Stokes v. State
| Decision Date | 06 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | A21A1658 |
| Citation | 362 Ga.App. 223,867 S.E.2d 834 |
| Parties | STOKES v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Juwayn Nadim Haddad, for Appellant.
Patsy A. Austin-Gatson, Tristan Wade Gillespie, for Appellee.
A Gwinnett County jury found Jamya Stokes guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Stokes appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict on the armed robbery count; and (2) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call her co-defendant to testify. We determine that the trial court properly denied Stokes’ motion for directed verdict as to the armed robbery charge and that Stokes did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm.
On appeal, a criminal defendant is no longer presumed innocent, and we review whether the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.
Bedford v. State , 311 Ga. 329, 331 (1), 857 S.E.2d 708 (2021).
Viewed in this light, the evidence adduced at trial showed that around November 16, 2018, Stokes and Donovan Mew were romantically involved and checked into a hotel room. While Mew was sleeping in the room, the sound of the door opening woke him up. Mew saw Stokes’ sister, Armauni Stokes, and a man who was later identified as Jerrard Williams. Armauni and Williams pulled out handguns, hit Mew in the forehead with one of the weapons, and pointed another at his face. Around that time, Mew observed that Stokes was dressed and standing in the bathroom and that she was grabbing some items and placing them in a bag. Mew fled the room and ran unclothed to the front desk to seek help. Seconds after Mew ran from the room, Williams, Armauni, and Stokes ran after him, with one of the Stokes sisters carrying a bag and a bundle of clothing. Williams, Armauni and Stokes ran from the stairwell and into the parking lot, and they all left in the same vehicle. Video surveillance footage from inside the hotel was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
One of the responding officers testified that Mew was "obviously shaken" and scared and that law enforcement had to "calm him down" in order to speak with him. The officer also learned that Armauni had checked into the room next to Mew's approximately 40 minutes after Mew had checked into his room. Upon his return to his hotel room, Mew discovered that his bank cards, cell phones, identification cards, bank statements, clothing, social security card, and approximately $6500 in cash were missing. Mew also testified that Stokes knew that he was carrying a large amount of cash on his person and that he had hidden the cash in one of his socks.
Stokes was indicted on one count each of armed robbery, aggravated assault, battery, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.1 The jury acquitted her of battery but found her guilty on all the other charges. The trial court sentenced Stokes to serve 25 years, with the first 14 to be served in confinement and the balance on probation, and the court also imposed a $2000 fine. Stokes filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. The trial court later granted Stokes’ motion to file an out-of-time appeal, and this appeal ensued.
1. First, in various related arguments, Stokes claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict as to the armed robbery charge because the State failed to prove that Mew's property was taken from his person or his immediate presence. We conclude that a rational jury could have found that Mew's property was taken from his immediate presence, and therefore the trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict.
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Under that standard, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to uphold the jury's verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only where there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence introduced with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sparks v. State , 292 Ga. App. 143, 664 S.E.2d 247 (2008). A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with the intent to commit theft, she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). Additionally, "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime." Rinks v. State , 313 Ga. App. 37, 38, 718 S.E.2d 359 (2011) (citing OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) ). Mindful of these principles, we now address Stokes’ claims.
In arguing that Mew's property was not taken from his person or immediate presence, Stokes first relies on the fact that Mew only became aware that his property was stolen upon his return to his hotel room. At the outset, however, we emphasize that "[a]n armed robbery may be committed even out of the physical presence of the victim if what was taken was under the victim's control or responsibility and if the victim was not too far distant." (Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State , 336 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1), 783 S.E.2d 672 (2016). See also Benton v. State , 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (b), 824 S.E.2d 322 (2019) (). Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Merritt v. State , 353 Ga. App. 374, 376 (1), 837 S.E.2d 521 (2020).
Before the armed robbery, Mew had gathered all of his belongings and placed them on a chair in his hotel room. Additionally, the perpetrators ran from the room immediately after Mew left, at which time Mew was still in the hotel seeking help. Therefore, the jury was authorized to conclude that Mew initially had control over his property and that the perpetrators took Mew's property while he was "not too far distant" from his hotel room. Benton , supra, 305 Ga. at 245 (1) (b), 824 S.E.2d 322 (); Jackson , supra, 336 Ga. App. at 72 (1), 783 S.E.2d 672 ().
Further, Mew testified that he fled the room because the perpetrators were pointing guns at him, he believed his life to be in jeopardy, and he was trying to leave the room as quickly as possible because "[his] life came first." Based on this evidence, the jury could have found that the perpetrators forcibly caused Mew to part with his property in order to protect his safety. See Merritt , supra, 353 Ga. App. at 376-377 (1), 837 S.E.2d 521 (); Maddox v. State , 174 Ga. App. 728, 730 (1), 330 S.E.2d 911 (1985) (). See also State v. Epps , 267 Ga. 175, 176, 476 S.E.2d 579 (1996) () (citation and punctuation omitted). Therefore, it is of no consequence here that Mew was absent from his hotel room at the time of the taking and only discovered his property missing upon his return. The evidence still authorized a finding that his property was taken from his immediate presence, and Mew's flight before his property was taken does not undermine Stokes’ conviction.
Stokes nevertheless insists that Mew's property was not stolen from his immediate presence because the perpetrators did not demand money from Mew or otherwise indicate that they were committing a robbery. Essentially, Stokes argues that the evidence failed to show that the perpetrators intended to commit a theft while Mew was in the room. These arguments are unavailing.
"A taking accomplished by force or intimidation is the distinguishing characteristic of robbery — the gist of the offense." (Punctuation omitted.) Epps , supra, 267 Ga. at 176, 476 S.E.2d 579. Therefore, "the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's use of an offensive weapon occurred shortly prior to or contemporaneously with the taking." (Punctuation omitted.) Lumpkin v. State , 310 Ga. 139, 146 (1) (a), 849 S.E.2d 175 (2020). "In proving intent, ... it is not necessary that the State introduce evidence that the accused expressed an intent to rob in so many words, or declared a purpose to carry the intent into effect, for the jury to arrive at the conclusion [s]he so intended." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State , 224 Ga. App. 14, 18, 479 S.E.2d 754 (1996). Rather, ...
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