Stone v. Farley
| Citation | 877 F. Supp. 1246 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 3:93cv0778 AS. |
| Parties | Lourenzy STONE aka Lorenzo L. Stone-Bey, Petitioner, v. Robert FARLEY, and Indiana Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
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John Pinnow, Greenwood, IN, for petitioner.
Laurel Twinney, Thomas D. Quigley, Indianapolis, IN, for respondents.
The above-named Petitioner was convicted in the Lake Superior Court, Criminal Division, Crown Point, Indiana, of first degree premeditated murder and first degree murder in the commission of a robbery. Judge James Clement of that court imposed a life sentence. A direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Indiana, and that court, unanimously, speaking through Justice DeBruler, affirmed the aforesaid convictions as indicated in the reported decision of Stone v. State, 268 Ind. 672, 377 N.E.2d 1372 (1978).
The petitioner then returned to Lake Superior Court in 1986, and sought post-conviction relief. While that petition was pending, he also petitioned this court for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This court dismissed without prejudice his petition for relief under § 2254, as indicated in Stone-Bey v. Duckworth, No. S87-560 (N.D.Ind. November 6, 1987). Not satisfied with this court's decision, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which dismissed the appeal without prejudice in Stone-Bey v. Duckworth, No. 87-2891 (7th Cir. April 4, 1988). The state post-conviction court conducted a hearing in February, 1989, and issued appropriate findings and decision on June 20, 1989. That decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana, and that court, speaking through Justice Givan, affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief as reported in Stone v. State, 587 N.E.2d 672 (Ind.1992). This time, Justice Dickson dissented without opinion and Justice Krahulik concurred in result without separate opinion.
On November 8, 1993, pro se petitioner, Lourenzy Stone, aka Lorenzo L. Stone-Bey, (hereinafter "Petitioner") an inmate at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana, filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner subsequently obtained the services of counsel and at this stage is currently being represented by John Pinnow. The return filed by the respondents on August 8, 1994, demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1982). Petitioner's counsel filed a Traverse on August 22, 1994. The state court record has been filed and examined pursuant to the mandates of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963).
This petitioner raises a plethora of claims here (thirteen). Many of them were not presented in the first instance to any court in the State of Indiana. It is necessary for a petitioner under § 2254 to present claims in the first instance to the state court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). The claims may be grouped as follows:
Of this fairly long list of claims, several were not in any significant or relevant way-presented in the first instance to any court in Indiana. In Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009, 109 S.Ct. 1648, 104 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989), the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Kanne, explained the initial considerations necessary to the evaluation of habeas petitions:
Resnover v. Clark, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2935, 124 L.Ed.2d 685 (1993) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). See also Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 901 (7th Cir.1982).
Because petitioner failed to present many of his above claims to the state court, and because he has failed to prove cause and prejudice for those defaults, only the following issues are before this court:
Affirming the trial court on Petitioner's direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court found the facts as follows:
The evidentiary facts are simple and indicate that on the night of February 25, 1976, appellant, together with four other men, James, Barber, Rogers and Williams went to Mona's Lounge in Gary, Indiana at 10:00 p.m. At least two of he group were armed with handguns. Four of the men went in and one of them announced that it was a stickup and ordered the customers present to get on the floor. A customer David Clay was armed and drew his weapon in self-defense. A fire fight ensued during which Clay was shot and killed and one of the gunmen wounded. The men then fled. The five men were jointly indicted. James entered a plea agreement and became a witness for the State. Appellant, together with Barber, Rogers and Williams were tried jointly and convicted. At their trial appellant's confession and the confession of Williams were admitted in redacted form. The record of the James' guilty plea proceeding was admitted in evidence when he refused on the stand at the trial to give evidence against appellant and the others being tried.
Certainly, this court has a right under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to presume the factual findings of the highest court of Indiana as presumptively correct. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), stated:
A judgment by a state appellate court rejecting a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency is of course entitled to deference by the federal courts, as is any judgment affirming a criminal conviction. But Congress in § 2254 has selected the federal district courts as precisely the forums that are responsible for determining whether state convictions have been secured in accord with federal constitutional law. The federal habeas corpus statute presumes the norm of a fair trial in the state court and adequate state postconviction remedies to redress possible error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (d). What it does not presume is that these state proceedings will always be without error in the constitutional sense. The duty of a federal habeas corpus court to appraise a claim that constitutional error did occur — reflecting as it does the belief that the "finality" of a deprivation of liberty through the invocation of the criminal sanction is simply not to be achieved at the expense of a constitutional right — is not one that can be so lightly abjured.
Id. at 323, 99 S.Ct. at 2791. The Supreme Court in Jackson held:
We hold that in a challenge to a conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 — if the settled procedural prerequisites for such a claim have otherwise been satisfied — the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); Dooley v. Duckworth, 832 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 967, 108 S.Ct. 1239, 99 L.Ed.2d 438 (1988); United States ex rel. Haywood v. O'Leary, 827 F.2d 52 (7th Cir.1987); Bryan v. Warden, Indiana State Reformatory, 820 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867, 108 S.Ct. 190, 98 L.Ed.2d 142 (1987); Shepard v. Lane, 818 F.2d 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 296, 98 L.Ed.2d 256 (1987); and Perri v. Director, Department of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843, 108 S.Ct. 135, 98 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).
Following Jackson, supra, there is an increasingly long line of cases in this circuit that suggest that the facts found by the highest court of a state are presumed correct. See e.g., Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1...
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