Stovall v. Stovall
Decision Date | 20 July 2010 |
Docket Number | No. COA09-946.,COA09-946. |
Parties | Nancy Fagg STOVALL, Plaintiff,v.Manley Keith STOVALL, Defendant. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
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Appeal by defendant and plaintiff from Order of Equitable Distribution entered 14 January 2009 by Judge Angela B. Puckett in District Court, Stokes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2010.
Bennett & West, King, by Michael R. Bennett, for plaintiff-appellee.
Randolph and Fischer, Winston-Salem, by J. Clark Fischer, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant and plaintiff appeal their equitable distribution order. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On or about 31 October 2005, plaintiff filed a verified complaint requesting equitable distribution.1 On 30 October 2006, the parties consented to entry of an equitable distribution pretrial order. The equitable distribution hearing was held on 17 November 2008, and on 14 January 2009, the trial court entered an order of equitable distribution. Both parties filed a notice of appeal from the equitable distribution order.
As to the actual distribution ordered by the trial court, Petty v. Petty, ---N.C.App. ----, ----, 680 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted) disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 363 N.C. 806, 691 S.E.2d 16 (2010).
The trial court found that New Madison Tobacco Warehouse (“New Madison”) is a warehouse which “was purchased during the marriage in approximately 1997 by the Defendant under the name Madison Enterprises, Inc.” The trial court classified New Madison as marital property. New Madison was subject to two mortgages, one with the prior owner of New Madison and one with First Citizens Bank (“New Madison debts”). Defendant made payments on the New Madison debts after the date of separation; plaintiff did not. As to these payments, the trial court found, in part, as follows:
Both plaintiff and defendant assign error to the trial court's findings and conclusions which gave defendant a “credit” for debt payments of $160,000.00 toward the New Madison debts after the date of separation. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by considering these payments as a credit to defendant; defendant argues that the trial court failed to give him enough credit for these payments.
(Emphasis added.) Schedule I includes the New Madison debts. Thus, the parties had contradictory stipulations in the equitable distribution pretrial order; the parties agreed that an equal distribution would be equitable, but they also stipulated that the trial court should consider “credit for the prior payment of said marital debts[.]”
Essentially, plaintiff argues that under the stipulations the trial court could only treat the payments as divisible under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-20(b)(4)(d) and pursuant to the stipulations divide the divisible property equally; defendant argues that not only should the payments all be credited to him, but he should have been credited for more. Thus, we first have to interpret the terms of the pretrial order to determine if the trial court could consider the defendant's payments on the New Madison debts at all, given the stipulation to an equal distribution, and if the payments could be considered, in what manner they could be considered.
We believe that stipulations in pretrial orders should be construed in the same manner as a contract between the parties, and this Court has previously set out the general principles for construction as follows:
Lynn v. Lynn, --- N.C.App. ----, ----, 689 S.E.2d 198, 204-05 (2010) ( ).
Here, the pretrial order is ambiguous, as it provides for an equal distribution, but then also provides for the trial court to consider “which party should receive credit for the prior payment of said marital debts,” a factor for unequal distribution. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-20(c) (2010). It is apparent from the evidence and arguments presented at trial in this matter that both parties understood the pretrial order as requiring the trial court to consider how the post-separation debt payments by defendant should be treated in the distribution, and it is also clear that defendant was asking to have some recovery of these funds, while plaintiff opposed this; defendant argued before the trial court for greater credit for his payments and efforts to maintain New Madison, and plaintiff argued that the increase in equity of New Madison as a result of defendant's debt payments should be considered as divisible property and must be divided equally in accord with the stipulation to an equal distribution. Thus, both parties recognized that under the pretrial order, the trial court was to consider defendant's post-separation payments to some extent; however, plaintiff argued that the pretrial...
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