Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 34335.,34335.
• Citation: 207 P.3d 162,147 Idaho 186
• Parties: Robert J. STODDARD, Claimant, v. The HAGADONE CORPORATION, Employer, and Royal Indemnity Company, Surety, Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents, and State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

207 P.3d 162

147 Idaho 186

Robert J. STODDARD, Claimant, v. The HAGADONE CORPORATION, Employer, and Royal Indemnity Company, Surety, Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents, and State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

No. 34335.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 2009 Term.

April 14, 2009.

Bowen & Bailey, LLP, Boise, for appellants. Scott Wigle argued.

Mallea Law offices, Meridian, for respondent. Kenneth Mallea argued.

W. JONES, Justice.

This appeal arises from the Industrial Commission's decision which did not assign responsibility to the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for Claimant Robert Stoddard's total and permanent disability benefits. The Industrial Commission found that ISIF was not liable for any portion of Stoddard's injury. Royal Indemnity Company (Royal) appeals to this Court alleging that it was error for the Industrial Commission to find that Stoddard's total and permanent disability was not a product of his pre-existing impairments combined with his last industrial accident and that it was error to analyze Stoddard's disability status as of the date of hearing rather than the date of accident. ISIF cross-appeals contending that Royal's claim against ISIF is barred by collateral estoppel, res judicata or the doctrine of waiver because the Industrial Commission previously held Royal 80% liable for Stoddard's injury.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Stoddard filed three separate claims for benefits arising out of three industrial accidents. The claims were consolidated and litigated with an ultimate finding that Stoddard was totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. Fault was apportioned between the sureties for the Hagadone Corporation (Hagadone), General Insurance Company of America (General) and Royal, with 20% liability being assigned to General and 60% liability being assigned to Royal. Stoddard, General and Royal filed motions for reconsideration and clarification alleging error in the decision. The Industrial Commission then apportioned the remaining 20% liability to Royal. Royal filed a separate action against ISIF alleging liability for a proportionate share of disability benefits.

Stoddard filed the original action in this case seeking compensation for three injuries that were the result of industrial accidents. A hearing was held in March of 2001 with the following findings of facts. Stoddard was employed by Hagadone as a groundskeeper at Duane Hagadone's summer home in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Stoddard suffered four injuries; three of which were found to be industrial accidents. The first injury was a groin strain and hernia. Stoddard suffered the injury while standing with one foot on a dock and one foot in a boat while unloading flats of potted flowers from the boat. The hernia required surgery, but Stoddard missed no work after the surgery or as a result of the hernia. The second injury was the result of a motor vehicle accident and was not the result of an industrial accident. Stoddard was involved in a rear-end collision and complained of pain in his neck, left shoulder and low back. Stoddard missed no work as a result of this injury. The third accident occurred while maneuvering a large flowerpot through a sliding glass door and was the result of an industrial accident. The injury caused pain in Stoddard's lower back area. The referee determined that the pain was in a different area of Stoddard's back than the pain felt after the motor-vehicle accident. Stoddard did not miss any work as a result of the third accident. Stoddard attended physical therapy for the shoulder and back injuries. Stoddard discontinued physical therapy because the exercises caused too much pain and instead walked on a regular basis for exercise; walking "significantly improved" Stoddard's condition. The fourth and final accident occurred while Stoddard was mowing the lawn at the residence and was the result of an industrial accident. Stoddard fell while mowing the lawn on an incline and "[his] feet slipped out from under [him], and [he] came straight down on [his] buttocks. And it changed [his] life." Stoddard has not been able to return to work since the fourth accident occurred in May of 1999.

The referee held that Stoddard was permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine, holding General liable for 20% for the hernia and the flowerpot injury and Royal liable for 60% for the lawnmower injury. All the parties filed motions for reconsideration and clarification. The referee then held that "[under the facts of this case, the [Industrial] Commission has determined that the last accident caused [Stoddard] to suffer total and permanent disability[]" and that Royal should be fully liable for the total and permanent disability benefits. General was held liable for 20% of the injuries as a result of the hernia and Royal was held liable for the permanent total disability or 80% of the injuries.¹ No appeal was made by any party from this order.

In 2006 Royal filed an action against ISIF and a hearing was conducted in July of 2006. Stoddard was not a party to the action because "this matter did not directly involve any pecuniary interests of Claimant." The second hearing presented two issues: "(1) [w]hether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine and, if so, (2)[w]hether ISIF is liable for a proportionate share of disability benefits." The Industrial Commission found that "[n]either party herein questions that [Stoddard] is totally and permanently disabled, the present issue being ISIF's proportionate responsibility for payment of the benefits associated with that total disability." The Industrial Commission found that ISIF was not liable for a proportionate share of Stoddard's total permanent disability because Stoddard's "current total and permanent disability is due to the lack of transferable skills to the sedentary labor market and his advanced age, and not the result of any combination of [Stoddard's] pre-existing impairment and his last industrial accident." Royal appeals to this Court.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The following issues are presented to this Court on appeal:

1. Whether the Industrial Commission erred by failing to apply res judicata, collateral estoppel or the doctrine of waiver.

2. Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it found that Stoddard's permanent and total disability was not the result of any pre-existing impairments combined with his last industrial accident.

3. Whether the Industrial Commission erred by holding that Stoddard's disability status should be analyzed as of the date of the second Industrial Commission hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court, upon review, may set aside the Industrial Commission's order upon the following grounds only:

(1) The commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence;

(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers;

(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud;

(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award.

I.C. § 72-732. This Court exercises free review over the Industrial Commission's legal conclusions but "will not disturb the [Industrial] Commission's factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Reiher v. Am. Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994). "Substantial and competent evidence consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). This Court reviews the Industrial Commission's factual findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Lethrud v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995). The Industrial Commission does not need to "`make detailed findings on every fragment of evidence presented to it.' ... [but only] findings sufficient to enable meaningful appellate review." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 338, 870 P.2d 1292, 1297 (1994) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Madron v. Green Giant Co., 94 Idaho 747, 751, 497 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1972)).

ANALYSIS

The Industrial Commission did not err by failing to apply res judicata, collateral estoppel or the doctrine of waiver.

ISIF contends that Royal's claim against ISIF is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel or the doctrine of waiver by virtue of the 2001 decision and I.C. § 72-718. I.C. § 72-718 states that,

[a] decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the decision in the office of the commission; provided, within twenty (20) days from the date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision. ... Final decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

I.C. § 72-718. Whether Royal's claim is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata is a question of law over which this court exercises free review. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007); Rodriguez v. Dep't of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001).

"Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, "bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims `relating to the same cause of action.'" Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617 (quoting Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805). Therefore, res judicata, or claim preclusion, does not bar Royal's action against ISIF because ISIF was not a party to the 2001 action.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to...