Stone v. Life Time Fitness, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 December 2016
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 15CA0598
• Citation: 411 P.3d 225
• Parties: Wendy Jane STONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LIFE TIME FITNESS, INC., a Minnesota corporation doing business in the State of Colorado, d/b/a Life Time Fitness; Life Time Fitness Foundation ; and LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

411 P.3d 225

Wendy Jane STONE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.LIFE TIME FITNESS, INC., a Minnesota corporation doing business in the State of Colorado, d/b/a Life Time Fitness; Life Time Fitness Foundation ; and LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Court of Appeals No. 15CA0598

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Announced December 29, 2016

As Modified January 12, 2017

Charles Welton P.C., Charles Welton, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Markusson Green & Jarvis, John T. Mauro, H. Keith Jarvis, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

Opinion by JUDGE MILLER

¶ 1 In this action seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained at a fitness club, plaintiff, Wendy Jane Stone, appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, Life Time Fitness, Inc.; Life Time Fitness Foundation; and LTF Club Operations Company, Inc. (collectively, Life Time), on Stone's negligence and Premises Liability Act (PLA) claims based on injuries sustained when she tripped on a hair dryer cord after washing her hands. The principal issue presented on appeal is whether the district court correctly ruled that Stone's claims are contractually barred based on assumption of risk and liability release language contained in a member usage agreement (Agreement) she signed when she became a member of Life Time.

¶ 2 We disagree with the district court's conclusion that the exculpatory provisions of the Agreement are valid as applied to Stone's PLA claim. Consequently, we reverse the judgment as to that claim and remand the case for further proceedings. We affirm the district court's judgment on the negligence claim.

I. Background

¶ 3 Stone was a member of a Life Time fitness club located in Centennial. According to the complaint, she sustained injuries in the women's locker room after finishing a workout. Stone alleged that she had washed her hands at a locker room sink and then "turned to leave when she tripped on the blow dryer cord that was, unbeknownst to her, hanging to the floor beneath the sink and vanity counter top." She caught her foot in the cord and fell to the ground, fracturing her right ankle.

¶ 4 Stone alleged that allowing the blow dryer cord to hang below the sink counter constituted a trip hazard and a dangerous condition and that, by allowing the condition to exist, Life Time failed to exercise reasonable care. She asserted a general negligence claim and also a claim under Colorado's PLA, section 13–21–115, C.R.S. 2016.

¶ 5 Life Time moved for summary judgment, relying on assumption of risk and liability release language contained in the Agreement Stone signed when she joined Life Time. Life Time argued that the Agreement was valid and enforceable, that it expressly covered the type and circumstances of her injuries, and that it barred Stone's claims as a matter of law. A copy of the Agreement appears in the Appendix to this opinion.

¶ 6 After full briefing, the district court granted Life Time's motion, concluding that the Agreement was "valid and enforceable" and that Stone had released Life Time from all the claims asserted in the complaint.

II. Discussion

¶ 7 Stone contends that the Agreement's exculpatory language does not validly apply to her claims. She contends that the district court, therefore, erred in entering summary judgment and dismissing her action.

A. Summary Judgment Standards

¶ 8 Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gagne v. Gagne , 2014 COA 127, ¶ 24, 338 P.3d 1152 ; see C.R.C.P. 56(c). We review de novo an order granting a motion for summary judgment. Gagne , ¶ 24 ; see Ranch O, LLC v. Colo. Cattlemen's Agric. Land Tr. , 2015 COA 20, ¶ 12, 361 P.3d 1063.

B. Negligence Claim

¶ 9 In her complaint, Stone alleged common law negligence and PLA claims, and she pursues both claims on appeal. The trial court's summary judgment ruled in favor of Life Time without distinguishing between Stone's negligence and PLA claims. It simply concluded that the exculpatory clauses in the Agreement were "valid and enforceable" and released Life Time from all claims asserted against it.

¶ 10 We turn to the negligence claim first because we may affirm a correct judgment for reasons different from those relied on by the trial court. English v. Griffith , 99 P.3d 90, 92 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 11 The parties agree that the PLA applies to this case. In section 13–21–115(2), the statute provides:

In any civil action brought against a landowner by a person who alleges injury occurring while on the real property of another and by reason of the condition of such property, or activities conducted or circumstances existing on such property, the landowner shall be liable only as provided in subsection (3) of this section.

The PLA thus provides the sole remedy against landowners¹ for injuries on their property. Vigil v. Franklin , 103 P.3d 322, 328–29 (Colo. 2004) ; Wycoff v. Grace Cmty. Church of Assemblies of God , 251 P.3d 1260, 1265 (Colo. App. 2010). Similarly, it is well established that the PLA abrogates common law negligence claims against landowners. Legro v. Robinson , 2012 COA 182, ¶ 20, 328 P.3d 238, aff'd , 2014 CO 40, 325 P.3d 1053.

¶ 12 Accordingly, albeit for reasons different from those expressed by the trial court, we conclude that Stone could not bring a claim for common law negligence, and the trial court therefore correctly ruled against her on that claim. We now turn to the effect of the exculpatory clauses in the Agreement on Stone's PLA claim.

C. Application of Exculpatory Clauses to PLA Claim

¶ 13 As we understand Stone's contentions, she does not dispute that the exculpatory language in the Agreement would preclude her from asserting claims under the PLA for any injuries she might sustain when working out on a treadmill, stationary bicycle, or other exercise equipment or playing racquetball. We therefore do not address such claims. Instead, Stone argues that the exculpatory clauses do not clearly and unambiguously apply to her injuries incurred after washing her hands in the women's locker room. We agree.

1. Law

¶ 14 "Generally, exculpatory agreements have long been disfavored." B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl , 960 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1998). Determining the sufficiency and validity of an exculpatory agreement is a question of law for the court. Id. ; Jones v. Dressel , 623 P.2d 370, 375 (Colo. 1981). This analysis requires close scrutiny of the agreement to ensure that the intent of the parties is expressed in clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal language.

Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc. , 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. 2004). Our supreme court has explained:

To determine whether the intent of the parties is clearly and unambiguously expressed, we have previously examined the actual language of the agreement for legal jargon, length and complication, and any likelihood of confusion or failure of a party to recognize the full extent of the release provisions.

Id.

¶ 15 Under Jones , a court must consider four factors in determining whether an exculpatory agreement is valid: (1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties was expressed in clear and unambiguous language. 623 P.2d at 375.

2. Analysis

a. The First Three Jones Factors

¶ 16 The first three Jones factors provide little help for Stone's position. The supreme court has specified that no public duty is implicated if a business provides recreational services. See Chadwick , 100 P.3d at 467 (addressing guided hunting services and noting that providers of recreational activities owe "no special duty to the public"); Jones , 623 P.2d at 376–78 (skydiving services); see also Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, Inc. , 262 P.3d 945, 949 (Colo. App. 2011) (addressing recreational camping services and noting supreme court authority).

¶ 17 With regard to the second factor, the nature of the services provided, courts have consistently deemed recreational services to be neither essential nor a matter of practical necessity. See Chadwick , 100 P.3d at 467 ; Hamill , 262 P.3d at 949 ; see also Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc. , 941 F.Supp. 959, 962 (D. Colo. 1996) (snowmobiling not a matter of practical necessity), aff'd , 127 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1997) ; Lahey v. Covington , 964 F.Supp. 1440, 1445 (D. Colo. 1996) (whitewater rafting not an essential service), aff'd sub nom. Lahey v. Twin Lakes Expeditions, Inc. , 113 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997). Stone attempts to distinguish those cases by asserting that people join fitness centers "to promote their health, not for the thrill of a dangerous recreational activity." She cites no authority for such a distinction, and we are not persuaded that such activities as camping and horseback riding, at issue in the cases cited above, are engaged in for a dangerous thrill as opposed to the healthful benefits of outdoor exercise. Consequently, the recreational nature of the services Life Time provides does not weigh against upholding or enforcing the Agreement.

¶ 18 With respect to the third factor, a contract is fairly entered into if one party is not at such an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect of the contract is to place that party at the mercy of the other party's negligence. See Hamill , 262 P.3d at 949 ; see also Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin , 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989). Possible examples of unfair disparity in bargaining power include agreements between employers and employees and between common carriers or public utilities and members of the public. See Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. , 784 P.2d at 784. However, this type of unfair disparity is generally not implicated when a person contracts with a business providing recreational services. See id. ; see also Hamill , 262 P.3d at 949–50.

¶ 19 In evaluating...