Stone v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 07 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2014-001488,Opinion No. 5459 |
| Citation | 795 S.E.2d 49,418 S.C. 599 |
| Parties | A. Marion Stone, III, Respondent, v. Susan B. Thompson, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Donald Bruce Clark, of Donald B. Clark, LLC, and Margaret D. Fabri, both of Charleston, for Appellant.
Alexander Blair Cash and Daniel F. Blanchard, III, both of Rosen, Rosen & Hagood, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.
Susan B. Thompson appeals the family court's order finding the existence of a common law marriage between her and A. Marion Stone, III. We dismiss.
Stone filed a complaint in the family court alleging the existence of a common law marriage with Thompson. In the complaint, Stone sought a divorce, equitable apportionment of the putative marital estate, attorney's fees and costs, and other relief. Thompson answered and filed a motion to bifurcate the case to first determine whether a common law marriage existed before deciding issues of divorce and equitable division. The family court subsequently granted Thompson's motion, and over the course of eight days, the court conducted a trial regarding the existence of a common law marriage.
At the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, the family court issued an order finding a common law marriage and awarding Stone attorney's fees. The family court also ordered each party to immediately schedule the final hearing on the remaining issues with the county clerk of court. Thereafter, Thompson appealed the family court's order.1
Thompson argues the family court's order on the issue of common law marriage is immediately appealable because the order is a final judgment, involves the merits, and affects a substantial right determining the mode of trial.2 We address each argument in turn.
Thompson first contends the family court's order is a final judgment pursuant to section 14–3–330(1) of the South Carolina Code (1976). We disagree.
Generally, only final judgments are appealable. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63–3–630(A) (2010) ( ); § 14–3–330(1) (); Rule 72, SCRCP ("Appeal may be taken, as provided by law, from any final judgment or appealable order."); Rule 201(a), SCACR ().
In the instant case, we find the family court's order is interlocutory. While the family court ruled that a common law marriage existed between Thompson and Stone, it has yet to decide the issues of divorce and equitable distribution. See Mid – State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Imps., Inc. , 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1993) (). Further, we do not believe the family court intended its decision on the common law marriage issue to be dispositive of the case as the family court included a handwritten notation on its Form 4F order stating that divorce and equitable distribution were "still pending." Additionally, the family court explicitly indicated on the Form 4F order that its order, although marked "Final," did not end the case. Thus, we find the order is not a final judgment.
In the alternative, Thompson argues the family court's order is an immediately appealable interlocutory order under section 14–3–330 of the South Carolina Code (1976 & Supp. 2015). We disagree.
Absent a specialized statute, an interlocutory order must fall within one of several exceptions to the final judgment rule found in section 14–3–330 to be immediately appealable. Hagood v. Sommerville , 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2005). Section 14–3–330 states, in pertinent part, the following:
S.C. Code Ann. § 14–3–330(1), (2) (1976).
In keeping with precedent, we narrowly construe section 14–3–330 because immediate appeals of various orders generally have not been allowed. Hagood , 362 S.C. at 196, 607 S.E.2d at 709. Indeed, our supreme court has cautioned that "[p]iecemeal appeals should be avoided and most errors can be corrected by the remedy of a new trial." Id.
Thompson first argues the family court's order is an intermediate order "involving the merits" of the case under subsection 14-3-330(1) because it finally decided the issue of common law marriage between the parties. We disagree.
Our supreme court has narrowly defined an order "involving the merits" as an order that "must finally determine some substantial matter forming the whole or a part of some cause of action or defense." Mid – State Distribs., Inc. , 310 S.C. at 334, 426 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting Jefferson v. Gene's Used Cars, Inc. , 295 S.C. 317, 318, 368 S.E.2d 456, 456 (1988) ). In this case, the issue of common law marriage was a preliminary matter for the family court to determine before reaching Stone's requests for divorce and division of the marital estate. The family court merely exercised its discretion to bifurcate the trial to save time and resources on the remaining issues if it found that a common law marriage did not exist.3 However, the family court was not required to proceed in this fashion and could have resolved all the issues raised in Stone's complaint. At this point, the family court has yet to address any of Stone's remaining claims for relief.
Nonetheless, Thompson claims her "defense" to Stone's divorce action—that a common law marriage does not exist—has been finally determined by the family court. We find, however, that inherent in any divorce proceeding is an initial determination of the existence of a valid marriage, which a party certainly could not appeal prior to the adjudication of the other relevant issues before the court. To accept Thompson's interpretation would seriously inhibit the efficiency of the family court by allowing any party to delay divorce proceedings with an interlocutory appeal by contending a valid marriage does not exist. As our supreme court aptly stated, "[E]ndless delays would be encountered—delays which are unnecessary in cases similar to the one now before us, which can be decided upon an appeal from such final judgment as may later be entered by the trial [c]ourt." Good v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. , 201 S.C. 32, 42, 21 S.E.2d 209, 213 (1942). Therefore, because the order in this case does not bring the litigants to "the end of the road" and requires further action by the family court, we find the order is not immediately appealable under subsection 14-3-330(1). See Mid-State Distribs., Inc. , 310 S.C. at 334–35, 426 S.E.2d at 780.
Finally, Thompson contends the family court's order is immediately appealable under subsection 14-3-330(2) because it affects her fundamental right to marriage and determines the mode of trial. We disagree.
"Immediate appeals under subsection (2) have been allowed in situations whe[n] the substantial right could not be vindicated on appeal after the case." Breland v. Love Chevrolet Olds, Inc. , 339 S.C. 89, 93, 529 S.E.2d 11, 13 (2000). "Generally [subsection (2) ] has only been used when the trial order affected the ‘mode of trial’ because if those orders are not immediately appealed, no appellate review is available to correct any error." Id. When a trial court's order deprives a party of a mode of trial to which it is entitled as a matter of right, the order is immediately appealable. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines , 341 S.C. 68, 72, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2000).
We first find Thompson conflates the idea of a fundamental constitutional right to marry, or not to be married, with a substantial right in a legal proceeding. In any event, the order does not affect a substantial right because Thompson will not be prevented from correcting any alleged errors in the family court's interlocutory order following final judgment on the remaining issues. See Breland , 339 S.C. at 93, 529 S.E.2d at 13 ; § 14–3–330(1) ().
Nevertheless, Thompson also points out that Stone currently has similar claims against her in the circuit court that were stayed pending the outcome of the family court proceedings. Thompson claims the interlocutory order deprives her of a particular mode of trial because the family court would be divested of subject...
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Stone v. Thompson
...appeals, which determined the family court's order was not final and appealable because it did not end the case. Stone v. Thompson , 418 S.C. 599, 795 S.E.2d 49 (Ct. App. 2016). Thompson petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. We issued an opinion on April 3, 2019, fi......
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Stone v. Thompson
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