Storch v. Moritsky

Decision Date20 December 1965
Citation266 N.Y.S.2d 54,24 A.D.2d 1027
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
PartiesJulius STORCH, Carl Kristein et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rose MORITSKY et al., Defendants. Rose MORITSKY, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; A & B CAB CORP. and Delio Feliciano, Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

Emanuel Morgenbesser, New York City, for appellant; Lewis I. Wolf, New York City, of counsel.

Cohen & Ruttenberg, New York City, for respondent; Neil Huttner, New York City, of counsel.

Before BELDOCK, P. J., and UGHETTA, CHRIST, HILL, and HOPKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for personal injury, the third-party plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered December 11, 1964, which granted the third-party defendants' motion to dismiss her third-party complaint for insufficiency.

Order affirmed, without costs.

On June 4, 1963, an automobile, owned by defendant Moritsky and driven by her co-defendant (Andrews), collided with a taxicab owned by third-party defendant A & B Cab Corp. and driven by third-party defendant Feliciano. Plaintiffs Storch and Kristein (passengers in the taxi) instituted an action to recover damages against Moritsky and Andrews only. Moritsky thereafter brought this third-party action against the taxi owner and its driver.

In our opinion, this third-party action for indemnification is not maintainable. The third-party plaintiff, although a passive tortfeasor as between herself and the driver of the car, is by statute liable for his negligence. As such, she is placed in pari delicto as a joint tortfeasor with the third-party defendants. No obligation to indemnify may be implied as between joint tortfeasors (Bush Term. Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428, 174 N.E.2d 516; Petzold v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 989, 218 N.Y.S.2d 65, 176 N.E.2d 514).

BELDOCK, P. J., and UGHETTA, CHRIST and HILL, JJ., concur.

HOPKINS, J., concurs in the result.

HOPKINS, Justice (concurring in the result).

The weight of authority supports the view that one joint tortfeasor cannot obtain indemnity from his fellow tortfeasor in an automobile collision case (Note, 68 Yale L.J., 964, 983-984), and our state is in accord with the majority view (Petzold v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 12 A.D.2d 118, 209 N.Y.S.2d 121, affd. 9 N.Y.2d 989, 218 N.Y.S.2d 65, 176 N.E.2d 514; Anderson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 285 App.Div. 44, 135 N.Y.S.2d 559). At least, this is the result where indemnity is sought by one driver (or owner) from another driver (or owner); our court has recognized an exception and has allowed indemnity by an owner of an automobile where a defect in the mechanism causing the accident was the result of the negligence of a repairman or manufacturer (Alfano v. Amchir, 23 A.D.2d 659, 257 N.Y.S.2d 2; Lipsman v. Warren, 10 A.D.2d 868, 199 N.Y.S.2d 761).

Indemnity shifts the entire burden of the loss from a party held liable for an injury suffered through the negligence of several to the party said to be primarily or actively responsible on the equitable principle that a wrongdoer substantially causing the injury should bear the loss (Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 81 U. of P., L.R., 130, 131). Though an owner of an automobile liable under section 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for the loss sustained by one injured as the result of the negligence of the operator driving with permission is not barred by any theory of imputed negligence from recovering for damage to his automobile from an owner or driver of an automobile jointly responsible for the accident (Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App.Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78, affd. 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E.2d 512), reasons of public policy sustain the denial of indemnity for the loss suffered by the owner as...

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5 cases
  • Anderson v. Comardo
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1981
    ...original plaintiff harm, but only against that party whose culpable acts have been imputed to the vicarious defendant (Storch v. Moritsky, 24 A.D.2d 1027, 266 N.Y.S.2d 54). The sale of intoxicating liquor to an intoxicated person is active wrongdoing, separate from but on an equal footing w......
  • Higginbotham v. Rath
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • May 6, 1968
    ...v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317; Helou v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 25 A.D.2d 179, 268 N.Y.S.2d 583; Storch v. Moritsky, 24 A.D.2d 1027, 266 N.Y.S.2d 54; Petroff v. Brzezinski, 24 A.D.2d 1072, 265 N.Y.S.2d 804; CPLR 1401, 1402). The 'loss of an inchoate or potential right ......
  • Trybus v. Nipark Realty Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • June 13, 1966
    ...right of contribution, in the event the jury should find that both they and appellant were actively negligent (cf. Storch v. Moritsky, 24 A.D.2d 1027, 266 N.Y.S.2d 54). ...
  • Storch v. Moritsky
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 9, 1966
    ...Court of Appeals of New York. June 9, 1966. Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, 24 A.D.2d 1027, 266 N.Y.S.2d 54. Passengers in taxicab, which collided with automobile, brought action against owner of the automobile and the driver for injuries. The owner of the ......
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