Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-1143,92-1143
• Citation: 502 N.W.2d 12
• Parties: James D. MORTIMER, Appellee, v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION and CNA Insurance Companies, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 12

502 N.W.2d 12

James D. MORTIMER, Appellee, v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION and CNA Insurance Companies, Appellants.

No. 92-1143.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 16, 1993.

Elliott R. McDonald, Jr., and Patricia Rhodes Cepican of McDonald, Stonebraker & Cepican, P.C., Davenport, for appellants.

Paul J. McAndrew, Jr., of Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes, Iowa City, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, SCHULTZ, and LAVORATO, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

Is a psychological condition caused or aggravated by a scheduled injury compensable as an unscheduled injury? The Iowa industrial commissioner thought not and denied benefits. On judicial review, the district court disagreed and reversed the commissioner's decision. We agree with the district court and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

James D. Mortimer was employed by Fruehauf Corporation. He was injured during the course of his employment when a cable snapped, causing an I-beam to strike his left foot. In the accident Mortimer sustained a crush injury resulting in the amputation of the first four toes of his left foot.

In proceedings before the Iowa industrial commissioner, Mortimer received workers' compensation benefits. These benefits were for a scheduled member injury under what is now Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(o) (1993).

Later, Mortimer filed a petition for review-reopening. Following a hearing a deputy commissioner concluded that Mortimer had a permanent partial impairment of twenty-seven percent to his left lower extremity (left foot and leg). The deputy also concluded that the injury aggravated a "preexisting depressive condition more than slightly, but the depression is a temporary aggravation under the status of the present record."

Mortimer filed a second review-reopening petition seeking additional benefits for a change in condition. See Iowa Code § 86.14. In the petition Mortimer alleged that the accident and injury had caused him "serious and continued depression" rendering him unable to work.

In his decision on this last review-reopening petition, a deputy commissioner found that

[s]ince the [first review-reopening decision], claimant has undergone a change in condition in that his psychological problems causally related to the work injury have become permanent. However, claimant's condition as to his injured foot has not been shown to have changed.

The deputy then concluded that (1) Mortimer's psychological condition was exacerbated by the scheduled member injury, (2) this exacerbation is contemplated by the schedule and therefore is not compensable industrially, and (3) because Mortimer failed to show a change in the condition of his scheduled member injury, he was not entitled to additional permanent partial disability benefits. The deputy limited Mortimer's award to temporary total disability benefits for the time he could not work because of the scheduled injury.

Mortimer appealed the deputy's decision to the Iowa industrial commissioner who affirmed the deputy's decision.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Mortimer petitioned the district court for judicial review. The court reversed the commissioner's decision and remanded the case for a determination of Mortimer's industrial disability because of his psychological condition.

It is from this ruling that Fruehauf and its insurer, CNA Insurance Companies, appeal to us.

II. Scope of Review.

Decisions of the industrial commissioner are reviewed by the district court pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 17A. See Iowa Code § 86.26. The district court's scope of review under section 17A.19 and our review on appeal under section 17A.20 is at law and not de novo. In our review we apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency's actions to determine whether our legal conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1987). If our conclusions are the same, we affirm; otherwise, we reverse. Id. Because the question presented concerns an interpretation of Iowa's workers' compensation act, the question is one of law.

The general principles that guide our interpretation of the workers' compensation act are stated in Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige, 329 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1983) (citations omitted):

Our ultimate goal is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. We look to the object to be accomplished, the mischief to be remedied, or the purpose to be served, and place on the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect, rather than defeat, the legislature's purpose. We avoid strained, impractical or absurd results in favor of a sensible, logical construction. We consider all parts of the statute together, without attributing undue importance to any single or isolated portion. The spirit of the statute must be considered along with its words, and the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words used. Although final interpretation and construction of the statute is for this court, we give deference to an interpretation by the responsible administrative agency. Our policy is to liberally construe workers' compensation statutes in favor of the worker.

III. Compensability of Psychological Condition Resulting from Scheduled Injury.

Mortimer concedes that he had a preexisting psychological condition. But Mortimer contends his condition was greatly aggravated by his foot injury. So he believes that his psychological condition should be compensated as an industrial disability.

Fruehauf and CNA vigorously contend that Mortimer is limited to benefits under the schedule. Because he has been paid all that he is entitled to under the schedule, Fruehauf and CNA insist that Mortimer is entitled to nothing more.

A. Compensability under Iowa's workers' compensation act. Before proceeding to the question at hand, we think it would be helpful to review the compensation scheme under Iowa Code chapter 85, Iowa's workers' compensation act. As a creature of statute, our workers' compensation law--subject to constitutional limitations--may provide such provisions and limitations as the legislature deems necessary. But, as we noted earlier, this law is for the benefit of the working person and should be, within reason, liberally construed.

Functional disability is arrived at by determining the impairment of the employee's body function. This disability is limited to the loss of the physiological capacity of the body or body part. Simbro v. Delong's Sportswear, 332 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Iowa 1983).

In contrast, industrial disability is arrived at by determining the loss to the employee's earning capacity of the body or body part. In this determination impairment of the body function--that is, functional disability--is just one factor. Other factors include the employee's age, education, qualifications, experience, and the inability of the employee to engage in employment for which the employee is fitted. All of these factors are used to measure the extent to which the injury impairs the employee's ability to earn wages. Id.

Chapter 85 divides permanent partial disability into either a scheduled or unscheduled loss. See Iowa Code § 85.34(2). Paragraphs (a) through (t) of section 85.34(2) are reserved for scheduled injuries, like a loss of a foot. Specific weekly benefits are listed. For example, paragraph (n) provides for weekly compensation during one hundred fifty weeks for loss of a foot. Unscheduled injuries are covered in paragraph (u). Benefits for these are based on the injury to the body as a whole. See Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(u) ("compensation shall be paid during the number of weeks in relation to five hundred weeks as the disability bears to the body of the injured employee as a whole").

We have approved the use of functional and industrial methods of determination within appropriate classifications of section 85.34(2). For example, a specific scheduled disability is determined by the functional method; an unscheduled disability is determined by the industrial method. Simbro, 332 N.W.2d at 887; see also Graves v. Eagle Iron Works, 331 N.W.2d 116, 117-19 (Iowa 1983) (held that an employee with a permanent partial disability to a leg had a scheduled disability that required the determination of functional impairment of his leg without regard to the industrial disability factors). So a person may suffer a permanent total disability as a result of some scheduled injury. This may happen because of age, lack of training, or other condition peculiar to the person. Yet such an injury is arbitrarily compensable according to the schedule.

An unscheduled injury can result in permanent total disability. In these circumstances, the "weekly compensation is payable during the period of the employee's disability." See Iowa Code § 85.34(3).

From this discussion it is easy to see that the maximum amount of compensation payable in this case differs radically depending upon which party is correct. The stakes are indeed high. If Mortimer is correct, the psychological condition would be considered an unscheduled injury. The commissioner would be obliged to use the industrial method to determine any disability and the corresponding period of compensation. Although we offer no view on what that disability might be, the commissioner could conceivably find that Mortimer has suffered a permanent total disability. In that event weekly compensation would be payable for as long as Mortimer is disabled.

In contrast, if the employer and insurer are correct, Mortimer's scheduled injury includes the psychological condition for which he has already been paid. In fact, the commissioner has determined that Mortimer owes the employer about twenty-nine weeks of permanent partial disability benefits that were paid in excess of what was required by law.

B. The merits. That brings us to the question in this case: Under chapter 85, are...