Stoneberg v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 15 October 1917
• Docket Number: 4925.
• Citation: 246 F. 98
• Parties: STONEBERG et al. v. MORGAN, Warden of United States Penitentiary.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

246 F. 98

STONEBERG et al. v. MORGAN, Warden of United States Penitentiary.

No. 4925.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

October 15, 1917

M. N McNaughton, of Leavenworth, Kan. (Lee Bond, of Leavenworth Kan., on the brief), for appellants.

L. S Harvey, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Kansas City, Kan. (Fred Robertson, U.S. Atty., of Kansas City, Kan., on the brief) for appellee.

Before SANBORN and CARLAND, Circuit Judges, and BOOTH, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The claim of the petitioners is that they are serving a term of imprisonment for two years in the penitentiary under a sentence thereto which the court had no jurisdiction to impose upon them because there was no act of Congress which empowered that court to inflict a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year for the offense with which they were charged. The United States asserts the existence of the court's power to impose the sentence of two years under section 8 of the Immigration Act which was approved February 20, 1907. 34 Stat.c. 1134, p. 900 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 4253).

By the Chinese Exclusion Act which was approved July 5, 1884 (23 Stat.c. 220, p. 117 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 4298)), Congress enacted

'That any person who shall knowingly bring into or cause to be brought into the United States by land, or who shall aid or abet the same, * * * any Chinese person not lawfully entitled to enter the United States, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not exceeding $1,000, and imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year.'

By section 8 of the Immigration Act approved February 20, 1907, Congress enacted:

'That any person, * * * who shall bring into or land in the United States, * * * or who shall attempt, * * * to bring into or land in the United States, * * * any alien * * * not lawfully entitled to enter the United States shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment for each and every alien so landed or brought in or attempted to be landed or brought in.'

It will be noticed that the limit of punishment denounced by the Chinese Exclusion Act for bringing in a Chinese person is a fine of $1,000 and imprisonment for one year, while the limit of the punishment denounced by the Immigration Act for bringing in an alien is a fine of $1,000 and imprisonment for two years. The petitioners were indicted in two counts-- in count 1 for bringing into the United States 'one Mah Chong, alias Mah Gwon Wy, who was then and there an alien, * * * and who was not then and there lawfully entitled to enter the United States, said Mah Chong, alias Mah Gwon Wy, being then and there a Chinese person of Chinese descent, * * * and being then and there of the class of aliens excluded from the Unite States under the provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act and of the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907,' and in count 2 for attempting to bring the same Chinese laborer into the United States at the same time and place that the petitioners were charged in the first count with bringing him in. The petitioners were tried, convicted, each of them was sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and be imprisoned in the penitentiary for two years, they were committed to the penitentiary at Leavenworth, and have been serving their sentences ever since July 25, 1916.

The indictment charged the offense denounced by the Chinese Exclusion Act, for which the authorized punishment was imprisonment for one year, and also the offense under the Immigration Act, for which the authorized punishment, if that act applies to the bringing in of a Chinese laborer, was two years, and the court inflicted imprisonment for two years under the latter act. The Chinese Exclusion Act in the year 1884 created the offenses of bringing into the United States a specific class of aliens, Chinese persons not lawfully entitled to enter the United States, and of aiding and abetting such an act, and fixed the punishment for each offense at a fine of not exceeding $1,000 and imprisonment for not exceeding one year. The Immigration Act by its terms created the offense of bringing into the United States any alien not lawfully entitled to enter the United States, an of attempting so to do, and fixed the punishment for each offense at a fine not exceeding $1,000 and imprisonment for not exceeding two years, and then expressly provided 'that this act shall not be construed to repeal, alter or amend existing laws relating to the immigration or exclusion of Chinese persons, or persons of Chinese descent. ' Section 43, 34 Stat.p. 911 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 4289). There were, therefore when the offenses of the petitioners were committed, two laws in force; one denouncing the bringing of a specific class of aliens, unqualified Chinese, into the United States, under a penalty of a possible imprisonment of one year, and one denouncing the bringing in of unqualified aliens of all classes, under a penalty of a possible imprisonment of two years. It certainly was not the intention of Congress, or the effect of these laws, to authorize the court to punish one who brought in a Chinese person by an imprisonment of three years--one year because the defendant brought in a Chinese person, and two years because he brought in the same Chinese person an alien.

What then, is the true construction and effect of two laws, the earlier of which treats of a specific class or subject, and the latter of which treats generally of many classes or subjects, including that treated in the earlier act, without repealing that act. The answer is: Where an earlier act prescribes the punishment for a specific class of offenses, or otherwise treats of a specific subject, that act is not affected by a subsequent general law which prescribes the punishment for many classes of offenses, including that class treated by the earlier special law, or treats of many subjects including that treated by the earlier special law; but, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed or indubitably inferable from the acts, they must stand and be read and construed together as a single act, the act regarding the specific class or subject as the law of that class or subject, and the later more comprehensive act as the general law of the classes or subjects not treated by the earlier act. Cook County National Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445, 450, 451, 2 Sup.Ct. 561, 27 L.Ed. 537; Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 48, 15 Sup.Ct. 532, 39 L.Ed. 614; State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, 430, 431, 436, 21 L.Ed. 650; Board of Commissioners v. AEtna Life Insurance Co., 90 F. 222, 227, 32 C.C.A. 585, 590; Christie-Street Commission Co. v. United States, 136 F. 326, 333, 69 C.C.A. 464, 471; United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 F. 961, 965, 72 C.C.A. 9, 13, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 185; City Realty Co. v. S. R. H. Robinson Contracting Co. (C.C.) 183 F. 176, 181; Hemmer v. United States, 204 F. 898, 906, 908, 123 C.C.A. 194, 202, 204; Priddy v. Thompson, 204 F. 955, 959, 123 C.C.A. 277, 281; Sweet v. United States, 228 F. 421, 426, 143 C.C.A. 3, 8; Soliss v. General Electric Co., 213 F. 204, 208, 129 C.C.A. 548, 552; King v. Pomeroy, 121 F. 287, 294, 58 C.C.A. 209, 216; United States v. Healey, 160...