Stone v. City of Wilton

• Citation: 331 N.W.2d 398
• Decision Date: 16 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 67243,67243
• Parties: Alex STONE and Martha Stone, Appellants, v. CITY OF WILTON, Iowa; Wilbert H. Stoelk, Mayor; and Christian L. Graber, Jerry L. Smith, Robert Gust, Max L. Lauser, and Richard L. Garrison, City Councilmen, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 398

331 N.W.2d 398

Alex STONE and Martha Stone, Appellants, v. CITY OF WILTON, Iowa; Wilbert H. Stoelk, Mayor; and Christian L. Graber, Jerry L. Smith, Robert Gust, Max L. Lauser, and Richard L. Garrison, City Councilmen, Appellees.

No. 67243.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 16, 1983.

Edward N. Wehr of Wehr & DeLange, Davenport, and John C. Fishburn of Fishburn & Fishburn, Muscatine, for appellants.

Rand S. Wonio of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, and Mark R. Gillett, Wilton, for appellees.

Considered by LeGRAND, P.J., ^* and HARRIS, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN and CARTER, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Justice.

Plaintiffs Alex and Martha Stone appeal from the dismissal of their petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages in an action regarding defendant City of Wilton's rezoning from multi-family to single-family residential of certain real estate owned by plaintiffs. The issues raised by plaintiffs focus on the validity of the rezoning ordinance and the trial court's striking of plaintiffs' claim for lost profits. We find no error in trial court's rulings and affirm its decision.

This appeal is a zoning dispute involving approximately six acres of land in the city of Wilton, Iowa. Plaintiffs purchased the undeveloped land in June 1979 with the intent of developing a low income, federally subsidized housing project. The project was to consist of several multi-family units; therefore, feasibility of the project depended upon multi-family zoning of the tract. At the time of purchase approximately one-fourth of plaintiffs' land was zoned R-1, single-family residential, and the remainder was zoned R-2, multi-family residential.

After the land was purchased, plaintiffs incurred expenses for architectural fees and engineering services in the preparation of plans and plats to be submitted to the city council and its planning and zoning commission. In addition, plaintiffs secured a Farmers' Home Administration (FHA) loan commitment for construction of the project.

This suit is based primarily on actions of city officials between December 1979 and June 1980. We will discuss only the most pertinent events now and will relate other facts later when we consider the issues raised by plaintiffs.

In December 1979 plaintiffs filed a preliminary plat for the project with the city clerk. In March 1980, following a public meeting, the planning and zoning commission recommended to the city council that land in the northern part of the city be rezoned to single-family residential due to alleged inadequacies of sewer, water and electrical services. The rezoning recommendation affected all of plaintiffs' property plus tracts owned by two other developers. Plaintiffs' application on May 21, 1980, for a building permit to construct multi-family dwellings was denied due to the pending rezoning recommendation.

In May 1980, plaintiffs filed a petition against the city seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating any rezoning of their property, temporary and permanent injunctions to prohibit passage of any rezoning ordinance, and in the event of rezoning, $570,000 damages for monies expended on the project, anticipated lost profits and alleged reduction in the value of plaintiffs' land. The temporary injunction was denied.

In accordance with the recommendation of the planning and zoning commission, the city council passed an ordinance rezoning the land from R-2 to R-1 in June 1980. Following the council's rezoning decision, the planning and zoning commission approved plaintiffs' preliminary plat.

This action proceeded to trial in November 1980.

I. Scope of Review. Normally, zoning disputes reach us on appeal from a trial court's judgment on a writ of certiorari to the appropriate board of adjustment or the board making the zoning decision. In such cases our review is the same as from judgment following a special verdict by a jury. Grandview Baptist Church v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Davenport, 301 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1981). The uniqueness of the procedural background of this case, however, necessitates a different standard of review.

This case was comprised of three distinct elements: a petition for a declaratory judgment as to validity of the zoning ordinance, a request for temporary and permanent injunctions, and a request for money damages--an action ostensibly combining law and equity. The fact that a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were sought is not dispositive of whether this action is at law or in equity. Green v. Advance Homes, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Iowa 1980) (nature of action seeking injunctive relief determined in light of relief sought and nature of error claimed on appeal); Freese Leasing, Inc. v. Union Trust and Savings Bank, 253 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa 1977) (nature of action for declaratory judgment determined by examination of the pleadings, the relief sought and the nature of the case).

The present case was denominated and tried as a matter in equity throughout the proceedings and the trial court's ruling resembles a ruling in equity. The main thrust of plaintiffs' case, both in the trial court and on appeal, is that the rezoning of their land is constitutionally and statutorily invalid. Monetary damages were sought as an alternative to injunctive relief, but on appeal the only issue concerning damages is whether the trial court erred in striking plaintiffs' claims for lost profits. In light of these facts we conclude that this case is best treated as one in equity. Our review, therefore, is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4.

II. Validity of the rezoning ordinance. Plaintiffs raise several constitutional and statutory challenges to the validity of the rezoning ordinance. We have reviewed all of plaintiffs' contentions, but for the sake of clarity our discussion departs substantially from the manner in which the issues were briefed by the parties.

Land use restrictions (such as at issue here) reasonably related to the promotion of the health, safety, morals, or general welfare repeatedly have been upheld even though the challenged regulations destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests or flatly prohibited the most beneficial use of the property. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 113 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 649, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 198 (1978). Hence, such laws, when justifiable under the police power, validly enacted and not arbitrary or unreasonable, generally are held not to be invalid as taking of property for public use without compensation. However, some instances of government regulation are "so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation." Goldblatt v. Town of Hemptstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130, 133 (1962); see e.g. Kasparek v. Johnson County Board of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1980) (new regulations relating to private sewage disposal system permits constituted a taking because property owners would be deprived of any reasonable use of their land, not merely the most beneficial use).

A. We focus initially on the general claims which plaintiffs make concerning the validity of the rezoning. Controlling our review of the enactment's validity is the principle that the validity of a police power enactment, such as zoning, depends on its reasonableness; however, "[the Supreme Court] has often said that 'debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature....' " Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595, 82 S.Ct. at 990, 8 L.Ed.2d at 134.

The zoning ordinance at issue was passed as a general welfare measure. It affected not only Stones' proposed housing project, but also land owned by Land, Ltd. and Wilton Sunset Housing Corporation, which intended to erect multi-family housing for the elderly. The city council's stated reasons for rezoning this section of the city from R-2 to R-1 were as follows: (1) The existing zoning was no longer appropriate to the current and anticipated growth and development of the area; (2) the existing zoning would create a greater density than now appropriate; (3) the existing zoning would create a traffic and pedestrian flow too great for the existing street and sidewalk systems in the area; and (4) the city's electrical, water and sewer systems were inadequate for a concentration of multi-family dwellings in that area of town.

Plaintiffs, however, claim the above were mere pretext. They contend that the council disregarded its comprehensive plan. They further argue that the council was prompted by a desire to advance the private economic interests of a member of the planning and zoning commission and by racial discrimination against the "type" of persons who might live in plaintiffs' housing project. The trial court disagreed and so do we. "If the [city council] gave full consideration to the problem presented, including the needs of the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land in the same area, then it has zoned in accordance with a comprehensive plan." Montgomery v. Bremer County Board of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Iowa 1980). On the record in this case, we cannot conclude that the council's stated reasons, which are recognized as valid reasons for zoning, Iowa Code §§ 414.2, .3 (1981), were mere pretext.

The apartment-owner member of the planning and zoning commission, whose interests, plaintiffs claim, were a basis for the rezoning, did not participate in the commission's resolution recommending rezoning. Thus the ordinance passed by the city council cannot be declared invalid due to an alleged conflict of interest. See Iowa Code § 362.6 (1981) ("A measure voted upon is not invalid by reason of conflict of interest in an officer of the city, unless the vote of the officer was decisive to passage of the measure.").

Plaintiffs...