Stone, Application of

• Decision Date: 07 January 1957
• Docket Number: No. 2772,2772
• Citation: 305 P.2d 777,77 Wyo. 1
• Parties: Application of J. Norman STONE for Admission to the Bar of the State of Wyoming. The STATE of Wyoming, Upon Relation of the Attorney General, George F. GUY and Assistant Attorney General, Bruce P. Badley, Edward Birchby, President of the Sheridan County Bar Association and G. R. McConnell, Attorney at Law, Plaintiff, v. J. Norman 'Stoney' STONE, Defendant.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 777

305 P.2d 777

77 Wyo. 1

Application of J. Norman STONE for Admission to the Bar of the State of Wyoming The STATE of Wyoming, Upon Relation of the Attorney General, George F. GUY and Assistant Attorney General, Bruce P. Badley, Edward Birchby, President of the Sheridan County Bar Association and G. R. McConnell, Attorney at Law, Plaintiff, v. J. Norman 'Stoney' STONE, Defendant.

No. 2772.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Jan. 7, 1957.

Writ of Certiorari Denied March 4, 1957.

See 77 S.Ct. 593.

George F. Guy, Atty. Gen., Bruce P. Badley, Asst. Atty. Gen., G. R. McConnell, Laramie, Edward Birchby and Henry A. Burgess, Sheridan, for plaintiff.

John J. Spriggs, Sr., Lander, for defendant and defendant was also present.

William J. Wehrli, Casper, Joseph H. Galicich, Rock Springs, Thomas O. Miller, Lusk, and Joseph J. Hickey, Cheyenne, amici curiae.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant stands charged with contempt in an action invoking the original jurisdiction of this court. The evidence discloses a long continuing, carefully planned attack on members of the supreme court, and we must now determine whether or not such acts constitute a direct contempt and whether they are a clear and present danger to the court and to the administration of justice in Wyoming. The charges in the petition relate only to acts and statements against this court. However, Art. 5, § 2, Constitution of Wyoming, provides that:

'The supreme court shall have * * * a general superintending control over all inferior courts * * *.'

and the charges, therefore, indirectly concern all of this State's judiciary.

Defendant's improper conduct, as charged in the petition, began during the pendency of his application for reciprocal admission to practice law in this State, which matter was decided adversely to Mr. Stone in Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 288 P.2d 767, certiorari denied 352 U.S. 815, 77 S.Ct. 71, 1 L.Ed.2d 68, and is res judicata insofar as this application is concerned.

For clarity and in order to provide factual background essential to the determination of the present legal problem, it is necessary to set out a chronological outline of relevant events, even though some of such matters were discussed in the case formerly decided.

Defendant, at the time named Jack N. Steinberg, came to Sheridan, Wyoming, in November 1954. After some two days there, he returned to Washington, D. C., where he had previously practiced law, changed his name by legal process to J. Norman Stone, and forwarded to this court a 'Petition for Admission to the Bar without Examination.' This matter was referred to the State Board of Law Examiners, the agency authorized by law to report to the supreme court touching the qualifications and moral character of persons seeking to practice law in Wyoming. Concurrently, defendant filed the usual 'Application for Character Report' with the National Conference of Bar Examiners, the agency which makes investigations and furnishes information to the State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming and most other states in the union regarding persons applying for admission to practice law. Defendant in such application stated (as is required and customary), 'I understand that I will not receive and am not entitled to a copy of the report nor to know its contents.'

In the application defendant disclosed the following facts, that:

(1) He had changed his name from Steinberg to Stone on November 30, 1954.

(2) He had refused to pay rent for an apartment occupied by him for some eighteen months and gave as the reason, 'The management knew it was damp but did not divulge that fact to me * * *. Subsequently I became ill.'

(3) He had sued fourteen different persons to recover fees for professional services; one for damages to him 'as a result of food poisoning'; another for damages suffered in an automobile accident; three persons on promissory notes; and one on Judgment creditor's action.

(4) The following actions had been brought against him in courts: (a) 'Suit to Recover Rent,' (b) 'Complaint for Fraud and Deceit and/or Breach of Contract,' (c) 'Suit for Breach of Contract,' (d) 'Complaint for Libel,' (e) 'Complaint for Unlawful Attachment.' Defendant claimed that all of said suits had been dismissed or settled, except one which was still pending trial.

(5) Five different complaints had been filed against defendant with the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of the Bar Association of Washington, D. C. Defendant gave his version of the facts surrounding each complaint, stating that each had been dismissed but admitting one had resulted in a reprimand.

The information resulting from the ensuing investigation merely confirmed what the application had disclosed on its face--that defendant was a troublemaker. This court in Application of Stone, supra, discussed some eighteen of defendant's past activities which we considered to be just cause why he ought not to practice law in this State. No useful purpose would be served by recapitulating or rediscussing such activities since the reported case is readily available.

Suffice to say that it is the firm conviction of the members of this court that no one shall ever be admitted to the Bar of this State unless this court is satisfied that he or she has an adequate knowledge of the standards and ideals of the profession and is otherwise a fit person to take the oath and perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney at law as well as possessing the requisite legal qualifications.

On August 3, 1955, five days before the State Board of Law Examiners filed its report with this court, defendant filed with the clerk a letter stating that he had been advised orally that he was not to be recommended for admission. His letter stated:

'If this be true, I respectfully request that I be so notified in writing and I further respectfully request that I be permitted to appear in open court before the Supreme Court of Wyoming so that I might present to said court overwhelming and cogent reasons supported by powerful and compelling evidence crying for my admission. I further respectfully request that I be permitted to subpoena all of the members of the aforesaid committee for purposes of examination under oath together with other witnesses favorable to me who will among other things testify to execrable practises of certain Sheridan lawyers living and deceased.' (Emphasis supplied.)

On August 8, 1955, the Board of Law Examiners recommended in writing that the supreme court deny defendant's application for admission; and the court immediately entered an order granting defendant until September 10, 1955, to file 'a statement in writing of his reasons why the recommendation of the State Board of Law Examiners should be overruled.'

On August 13, defendant filed a 'Demand for Jury Trial'; on August 18, a 'Motion for Bill of Particulars,' demanding a copy of the report and a specification of all charges; and on September 3, a 'Request for Information' as to all applicants for the admission to the Wyoming bar since 1900. On October 5, he sent to this court a copy of his letter to 'Attorney General Herbert T. Brownell' (copy of this letter was also addressed to each member of the court individually and, according to the notation on the letter, to twenty other persons or agencies) in which he stated:

'I indict the State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming together with the Supreme Court of Wyoming with having fomented a conspiracy in concert to deprive me of my livelihood, willfully, knowingly, maliciously * * *.'

On the same day, he wrote a letter to the clerk of this court, stating:

'I accuse the Wyoming Supreme Court of being unfair, prejudiced, partial and biased and am sure that I will not get a fair hearing unless the court permits a jury of good Wyoming people to hear it. The court is trying to bury me under a maze of legal technicality but the people of Wyoming can see through this hocus pocus.'

Defendant failed to avail himself of the month-long opportunity provided by the court of stating reasons why the recommendation of the examiners should be overruled. Accordingly on October 18, 1955, the court rendered its opinion, Application of Stone, supra.

Following the issuance of that opinion, defendant filed no application for rehearing, the remedy prescribed for litigants who are dissatisfied with decisions of the court. Instead, he sent to the court various writings, scurrilous and contumelious in nature, demanding that certain steps be taken by the court. Such demands not being in accordance with the authorized procedure before the court, they were, in each instance, denied. Defendant also at different times sent to the court copies of his advertisements in the 'Sheridan Press' and, later, copies of his own publication, 'Stone's Shooting Star.' We herewith list the signed papers which he sent to the court following the opinion, Application of Stone, supra, and before the beginning of the present case:

(a) December 12, 1955, a twelve-page 'Motion for Jury Trial * * *' and '* * * Authorities * * *'; (b) December 14, 1955, a six-page letter to the court; (c) February 23, 1956, 'Motion for Leave to Argue * * * and for Disqualification of * * * Blume, Parker, and Harnsberger * * *' together with thirty-eight pages of 'Motion * * *,' '* * * Affidavit * * *,' and 'Addendum * * *'; (d) February 28, 1956, 'Notice of Taking of Deposition of D. P. B. Marshall'; (e) March 8, 1956, 'Motion to Compel * * * Marshall * * * to Submit to Deposition or be Adjudicated in Contempt * * *.'

On September 20, 1956, defendant sent a 'Petition de Novo' which was retained by the clerk.

These writings as well as copies of the advertisements and publications will be discussed later in this opinion and judgment as the occasion arises.

In September 1956 the petition in the present hearing on contempt was filed and in the interest of clarity a chronology of the filings in this proceeding is here given:

(a) ...