Strang v. Cabrol

• Decision Date: 27 December 1984
• Docket Number: S.F. 24762
• Citation: 691 P.2d 1013,209 Cal.Rptr. 347,37 Cal.3d 720
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 691 P.2d 1013 Deborah STRANG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George J. CABROL et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 347

209 Cal.Rptr. 347

37 Cal.3d 720, 691 P.2d 1013

Deborah STRANG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George J. CABROL et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S.F. 24762.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Dec. 27, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1985. ^*

Terrence J. Ford, Paula Tripp and Rodney A. Klein, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Moss & Enochian, Steven R. Enochian and Todd E. Slaughter, Redding, for defendants and respondents.

Charles G. Miller, Los Angeles, Susan M. Akram, Bartko, Welsh & Tarrant, San Francisco, James V. Jordan, Jonathan Solish and Solish, Jordan & Wiener, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

BY THE COURT:

We granted a hearing in this case to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal regarding the question whether civil liability for personal injuries may be predicated on the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a minor who is not obviously intoxicated. We conclude that no liability exists in such a case, that the trial court properly sustained defendants' general demurrer, and that we should adopt the well-reasoned opinion of Presiding Justice Puglia for the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, in this case, with appropriate additions and deletions. ^* The Court of Appeal opinion, as so modified, is as follows:

In a personal injury suit, plaintiff Deborah Strang appeals from a judgment dismissing her third cause of action after the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer thereto without leave to amend. [ ] We shall hold that defendants are immune from liability to plaintiff by force of the 1978 amendments to Civil Code section 1714 and Business and Professions Code section 25602 (hereafter the 1978 amendments). Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of dismissal.

For purposes of this appeal, we treat as true all material facts properly pled in the complaint. (Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 746, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 765, 120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222.) George Cabrol and four other individuals are named as defendants in the third cause of action. Together they constitute a partnership doing business as Liquor For Less, also named as a defendant in the third cause of action. It is alleged inferentially that Liquor For Less is licensed to sell alcoholic beverages (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 23300; all further references to sections of an unspecified code are to the Business and Professions Code). Plaintiff alleges these defendants sold alcoholic beverages to Shawn Patterson, who was under the age of 21, in violation of section 25658. Patterson in turn provided the alcohol to Donald Baas, also under the age of 21. Baas consumed the alcohol and became intoxicated. Thereafter, plaintiff sustained personal injuries while riding in a vehicle driven by Baas. Plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by Baas' driving while intoxicated. At the time of the sale, defendants knew or should have known that Patterson would distribute the alcoholic beverages to other underage persons. They also knew or should have known that these underage persons would become intoxicated and operate vehicles on the roadways, in a manner hazardous to the motoring public.

Subdivision (a) of Civil Code section 1714 declares that everyone is responsible for his own negligent or willful acts. That general principle is qualified, however, in subdivisions (b) and (c) added as part of the 1978 amendments: "(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager [1971] (5 Cal.3d 153 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151] ), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club [1976] (16 Cal.3d 313 [128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719] ), and Coulter v. Superior Court [ (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144, 145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669] and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.

"(c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of such beverages." (Stats.1978, ch. 929, § 2, p. 2904.)

Subdivision (a) of section 25602 provides: "Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Stats.1978, ch. 929, § 1, pp. 2903-2904.) As part of the 1978 amendments, a provision similar to subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1714 was added as subdivision (c) to section 25602: "(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal.3d 153 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151] ), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal.3d 313 [128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719] ) and Coulter v. Superior Court [21 Cal.3d 144, 145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669] be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." Also added to section 25602 as part of the same enactment was subdivision (b), which provides that no person who commits a misdemeanor pursuant to subdivision (a) "... shall be civilly liable to any injured person ... for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage." (Id., at p. 2904.)

The single statutory exception to the broad immunity created by the 1978 amendments is found in section 25602.1, also added in 1978: "Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 25602, a cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death against any [licensed purveyor of alcoholic beverages] who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or giving of such beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained by such person." (Italics added, Stats.1978, ch. 930, § 1, p. 2905.)

Section 25658 provides in subdivision (a) that: "Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." Because section 25658 contains no express language of civil immunity comparable to that contained in section 25602, plaintiff maintains that defendants remain exposed to common law tort liability for selling alcoholic beverage to a person who, though not obviously intoxicated, is under age 21, as are licensed vendors who sell liquor to an obviously intoxicated minor pursuant to section 25602.1.

The 1978 amendments expressly abrogate the holdings of Vesely, Bernhard, and Coulter. Departing from the then existing common law rule, Vesely held that a commercial vendor of alcoholic beverages was subject to liability for injuries to third persons resulting from the vendor's sale of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person in violation of section 25602. (Supra, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151.) The Vesely court reasoned that the injured third party was among the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted and concluded a presumption of negligence would arise if the plaintiff could establish that the statutory violation proximately caused his injuries. (P. 165, 95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151; see also Evid.Code, § 669.) While Vesely relied upon a statutory violation to make out a breach of duty of care, the Bernhard court clarified that "there was no bar to civil liability under modern negligence law" against a defendant commercially providing alcohol in Nevada to an obviously intoxicated person. (Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 325, 128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719; see also Cantor v. Anderson (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 124 at p. 127, 178 Cal.Rptr. 540.) Finally, in Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, 145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669, the Vesely holding was extended "to noncommercial providers, such as 'social hosts,' relying upon both section 25602 and traditional common law negligence principles." (Cory v. Shierloh (1981) 29 Cal.3d 430, 434-435, 174 Cal.Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8; see also Cantor v. Anderson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 127, 178 Cal.Rptr. 540.) Said the Coulter court: "We think it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those on the highway.... Simply put, one who serves alcoholic beverages under such circumstances fails to exercise reasonable care." (Italics in original; Coulter, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 152-153, 145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669; see also Cory v. Shierloh, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 435, 174 Cal.Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8.)

Guided by settled principles of statutory construction we conclude that the sweeping civil immunity now provided by Civil Code section 1714 and section 25602 was intended to encompass the situation where alcoholic beverages are sold to a person "under the age of 21 years" ( § 25658), except where the sale is by a licensee to a "minor" who, at the time of sale, is "obviously intoxicated" within the meaning of section 25602.1. "Although the 1978 amendments are hardly models of draftmanship" (Cory v. Shierloh, supra, 29...