Stone Container Corp. v. Castle

• Decision Date: 26 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-1291.,01-1291.
• Citation: 657 N.W.2d 485
• Parties: STONE CONTAINER CORP. and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Walker H. CASTLE, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

657 N.W.2d 485

STONE CONTAINER CORP. and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Walker H. CASTLE, Appellee.

No. 01-1291.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

February 26, 2003.

Thomas M. Plaza and Judith Ann Higgs of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra & Prahl, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellants.

Harold K. Widdison, Sioux City, for appellee.

TERNUS, Justice.

The issue presented in this case is whether the industrial commissioner correctly required an injured worker's employer to pay for a laptop computer pursuant to the employer's obligation to "furnish reasonable and necessary ... appliances" under Iowa Code section 85.27 (1999). The district court affirmed the commissioner's award, but the court of appeals, in a split decision, reversed. In view of the unique circumstances presented by the case before us, we think the commissioner was right. Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals decision and affirm the district court judgment.

I. Record on Appeal.

Before we review the propriety of the agency's decision, we consider the employer's objection to certain factual assertions made by the employee on appeal. Although the employer does not dispute the accuracy of the facts upon which the employee relies, it argues there is no support in the record for these facts because the deputy industrial commissioner who heard the evidence inadvertently failed to tape record the full hearing. As a result, there is only a partial transcript of the testimony presented to the agency.

Iowa's Administrative Procedure Act governs the record on judicial review:

Within thirty days after filing of the petition [for judicial review,] or within further time allowed by the court, the agency shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of any contested case which may be the subject of the petition. By stipulation of all parties to the review proceedings, the record of such a case may be shortened.... The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(6). The district court file does not reveal any stipulation by the parties to shorten the record, nor does it show that either party requested any corrections or additions to the record. More importantly, the accuracy of the facts relied upon by the employee was never contested by the employer in the district court; the employer simply made the legal argument that a computer was not an "appliance" within the meaning of section 85.27 under the facts of this case. It is perhaps for this reason that the district court did not require any additions to the record, despite having only a partial transcript of the testimony.

Under these circumstances, we will not entertain the employer's belated argument on appeal that the employee lacks record support for his factual assertions. If the employer was dissatisfied with the record on judicial review, this matter should have been raised and resolved in the district court.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The appellee, Walker Castle, suffered catastrophic injuries in an industrial accident while working for the appellant, Stone Container Corporation. Castle, who was nineteen years old at the time, lost both his legs at the hip joint, as well as his buttocks, rectum and a testicle. He has undergone numerous surgeries, including skin grafts and colon resections. Castle suffers from chronic phantom limb pain, a "painful sensation of the presence of a limb that has been amputated." Webster's Medical Desk Dictionary 536 (1986).

In addition, Castle is very sensitive to temperature due to his extensive skin grafts and scaring. Normal room temperature causes his skin to break down. As a result, he is forced to spend most of his time in seclusion in his room at Opportunities Unlimited¹ where the temperature can be kept cooler. Moreover, he is often unable to use his wheelchair because his skin problems prevent him from sitting. Therefore, he uses a "prone cart" that permits him to lie on his stomach and chest.

Castle also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychological injuries as a result of the accident. He has lived in a medically supervised environment from the time he was injured in April 1997.

Prior to the accident, Castle had no education or training beyond high school. He did not own a computer. At his request, however, Stone Container's worker's compensation carrier, appellant, National Union Fire Insurance Company, provided Castle with a laptop computer in October 1997. (In the remainder of this opinion, we will refer to the insurer and the employer jointly as the employer.) Following that acquisition, Castle completed ten hours of college course work.

Eventually Castle's computer ceased to work and could not be repaired, prompting him to file an application for alternate medical care pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.27, on August 30, 2000. Castle requested the employer be required to provide him with a laptop computer, including adaptations that would facilitate his use of it in his wheelchair and the prone cart.

At the hearing on Castle's application, his attorney asserted Castle needed a computer to assist him "in his educational pursuits, rehabilitation pursuits, and the computer ... would serve ... to replace function that he has lost ... due to his injuries." Castle called two employees of Opportunities Unlimited who supported his claim: a computer teacher who was certified by Microsoft, and a licensed occupational therapist. The employer argued in response that a computer did not qualify as medical care under section 85.27 and therefore the employer had no obligation to provide Castle with one.

The deputy industrial commissioner, who had been delegated the authority to issue a final agency decision on Castle's request, concluded the computer and adaptive devices were appropriate expenses under section 85.27. Relying on the common meaning of the statutory terms as well as an administrative rule defining "appliance," see Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—8.5, the deputy stated that "[t]he computer is, in this case[,] an appliance because of the rehabilitative and therapeutic use it provides in an occupational therapy setting to increase [Castle's] vocational and personal independence, which were lost as a result of his injuries."

As previously noted, this ruling was affirmed by the district court on judicial review, but was reversed by the court of appeals. We granted Castle's application for further review.

III. Scope of Review.

Our review of the agency decision is for correction of errors of law, Noble v. Lamoni Prods., 512 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Iowa 1994), and is governed by Iowa's Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A, see Iowa Code § 86.26.² In addition to the standards of review set out in section 17A.19(10), our review is guided by three other principles of law. First, administrative rules have "the force and effect of law as long as they are `reasonable and consistent with legislative enactments.'" Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 641 N.W.2d 823, 835 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). In addition, we must "give appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Iowa Code § 17A.11(1)(c ). Finally, we interpret the worker's compensation statute liberally, keeping in mind that the law was enacted "for the benefit of the working person." Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1993); accord IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001).

Although the employer relies on several legal grounds for reversal, see Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(b), (f), (l)-(n), these grounds all rest on the basic argument that the deputy was wrong in concluding that an employer could be obligated to provide its injured employee with a computer under section 85.27. Therefore, we will address the employer's specific contentions within our discussion of this larger issue. We first consider a preliminary contention of the employer that the agency failed to notify the parties that it would take official notice of certain "facts" in making its decision as required by Iowa Code section 17A.14(4).

IV. Official Notice Under Section 17A.14(4).

The employer argues that the deputy industrial commissioner improperly used a medical dictionary as a resource to determine the meaning of terms used in section 85.27 and the implementing administrative rule. The employer claims the deputy was required to give the parties advance notice of his intent to consult this source pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.14(4). This statute states in pertinent part:

Official notice may be taken of all facts of which judicial notice may be taken and of other facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency. Parties shall be notified at the earliest practicable time, either before or during the hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports, preliminary decisions or otherwise, of the facts proposed to be noticed and their source, ... and the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to contest such facts before the decision is announced unless the agency determines as part of the record or decision that fairness to the parties does not require an opportunity to contest such facts.

Iowa Code § 17A.14(4) (emphasis added).

The employer's attempt to apply this statute to the use of a dictionary, medical or otherwise, as a guide to interpretation of legislative enactments is misguided. A dictionary is simply one source of meaning upon which agencies and courts routinely and properly rely in interpreting statutory terms. E.g., Harker, 633 N.W.2d at 326 (citing general dictionary to define term used in worker's compensation statute); Ciha, 552 N.W.2d at 155 (using legal dictionary to interpret industrial commissioner's rule defining "appliance"). See generally State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1999) (st...