Stoutamire v. State

• Decision Date: 01 August 1938
• Citation: 183 So. 316,133 Fla. 757
• Parties: STOUTAMIRE et al. v. State
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

183 So. 316

133 Fla. 757

STOUTAMIRE et al. v. State

Florida Supreme Court

August 1, 1938

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1938.

Error to Criminal Court of Record, Duval County; Wm. J. Porter Judge.

Clyde Stoutamire and Jack Harris were convicted of larceny of an automobile, and they bring error.

Judgment of conviction as to Clyde Stoutamire affirmed, and judgment of conviction as to Jack Harris reversed.

COUNSEL J. Lewis Hall and Clyde W. Atkinson, both of Tallahassee, and Charles Miller and Charles Flynn, both of Jacksonville, for plaintiffs in error.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Tyrus A. Norwood, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

OPINION

BROWN Justice.

The plaintiffs in error, Clyde Stoutamire and Jack Harris, along with Peter Manski, were informed against in the Criminal Court of Record of Duval County on the 10th of December, 1936, the information charging them jointly in one count with the larceny of one automobile, the property of Thomas F. Anglin. No motion for severance or a separate trial was requested by any of the defendants and they were tried jointly in March 1937, found guilty and sentenced to a prison term. Manski was given a suspended sentence, and Clyde Stoutamire and Jack Harris took writ of error from the judgment and sentence.

Thomas F. Anglin testified that he bought an automobile from the defendant Clyde Stoutamire; that he parked his car on Bay Street in Jacksonville on November 25, 1936, and when he came back to get it, it was gone; that a week later he found his car at the police station painted black, although when it was stolen it was painted gray. That the motor numbers had been ground off when the car was recovered. Gene Austin testified that the defendant Peter Manski brought the car into the Shad Garage on Saturday afternoon to be painted. The defendant Stoutamire worked at this place.

Tomlinson, a city detective, testified that he found the car in the Shad Garage newly painted with the motor numbers recently filed off; that Stoutamire had the car to repaint. At this point a confession of Stoutamire was attempted to be introduced and the Court after determining that it was freely and voluntarily made to the officers, admitted it.

This raises the main question presented upon this appeal. It is contended by plaintiffs in error that a confession made to an officer, while the defendant was in custody, is not admissible unless it is shown that the officers advised the defendant of his constitutional rights and that anything he said might be used against him at the trial.

The leading Florida case on this question is McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250, 70 So. 24. It is there stated (page 25):

'The language used by this court in some opinions dealing with the admissibility in evidence of confessions made by an accused person under arrest seems to indicate that the view has obtained here that a confession of guilt, freely and voluntarily made by an accused person to an officer who has merely arrested such person, is not admissible in evidence at the trial of such person, unless it is clearly shown that the accused person was fully advised by the officer or some person in authority of such accused person's rights under the law. We think, however, that a careful review of the many decisions by this court upon the subject of the admissibility of confessions will show that no such view has been expressed.

'The distinction has been drawn between judicial and extrajudicial confessions, and this court has invariably held that in cases where the confession offered in evidence could be classed as a judicial confession it was necessary to its admissibility that it be preceded by a warning or caution that the accused need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used against him at the trial. In a recent and most excellent work, entitled 'Ruling Case Law,' the subject is exhaustively discussed. 1 R.C.L. 569.'

Then follows a review of the earlier cases, pointing out that the cases in which this Court had held a warning or caution necessary were dealing with judicial confessions.

The Court followed this rule in Edwards v. State, 71 Fla. 354, 71 So. 331, 332:

'In the recent case of McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. [250], 70 So. 24, we reviewed our former decisions, and held that a voluntary confession to an officer is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that it was not preceded by a warning or caution that the one in custody need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used against him.'

And again in Phillips v. State, 88 Fla. 117, 101 So. 204, 205:

'It was not necessary for the officer to warn the defendant that what he might say could be used against him, as the statement was not made in court. See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250, 70 So. 24.'

The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 317, 322, 105 So. 843, and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479, cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question.

Plaintiffs in error contend that in the recent case of Hulst v. State, 123 Fla. 315, 166 So. 828, this Court abandoned this rule and held that it was necessary to the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession that the accused be previously warned of his constitutional rights. The following portion of the opinion is relied upon (page 830):

'Though a confession made to an officer by a person under arrest is inadmissible at the trial, unless it clearly appears that it was voluntarily made after he was fully advised of his rights under the law, Howell v. State, 66 Fla. 210, 63 So. 421; yet statements freely and voluntarily made by one accused of crime are admissible against him as proof of independent facts and not as proof of confession of guilt. 1 R.C.L. 472, § 7. The admission of defendant to the policemen that he was drunk at the time the truck fatally injured deceased was not a confession of guilt, but was merely an admission of fact. There is no showing that this admission, although made by the accused in ignorance of his right to remain silent, was not freely and voluntarily made, and it is not inadmissible on that ground.'

That part of the above opinion relied upon by plaintiffs in error is clearly dicta as the statements made by defendant in that case were admissions and not a confession. Further the Howell Case, supra, does not lay down this doctrine. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Ellis in the McDonald Case, supra, 'the references made by the court in the Howell Case, 66 Fla. 210, 63 So. 421, were only to those cases in which the admissibility of judicial confessions was considered. But the Howell Case does not purport to discuss the question. It is stated that the point was not properly presented before the court.' The latest expression of this court on this important question will be found in Kearson v. State, 123 Fla. 324, 166 So. 832, 834:

'Statements of an accused while in the custody of an officer are admissible in evidence, though they are incriminating, if such statements were voluntarily made. It is not necessary in such case for the officer to warn the accused that what he may say can be used against him. Phillips v. State, 88 Fla. 117, 101 So. 204.'

For a further discussion of the subject see 1 R.C.L. 567, Paragraph 112; 16 C.J. 723 et seq.; Note, 18, L.R.A.,N.S., 768 et seq.; Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Edition, page 523.

The trial judge has determined that the confession was a voluntary one and this Court must indulge the presumption that the finding was correct. Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 317, 105 So. 843; Thomas v. State, 58 Fla. 122, 51 So. 410. Often the fact that the accused was warned or advised of his constitutional rights is an important factor in determining whether or not a confession was freely and voluntarily made; however, we are of the opinion that there is ample evidence to sustain the findings of the trial judge, and under the rule established by the decisions of this Court this extrajudicial confession is not rendered inadmissible merely because the accused was not so advised.

Plaintiffs in error contend that the corpus delicti was not prima facie established before the confession was introduced in evidence, and therefore the alleged confession of Clyde Stoutamire was inadmissible.

In the case of Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479, text 486, it was stated:

'The corpus delicti need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a basis for the introduction of a confession of the accused. That degree of proof, though requisite to a...