Stotler v. Lutheran Social Service of Iowa

• Citation: 74 A.L.R.3d 476,209 N.W.2d 121
• Decision Date: 03 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 56275,56275
• Parties: Debra L. STOTLER, a minor by Barbara Jean Stotler, mother and next friend, Appellees, v. LUTHERAN SOCIAL SERVICE OF IOWA, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 121

209 N.W.2d 121

74 A.L.R.3d 476

Debra L. STOTLER, a minor by Barbara Jean Stotler, mother and next friend, Appellees, v. LUTHERAN SOCIAL SERVICE OF IOWA, Appellant.

No. 56275.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 3, 1973.

Dickinson, Throckmorton, Parker, Mannheimer & Raife, by Robert E. Mannheimer, Paul R. Tyler, and F. Richard Lyford, Des Moines, for appellant.

Arthur K. Anderson, Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered en banc.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

By equity action plaintiff unwed mother seeks judicial invalidation of a written agreement by which she released her infant child to defendant agency for adoptive placement. Defendant appeals from decree granting relief sought. We reverse.

About July 15, 1972, plaintiff, Debra L. Stotler (Debra) and her mother, Barbara Stotler (Mrs. Stotler), appeared at the Des Moines office of defendant, Lutheran Social Service of Iowa, a licensed child placement agency (agency) and there conferred with its representative, Shirley Delores Furtick. Evidence as to the ensuing discussion is in conflict. Debra and her mother testified to the effect Miss Furtick represented to them a child placement relinquishment could be rescinded anytime within 30 days after execution of release papers, and within one year with the aid of an attorney. That is denied by Miss Furtick. She testified the Stotlers were advised regarding two types of documents available, one being an agreement for temporary child foster care, the other for a permanent adoption.

Additionally, Miss Furtick testified she had been told by Mrs. Stotler that in her opinion Debra was not ready to assume child care responsibilities; both Mr. and Mrs. Stotler were under doctor's care; Debra might continue her schooling; and Mrs. Stotler's health would not permit her to care for the baby. For the most part the foregoing is testimonially disputed by Mrs. Stotler.

According to Miss Furtick it was agreed, at time of the office conference, Debra would release her child to agency for permanent placement.

November 17, 1972, or nine days after Debra became 18, a son was born to her at Broadlawns Hospital in Des Moines. The agency was then contacted whereupon Miss Furtick called on Debra. Mrs. Stotler was in the hospital room during most of the time Miss Furtick was there present. Evidence as to what was then said by Debra and Miss Furtick is, in substance, substantially as heretofore related with regard to the office conference.

It further appears Miss Furtick inquired, while at the hospital, as to whether Debra wanted more time to think about the adoption matter before signing the papers, to which Debra responded in the negative and declared she would rather go ahead and get it over.

Without question Debra also then sought, through her mother, parental advice in the matter. Thereupon the latter left the hospital room and upon returning stated, in essence, Debra's father had opined it was her decision to make.

The record also discloses Alice Marie Rowe, a hospital medical social worker unaffiliated with agency, appeared in Debra's room but heard no part of the above mentioned controverted discussion. Her testimony does reveal, however, she asked whether Debra knew what she was doing, to which the latter responded affirmatively and stated she was giving up her baby.

Ultimately Debta signed, without reading, six regularly witnessed copies of a release agreement which provided, in part '* * * fully understanding that she is hereby terminating all her rights in said child, the undersigned does hereunto set her hand this 20th day of November, 1972'. For days later agency placed the child in an adoptive home.

About December 15, 1972, Debra requested the agency return her child. That being refused the instant action was commenced.

Issues presented by agency for review are:

(1) is plaintiff's child recovery right limited by provisions of The Code 1971, Chapter 238;

(2) does general contract law apply to plaintiff's release of her infant child for adoptive placement by defendant agency;

(3) are circumstances attending the execution of an unequivocal child release for adoption agreement determinative as to its validity;

(4) if a parent executes an absolute child adoption placement agreement under the unexpressed belief it is conditional only, is this such a mistake of fact as to make the instrument voidable?

These issues will not be dealt with divisibly or in the order assigned.

I. Before entertaining them it is essential we resolve the extent of our review, inceptionally questioned by Debra. In that vein she contends the notice of appeal restricts our consideration of this case to the propriety of trial court's order overruling agency's motion for a new trial. We are not so persuaded. See Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972).

II. A consideration of the problems instantly posed necessitates a prefatory analysis of some relevant basic principles regarding the subject at hand.

Adoption is a creature of statute, being unknown to common law. See in re Adoption of a Baby Girl, 248 Iowa 619, 623, 80 N.W.2d 500 (1957); 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, §§ 2--3; 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 2.

Although such statutes have been subject to strict construction in some jurisdictions this court has not adhered to that concept for at least the past 70 years. See Hopkins v. Antrobus, 120 Iowa 21, 24, 94 N.W. 251 (1903). See also Corbett v. Stergios, 257 Iowa 1387, 1396, 137 N.W.2d 266 (1965).

Moreover this standard is clearly in keeping with Code § 4.2, which states:

'The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. Its provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice.'

On the other hand, failure to comply with statutorily prescribed procedures is fatal to the power of a court to decree an adoption. See In re Adoption of Moriarty, 260 Iowa 1279, 1286, 152 N.W.2d 218 (1967).

III. Although our review is de novo it is limited to issues duly presented upon evidence properly introduced in course of trial. And in considering credibility of witnesses we accord weight to trial court's findings but are not bound by them. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(7); In re Adoption of Keithley, 206 N.W.2d 707, 711--712 (Iowa 1973); In re Estate of Cory, 184 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1971); In re Adoption of Blanchard, 179 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 1970).

IV. At this point it should also be noted, in this state parental rights may be Involuntarily terminated only by an order or decree of court for neglect of a child as that term is defined in Code chapter 232. See In The Interest of Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa, opinion filed May 23, 1973). See also Code § 238.26; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

V. Distinguishably, however, our problem centers upon the matter of a controverted Voluntary release of an infant to a child placement agency for purpose of adoption. In that regard the court, in People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin A. Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 791, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971), found no perceivable distinction in principle between release to an authorized agency and direct adoption surrender to an individual. But that finding was promptly subjected to severe criticism. See 166 N.Y.L.J. 26 (1971).

Be that as it may we find it unnecessary to here resolve the above matter and confine our review to the factual situation instantly before us.

VI. Unquestionably the release of an infant by an unwed mother to a licensed child placement agency is statutorily permitted. In other words, even though Debra was then only 18, the release of her newborn son to agency for purpose of adoption was, per se, lawfully proper. See Code §§ 238.26--238.28, 600.3.

VII. Trial court found the equity action instituted by Debra was predicated upon a claim of mistake on her part in execution of the child release agreement and accordingly granted the relief prayed.

Agency claims this constituted error because the setting aside of such a release is restricted by Code 238.29, which provides:

'Children so surrendered may not be recovered by the parents except through decree of court based upon proof that the child is neglected by its foster parent, guardian, or custodian, as neglect is defined by the statute relating to neglected children.'

It is to us apparent this legislative enactment presupposes a valid child relinquishing agreement which, if given, can be revoked only for neglect of the child. Stated otherwise it does not relate to the issue here posed, i.e., validity of the releasing instrument. Therefore agency's claim is misdirected.

At the outset it will be noted, every consent to an adoption must designate the adopting parties. See Code § 600.3; In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 248 Iowa 619, 623, 80 N.W.2d 500 (1957). It therefore follows, in private adoption cases the identity of the adopting parties is inceptionally made known to the consenting party, thus precluding anonymity.

Unlike the situation attendant upon privately arranged adoptions, licensed agencies can effect beneficial pre-placement evaluations of both child and prospective parents at the same time acting as an intermediary, thus to some degree preserving anonymity of the parties. See Code § 238.4; McCurdy v. Albertina Kerr Homes, Inc., 498 P.2d 392, 395 (Or.App. 1972). See also S. Katz, 'Judicial and Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption', 51 Geo.L.J. 64, 65--67 (1962); H. Uhlenhopp, 'Adoption in Iowa', 40 Iowa L.Rev. 228, 237--240 (1955).

Consequently, it must be assumed the legislature intended, by enactment of chapter 238 and more particularly § 238.29 the validity of a child relinquishing agreement be judicially determined under applicable principles of equity, at the same time protecting, as far as possible, benefits attendant upon relative...