Story v. Hefner

• Decision Date: 22 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 47667,47667
• Citation: 1975 OK 115,540 P.2d 562
• Parties: Richard T. STORY and Dorothy J. Story, Appellants, v. Robert A. HEFNER, Jr. Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 562

540 P.2d 562

Richard T. STORY and Dorothy J. Story, Appellants, v. Robert A. HEFNER, Jr. Appellee.

No. 47667.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 22, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1975.

James E. Work, Shirk, Semtner, Work & Robinson, Oklahoma City, for appellants.

Kent F. Frates, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

DOOLIN, Justice.

The Apple Valley Recreational Club had its beginning in May of 1962. The Club maintained certain real estate which encompassed a large recreational lake developed by four tenants in common under the guidance of Robert Story, the defendant appellant, who initially held only an option to buy into the joint venture.

This initial agreement was terminated in September of 1964. In November of the same year, another agreement was executed also giving Story an option to purchase into the property and included a clause stating, 'It is the intention of the parties that the premises be operated for the joint benefit of the parties and that each party shall contribute his proportionate share of the cost of maintaining and operating the premises.'

In January of 1966, through the various buy-out agreements Story and Hefner, the plaintiff appellee, became sole tenants in common in the 260 acre tract.

From 1966 to 1974 Hefner and Story jointly utilized the lake for fishing and other recreational purposes. In May of 1967 the parties decided to divide the property into two individually owned tracts by the exchange of quit claim deeds. Although there was testimony that both Story and Hefner believed that the lake itself could not be divided, the new property line created by the deeds did run through and divide the lake. However, both parties continued joint use of the lake after the execution of the deeds.

Seven years after this division, Hefner brought the present action to enjoin Story from using the portion of the lake covering Hefner's property and asked the court for a declaratory judgment declaring that the Storys had no right to use or enjoy this portion of the lake. A temporary injunction was issued and Hefner erected buoys across the lake preventing Story from entering the part of the lake that Hefner considered to be his.

Story answered and cross-petitioned claiming a right to reasonable use of the entire lake surface and asking for a permanent injunction prohibiting Hefner from interfering with his reasonable recreational use of the lake.

The trial court entered judgment for Hefner and granted each party exclusive right to the use of the lake over his own land and denied the existence of an easement or license, or riparian rights which would allow the Storys to use the entire lake. Each party was permanently enjoined from trespassing upon the other's lake surface. The Storys appeal.

Hefner bases his claim on the unequivocality of the two bare quit claim deeds. Story does not deny the deeds but rather bases his defense on evidence that the Consideration for the deeds was the continued use of the entire lake, since no money changed hands. Story contends that the finding of the trial court that the deeds gave each party exclusive right to the use of the lake is erroneous. We agree.

At trial, Hefner offered into evidence the two quit claim deeds which divided the property. In addition, he offered a map of the properties which showed that Story had access to all of his property without crossing the Hefner tract. Story, however, was not seeking access to or through Hefner's dry land. His defense was based on written and oral agreements, riparian rights and continuous recreational use that would tend to show that the intention of the parties at the time of the execution of the deeds was to allow the use of the entire lake surface to Both parties, thus creating an implied easement. Story at no time sought to prohibit Hefner from using the entire like.

Over the objections of Hefner, Story was allowed to introduce the prior agreements between the parties. His evidence also showed that after the quit claim deeds were prepared, but before they were executed, each party prepared a written separation agreement. Both agreements included a provision that would allow both parties the common use of the lake. Because of a disagreement as to other parts of the document, neither of these agreements was adopted.

Story was properly allowed to offer evidence of these prior negotiations. The presence of a provision in the tentative contracts of Both parties guaranteeing each party the right to reasonable use of the entire lake is evidence of their intention at the time of the division of the property to continue to use the lake jointly.

While we agree with Hefner that in a case of equitable cognizance a judgment will be sustained on appeal unless it is found to be against the clear weight of the evidence or is contrary to law or established principles of equity, this Court must examine the record and weigh the evidence. Nunn v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 571 (Okl.1966). Evidence of the parties intentions and the prior agreements were properiy admitted by the trial court and should be considered, for any competent and relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is admissible to prove an easement by implication.

An easement is the right of one person to go onto the land of another and make a limited use thereof. Easements may be expressly created by deed or come about by necessity or prescriptive use or as in the present case may be implied into a deed.

An implied easement is a creature of common law. It is based on the theory that whenever one conveys property he includes or intends to include in the conveyance whatever is necessary for its beneficial use and enjoyment and to retain whatever is necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. An easement by implication is a true easement having permanence of duration and should be distinguished from a 'way of necessity' which lasts only as long as the necessity continues.

Ordinarily an easement being an interest in land requires compliance with the Statute of Frauds. However, an easement implied from pre-existing use arises by inference of the Intention of the parties at the time of the conveyance which may be established by parol. The inference is drawn from the circumstances under which the conveyance is made rather than from the language of the deed. The implication of an easement may always be prevented by language in the deed sufficiently explicit to negate it.

To establish an easement by implication there must first be a conveyance that divides one ownership into separately owned parts. At the time of the conveyance one part of the property must be being used for the benefit of the other part, creating a quasi-easement. The use must be apparent and continuous and must be reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the quasi-dominant tract.

In determining whether the circumstances under which a conveyance of land is made imply an easement we must also consider whether reciprocal benefits result and the manner in which the land was used prior to the conveyance as well as the extent of the necessity for the enjoyment of the land. See 5 Restatement Property §§ 474--476, 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements §§ 24, 27--33 (1966), 28 C.J.S. Easements §§ 31, 33, 54, 69 (1966).

According to the trial record the court was aware of the aforementioned requirements for the existence of an implied easement in favor of the Storys. It recognized that all of the elements were present except for the necessity to the full enjoyment of the Story's property. We hold that an adequate necessity does indeed exist.

The necessity requisite to the creation of an easement by implication is not an absolute necessity, a reasonable necessity is sufficient. Where, during unity of title, an apparent permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, and such servitude, at time of the severance, is in use and is reasonably necessary for fair enjoyment of the dominant estate, a grant or reservation of the right to continue such use arises by implication of law. Keller v. Fitzpatrick, 204 Okl. 192, 228 P.2d 367 (1951); Gorman v. Overmyer, 199 Okl. 451, 190 P.2d 447 (1947).

In 1962, the parties stocked the lake with $3,000.00 worth of bass. Story introduced evidence and it was undisputed that if the injunction was continued, he would no longer be able to water ski on the lake or fish for bass which migrate to the deeper water near the dam in the summer. The dam is located at the north end of the lake and is included in Hefner's property. Story also agreed to maintain and has maintained a drain on the dam keeping it free from debris. If the drain is not properly cleared, his cabin, well house and other improvements would become flooded. The injunction prevents Story's access to the drain.

The lake is a recreational lake. It is used for skiing and fishing. The use of the entire lake surface is not merely a convenience, it is necessary for this use. Thus, it is necessary for the fair enjoyment of the Storys' estate and a reservation of their right to continue such use arises by implication of the law.

Hefner relies on Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okl. 94, 225 P. 931 (1924), claiming that Story's use of the Hefner portion of the lake after the exchange of the deeds was based on an oral license and thus was revocable at will. The Court defined a license in Haas v. Brannon, as 'an authority to do a particular act upon another's land without possessing an estate therein. * * * It is distinguished from an easement which implies an interest in the land to be affected.'

An oral license ordinarily can be revoked at the pleasure of the licensor with two exceptions: a license coupled with an interest is not revocable; first, where a continuation of such interest is necessary for him to make use of such interest; and second, where the licensee has incurred expenses in making permanent improvements to the property. Anchor Stone and Materials Company v. Carlin, 436...