Mid-State Distributors, Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., MID-STATE

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: TOAL; HARWELL
• Citation: 310 S.C. 330,426 S.E.2d 777
• Parties: DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Respondent, v. CENTURY IMPORTERS, INC., Carlton and United Breweries Ltd., Molson Breweries U.S. Holdings, Inc., Fosters Brewing Group Limited, f/k/a Elders IXL, and Capital Wine and Beverage Distributing Co. of Columbia, Inc., of whom Carlton and United Breweries Ltd. is, Appellant. Appeal of CARLTON AND UNITED BREWERIES LTD. . Heard
• Decision Date: 05 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 23792,MID-STATE

Page 777

426 S.E.2d 777 310 S.C. 330 MID-STATE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Respondent,
v.
CENTURY IMPORTERS, INC., Carlton and United Breweries Ltd.,
Molson Breweries U.S. Holdings, Inc., Fosters Brewing Group
Limited, f/k/a Elders IXL, and Capital Wine and Beverage
Distributing Co. of Columbia, Inc.,
of whom Carlton and United Breweries Ltd. is, Appellant.
Appeal of CARLTON AND UNITED BREWERIES LTD. No. 23792. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard Jan. 5, 1993.
Decided Feb. 1, 1993.

Page 778

[310 S.C. 331] Harold W. Jacobs, and Julian Hennig, III, of Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, for appellant.

Nikki G. Setzler, and William J. Buchanan, of Setzler, Chewning & Scott, West Columbia; and James B. Richardson, Jr., of Svalina, Richardson & Smith, Columbia, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

This case arises from a pre-trial denial of a motion, under Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP, to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We DISMISS the appeal as interlocutory.

Facts

Respondent, Mid-State Distributors (Mid-State), brought an action against Appellant, Carlton and United Breweries Limited (Carlton) ¹, alleging that Mid-State's beer distributorship franchise was wrongfully terminated in violation of Title 61, Chapter 9 of the S.C.Code of Laws (1976). After Mid-State made several amendments to the summons and complaint, Carlton filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

Mid-State alleged, in the amended summons and complaint, that South Carolina had personal jurisdiction over Carlton. Carlton, in support of their motion, attached the affidavit of a corporate director, which stated that Carlton was an Australian corporation with a principal place of business in Australia. This affidavit further stated that Carlton does not conduct business in the State of South Carolina, has not qualified to do business here, owns no property here, maintains no agent here,

Page 779

and has no other contacts with South Carolina.

[310 S.C. 332] The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was heard on April 20, 1992, and denied on April 21, 1992. Carlton appeals from the denial.

Law/Analysis

The primary issue before us is whether the pre-trial denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP, is appealable. If so, then the issue becomes whether Carlton is subject to suit under the South Carolina "long arm statute," codified at S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803 (1986).

South Carolina case law is settled that "at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing by pleadings and affidavits." Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins & Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 462, 388 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1990), cert. denied sub nom. Kramer v. Hammond, 498 U.S. 952, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990); see White v. Stephens, 300 S.C. 241, 387 S.E.2d 260 (1990); Askins v. Firedoor Corp. of Florida, 281 S.C. 611, 316 S.E.2d 713 (Ct.App.1984).

There is no "other evidence" requirement for personal jurisdiction where the complaint itself demonstrates jurisdiction. Springmasters, Inc. v. D & M Mfg., 303 S.C. 528, 402 S.E.2d 192 (Ct.App.1991). In Berkeley PG Corp. v. Southbank Inv. Group, Inc., 291 S.C. 315, 353 S.E.2d 305 (Ct.App.1987), the Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show a binding contract to be performed within the state, or that the contract was binding between the parties; instead, the court opined that the plaintiff only needed to make a prima facie showing that the trial court should exercise personal jurisdiction. Id.

The relevant question is whether Mid-State made a sufficient prima facie showing. In their amended complaint, Mid-State alleges that Carlton is an integral part of the distribution system for Foster's beer. Mid-State pleads facts which show that Carlton is contacted with orders from the importer, who receives the orders from the distributors. It is alleged that Carlton then ships goods directly to the distributor F.O.B., Australia, with the expectation and intention that the beer be consumed in South Carolina. Mid-State also alleges that Carlton is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Foster's[310 S.C. 333] Brewing Group, which also owns 50% of the importer.

In an earlier order ², denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the judge noted that Mid-State's franchise existed separately from any agreement between Mid-State and the importer. The lower court also wrote that "[S.C.Code Ann.] § 61-9-1010 prohibits the manufacturer, acting alone or through a related corporation--the new importer, Century--from terminating Mid-State's franchise without just cause." In the order's conclusion, the judge stated that, "Mid-State's franchise cannot...