Stone v. Worcester Cnty. Sheriff's Office, Civil Action No. 18-cv-10011-ADB
| Decision Date | 26 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-cv-10011-ADB |
| Parties | STEPHEN STONE, Plaintiff, v. WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Pro se plaintiff Stephen Stone, who is presently confined at the Norfolk County Jail, has filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") in which he complains that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated while he was confined at the Worcester County Jail and House of Correction ("Worcester County HOC" or "Jail") beginning in August 2015. He alleges that the medical treatment he received at the facility for his serious mental health issues was below the level of care required by the Constitution. Upon a preliminary screening of the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 9 ("Amended Complaint")], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court ordered that all official capacity claims be dismissed and that summonses issue as to Worcester County Sheriff Lewis Evangelidis and Dr. Bernard Katz. [ECF No. 14]. These Defendants have separately moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)") for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [ECF Nos. 20, 30]. For the reasons stated below, the Defendants' motions are DENIED.
The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint. For purposes of evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will, as it must, "accept[] all well-pled facts in the complaint as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019).
Stone has suffered from anxiety and other serious mental health issues since he was five years old. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. Prior to his incarceration at the Worcester County HOC, his mental illness was being effectively treated by the prescription medication Klonopin, to which Stone responded "very well." Id. In 2009-2010, during a period of incarceration in the Worcester County HOC previous to the one at issue in this action, defendant Katz, who worked at the facility as a contracted doctor, had prescribed Klonopin for Stone and was aware of his medical needs. Id. At the time, Evangelidis was not the sheriff of Worcester County. Id. After Evangelidis was elected sheriff, he instituted a new medication policy which included a prohibition of the prescription of Klonopin to inmates ("the Policy"). Id.
On August 17, 2015, after the election of Evangelidis, Stone was brought to the Worcester County HOC. Id. ¶ 9. At intake, Stone was not provided Klonopin due to the Policy. Id. During his stay at the Jail, Stone "continuously" asked Katz for Klonopin, and Katz responded that he was no longer able to provide that particular prescription medication due to the Policy.
Stone's mental health rapidly deteriorated because he did not have access to Klonopin. Id. Between August 2015 and August 2016, he cut himself more than once, and employees of the Worcester County HOC were aware of at least two or three of these incidents. Id. ¶ 10. He also had numerous mental health breakdowns. Id.
On August 16, 2016, Stone attended a court proceeding at the Norfolk Superior Court. Id. ¶ 12. He had surreptitiously brought a razor with him from the Worcester County HOC. Id.¶ 11. After the proceeding, when employees of the Worcester County HOC were present to transport him back to the institution, Stone attempted suicide by cutting his arm with the razor. Id. ¶ 12. He was taken by ambulance to Norwood Hospital. Id.
On October 19, 2016, when Stone was brought to Malden District Court, he had a mental breakdown after court security refused him access to the building. Id. ¶ 13. In reaction to his visible emotional instability, Worcester County HOC transport officers tackled him on the pavement outside of the courthouse. Id. After they placed him in the back of the facility's van, he began to bang his head and kick the cage because of his emotionally unstable condition. Id. Aware of this conduct, the transport officers called the Worcester County HOC to notify officials of the situation, ask for permission to leave without waiting for another inmate, and request leave to use flashing blue lights while transporting Stone back to the Jail. Id. During the return trip to the Jail, the two transport officers failed to monitor Stone. Id. ¶ 14. Their view of Stone was obstructed by an American flag that someone had hung over the observation window. Id. During this ride, Stone attempted suicide by tying a "thermo" around his neck. Id. When the van arrived at the Worcester County HOC, Stone was blue in the face and barely conscious. Id. A correctional officer cut off the thermo, and Stone was taken to a hospital for emergency treatment. Id.
On or around November 26, 2016, Stone attempted suicide in a "camera cell" at the Jail by tying a sheet around his neck. Id. ¶ 16. When correctional officers entered the cell, Stone was "semi-unresponsive" and required an oxygen mask and an injection to lower his pulse and breathing. Id. On January 22, 2017, Stone cut his wrists open with a razor after he was denied access to the phone. Id. ¶ 20. He was taken to a hospital, where he received stitches and was informed he had cut his tendon. Id.
The Amended Complaint sets forth three § 1983 claims for violations of the Eighth Amendment: Katz's refusal to prescribe Klonopin because of the Policy; Evangelidis's implementation and enforcement of the Policy; and, the failure of the transport officers on October 19, 2016 to monitor Stone during the drive back to the Jail. Id. ¶¶ 25-27.1
As noted above, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gilbert, 915 F.3d at 80. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint must set forth "more than labels and conclusions," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and must contain "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory," Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations). The alleged facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
"Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (jointopinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.)). However, not "every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id. at 105, 106. "In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Id. at 106.
An Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care consists of subjective and objective components. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc). As to the objective component, a plaintiff must plead facts, which, if true, show "a serious medical need for which [the plaintiff] has received inadequate treatment." Id. at 85. For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, a medical need is "serious" if it has "been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Id. at 82 (quoting Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)).2 The objective prong does not "impose upon prison administrators a duty to provide care that is ideal, or of the prisoner's choosing." Id.
The subjective component requires factual allegations supporting an inference of "deliberate indifference" by the defendant. Id. at 83. Deliberate indifference refers to "a narrow band of conduct." Id. (quoting Fenney v. Corr. Med. Servs. Inc., 464 F.3d 158, 162 (1st Cir. 2006)). Demonstrating deliberate indifference requires allegations supporting a conclusion "that the absence or inadequacy of treatment is intentional" rather than simply inadvertent. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015). "The obvious case [of deliberate indifference] would be a denial of needed medical treatment in order to punish the inmate." Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83(quoting Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993)). "But deliberate indifference may also reside in 'wanton' decisions to deny or delay care where the action is recklessness, 'not in the tort law sense but in the appreciably stricter criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable.'" Watson, 984 F.2d at 540 ().
"[T]he subjective deliberate indifference inquiry may overlap with the objective serious medical need determination." Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc. 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 187 n.12 (2d Cir. 2003)). "[S]imilar evidence . . . may be relevant to both components." Id. (quoting Smith, 316 F.3d at 187 n.12).
Upon careful review of the Amended Complaint and the Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Court finds that Stone has set forth plausible claims that both...
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