Storts v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.
Decision Date | 11 March 1996 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 95-1036-MLB. |
Citation | 919 F. Supp. 1513 |
Parties | Tammy STORTS, Plaintiff, v. HARDEE'S FOOD SYSTEMS, INC., Imasco Holdings, Inc., and Imasco, Ltd., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Donald A. McKinney, Wichita, KS, for plaintiff.
Paul P. Hasty, Jr., Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, Overland Park, KS, for defendants.
This matter comes before the court for a de novo review of the United States Magistrate Judge's recommendation and report sustaining defendants Hardee's and Imasco Holdings' motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint (Doc. 20).1 The court has reviewed the file and the parties' memoranda (Docs. 22, 23, 24).
Plaintiff filed her complaint February 2, 1995. She alleged, in pertinent part, that on February 5, 1993 she was abducted from the parking lot of the Hardee's restaurant located on the Kansas Turnpike near Wellington, Kansas. She further alleged that the restaurant was negligently designed and operated "... in a manner which violated basic principles of consumer safety and crime prevention ..." and that Hardee's failed to provide proper security and other protections for her safety. Plaintiff contended that her abduction and resulting injuries and damages were the direct result of Hardee's negligence.
Plaintiff served process on Hardee's by serving C.T. Corporation Systems by certified mail postmarked May 18, 1995 and Imasco Holdings by certified mail received May 30, 1995 (Doc. 5, 6).2 Plaintiff's reasons for waiting so long to serve defendants are not apparent. In any event, Hardee's filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations (Docs. 2, 3).
Plaintiff's initial reaction to the motion was to file a first amended complaint (Doc. 4). Three days later, plaintiff filed her response to the motion to dismiss which stated, in substance, that she had abandoned the negligence claims of her original complaint and instead was pursuing a breach of contract claim which was not barred by the statute of limitations (Doc. 8). Hardee's and Imasco Holdings moved for dismissal of the first amended complaint on the ground that her claim still was barred by the statute of limitations (Docs. 9, 10). Plaintiff responded in a lengthy document which purported to discuss not only the contractual issues raised by Hardee's in its motion but also plaintiff's liability and damage theories including plaintiff's psychological condition (Doc. 11). After defendants filed their reply (Doc. 12), this court referred the motion to dismiss to United States Magistrate John Thomas Reid for a recommendation for disposition (Doc. 13). Magistrate Judge Reid's recommendation and report was filed on September 12, 1995 (Doc. 20). Plaintiff now seeks review of every aspect of Judge Reid's ruling.
The magistrate judge found that the gist of plaintiff's complaint was grounded in tort, not in contract, and was thus barred by Kansas' two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Plaintiff takes strong exception to this ruling. She argues that her claim is based upon certain specific provisions of the contract between Hardee's and the Turnpike Authority. The provisions upon which plaintiff relies are as follows:
.
Plaintiff argues that these contractual provisions impose upon defendants a higher duty than the negligence standard imposed by law, i.e., due care, and that they transcend the general rule that a business owner has no liability for injuries inflicted upon customers by the criminal acts of third parties which are committed in the business' parking lot unless "... circumstances exist from which the owner could reasonably foresee that its customers have a risk of peril above and beyond the ordinary and that appropriate security measures should be taken." Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 253 Kan. 540, 548, 856 P.2d 1332 (1993).
Plaintiff concedes that she is not a party to the contract but nevertheless contends she is a third party beneficiary of the "higher duties" allegedly created by the contract.3 Apparently recognizing that the contract language does not specifically confer third party beneficiary status upon her, plaintiff asserts that the contract is ambiguous. Plaintiff contends that she should be able to offer evidence so that a jury can decide what is meant by certain terms of the contract and whether defendants owed her a duty (Doc. 24 at 9-14).
The basis of defendants' motion to dismiss was that plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. It was not predicated upon plaintiff's failure to state a claim as a third party beneficiary and the magistrate judge's decision was not based on that ground. However, because this matter is before the court de novo and because the parties have addressed the matter of plaintiff's third party beneficiary status in their memoranda, the court has elected to treat defendant's motion as one for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because both parties have cited to it, the court has considered one matter outside the pleadings: the contract. Technically, this requires conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment. Id.; Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.1991). Conversion to summary judgment ordinarily requires the court to notify the parties and afford them an opportunity to present evidence. This procedure is not required, however, when the parties have had full opportunity to state their positions. In re: Harris Pine Mills, 44 F.3d 1431, 1439-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995). The court finds that further evidentiary presentation is not necessary since the court's decision is one of law based upon the written contract. The parties have briefed and rebriefed the contract and third party beneficiary issues and no...
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...tolling provisions provided by 60-515 must assert the facts justifying its application in his complaint"); Storts v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 919 F.Supp. 1513, 1522 (D.Kan.1996) (same). if Ms. Lowe was and continues to be legally incapacitated, she lacks capacity to sue. See, e.g., In Inte......
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...that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. Id. § 302. 14. See Storts v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 919 F.Supp. 1513 (D.Kan.1996) (restaurant patron abducted from parking lot not intended beneficiary of contract between restaurant and security c......
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...contract was not enough to establish that the court security officers were third-party beneficiaries). In Storts v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 919 F.Supp. 1513, 1519 (D.Kan.1996), the federal district court of Kansas found that the contracting parties did not intend to create safety or “s......
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