Section 19, against cruel and unusual punishment, or (b) the sentence is the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive."

There being no allegations falling within the latter portion of the above rule, the question presented requires us to consider the minimum sentence for safecracking as measured against the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Where, as here, we are considering the constitutionality of a punishment in the abstract, we are guided by two principles. First, the historical principle that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is designed to prevent inhuman and barbarous treatment. Second, that the sentence must not be grossly out of proportion with the severity of the crime. State v. Gamble,249 S.C. 605, 155 S.E.2d 916 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 927, 88 S.Ct. 862, 19 L.Ed.2d 988; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).

We are concerned here only with the second principle. South Carolina has long recognized the concept requiring the sentence to be in proportion to the crime. E. g. S.C.Const. Art. XL (1778). More recently, this Court has reaffirmed the concept that a sentence, though not cruel and unusual in kind, may be so severe in duration as to be cruel and unusual. State v. Kimbrough,212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948); State v. Gamble, supra.

In considering the proportionality of a sentence, we are mindful that a punishment is selected by the members of the legislature, whose ability to evaluate the moral consensus toward a punishment and its social utility as a sanction cannot be denied. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra. The presumption of validity extends to the statute in question here, and appellants must assume the heavy burden of persuading us that this penalty is without justification and is unconstitutionally severe. See generally 6 West's South Carolina Digest, Constitutional Law, kk48, 70.3.

The first test in a proportionality analysis is a subjective one, in which the consideration is whether the punishment shocks the collective conscience of our society. This standard reflects more than a disagreement with the wisdom of the legislature. Due to the difficulty in analyzing subjective standards, we will not discuss this standard. It suffices to say that we are not convinced that the conscience of society has been shocked.

The second test is an objective one, which looks to the gravity of the offense, Willis v. Leeke, 255 S.C. 230, 178 S.E.2d 251 (1970), to the legislative purpose behind the sentencing statute, to a comparison of a defendant's punishment, to punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense, and to a comparison of other punishments available in the same jurisdiction for other offenses. See e. g. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir., 1973), cert. den., 415 U.S. 983 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881; People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338 (1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 372, 46 L.Ed.2d 287.

The gravity of the crime of safecracking could reasonably have been found by the legislature to be great. Safes are designed and purchased to provide a place of safekeeping for highly valuable and confidential items. Once who would steal the more valuable items shows greater determination and may pose a much greater threat to society both physically and economically than a mere petty thief.

While it is a recognized principle that long sentences lessen the chances of rehabilitation, the legislature may have felt that the longer minimum sentence was necessary in order to isolate those who would commit such an offense and to deter others from similar conduct.

As to a comparison of the minimum penalty for safecracking with the penalties provided for similar and other offenses, it suffices to say that we have considered this type of attack before. State v. Haulcomb, 260 S.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 601 (1973), app. dismissed 414 U.S. 886, 94 S.Ct. 229, 38 L.Ed.2d 134. There, in relation to the maximum sentence for safecracking, we said that ...