Stratakos v. Nassau Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV 15-7244 (GRB)(ARL) |
| Citation | 574 F.Supp.3d 154 |
| Parties | Demitrios STRATAKOS, Plaintiff, v. NASSAU COUNTY; Police Officer Prashant Rane and Police Officer Karl Padilla, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Ethan Daniel Irwin, Ethan D. Irwin PLLC, New York, NY, James M. Ingoglia, Raiser & Kenniff, P.C., Steven Raiser, Raser & Kenniff, Mineola, NY, for Plaintiff.
John Alexander Genua, Ralph J. Reissman, Spencer David Shapiro, Office of the Nassau County Attorney, Mineola, NY, Alexander Sendrowitz, Quatela Chimeri, PLLC, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants Nassau County, Police Officer Prashant Rane, Police Officer Karl Padilla, Police Officer "John" Cabey, Sergeant James Brown.
John Alexander Genua, Spencer David Shapiro, Office of the Nassau County Attorney, Mineola, NY, Alexander Sendrowitz, Quatela Chimeri, PLLC, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendant Detective "John" Dluginski.
Alexander Sendrowitz, Quatela Chimeri, PLLC, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendant Police Officer John Does Numbers 1-10.
Plaintiff Demitrios Stratakos ("plaintiff") commenced this action against defendants Nassau County, Police Officer Prashant Rane and Police Officer Karl Padilla for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent state law claims. Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Docket Entry ("DE") 102. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED to the extent set forth herein.
The facts and procedural history are contained in this Court's Memorandum and Order dated June 24, 2021, familiarity with which is assumed. Stratakos v. Nassau Cty. , No. CV 15-7244 (GRB), 2021 WL 2587722, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2021). As noted therein, the Court awarded plaintiff a total of $230,000, consisting of $115,000 in compensatory damages, $75,000 in punitive damages against defendant Rane and $45,000 in punitive damages against defendant Padilla. Id. at *14.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. DE 102. Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees totaling $246,100.00 and costs totaling $41,313.17. Pl.’s Br. 20, DE 102. In their response, defendants: (1) contend that plaintiff failed to contemporaneously keep time records; and (2) challenge plaintiff's fee request as unreasonably high because (i) the rates and hours charged are unreasonable, (ii) billings contain vague entries, and (iii) argue for a reduction based upon limited success. DE 104.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes an attorneys’ fee award to prevailing plaintiffs in a civil rights lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. James v. City of Boise , 577 U.S. 306, 306, 136 S.Ct. 685, 193 L.Ed.2d 694 (2016) ; Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 550, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) ; Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). "When a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation ... he serves ‘as a private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Fox v. Vice , 563 U.S. 826, 833, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (citations omitted). As such, "plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 109, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ); see also Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). The Supreme Court has described this standard as "generous" since nominal damages of one dollar are enough to bring plaintiff across the "prevailing party" threshold. Farrar , 506 U.S. at 112, 113 S.Ct. 566 ; see also Barbour v. City of White Plains , 700 F.3d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 ).
Here, plaintiff qualifies as a "prevailing party" under § 1988 as plaintiff established Fourth Amendment violations of excessive force and assault and battery, failure to intervene, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Stratakos , 2021 WL 2587722, at *8-11. This decision reversed an earlier summary judgment order dismissing the claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and condemned "the fraudulent nature of the evidence submitted by defendants at summary judgment." Id. at *10. There can be little question as to the extent of plaintiff's success, which was substantial. Therefore, the remaining issue concerns the amount of a "reasonable" fee award to plaintiff. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; see also Farrar , 506 U.S. at 114-15, 113 S.Ct. 566 ().
"Both [the Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar—the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case–creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’ " Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co. , 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). "The lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney's fee." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 553, 130 S.Ct. 1662 ; see also Millea , 658 F.3d at 167. "[T]he lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 551, 130 S.Ct. 1662. "The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay ... bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively." Lilly v. City of New York , 934 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2019).
"The burden is on the party seeking attorney's fees to submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed." Maldonado v. Srour , No. 13-CV-5856 (ILG)(JO), 2016 WL 5864587, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2016). "The moving party must support its application by providing contemporaneous time records that detail for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." Riley v. City of New York , No. 10-CV-2513 (MKB), 2015 WL 9592518, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2015) (quoting N.Y.A.R.C., Inc. v. Carey , 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "District courts have broad discretion, using their experience with the case, as well as their experience with the practice of law, to assess the reasonableness of each component of a fee award." Feltzin v. Union Mall, LLC , 393 F. Supp. 3d 204, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has instructed district courts to consider "all case-specific variables" including factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron , 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989), in determining the reasonable hourly rate. Lilly , 934 F.3d at 230.1 The Court "need not robotically ‘recite and make separate findings as to all twelve of the Johnson factors.’ " Vanacore v. Expedite Video Conferencing Servs., Inc. , No. 14-CV-6103 (GRB), 2019 WL 96243, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) (); see also Lilly , 934 F.3d at 233 (). "[T]he most critical factor in a district court's determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorneys’ fee in a given case is the degree of success obtained by the plaintiff." Konits v. Karahalis , 409 F. App'x 418, 421 (2d Cir. 2011).
This Court also follows the Second Circuit's "forum rule," which "generally requires use of the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee." Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. , 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009). Under the "forum rule," this Court uses the prevailing hourly rate in the Eastern District of New York in calculating the reasonable hourly rate. Torcivia v. Suffolk Cty. , 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 250-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). In recent years, courts in this district have awarded fees in the Eastern District of New York at an hourly rate of $200 to $450 per hour for partners, $200 to $325 for senior associates, and $100 to $200 for junior associates. Crews v. County of Nassau , No. 06-CV-2610 (JFB), 2019 WL 6894469, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2019). "Ultimately, however, in light of the numerous factors that courts in this circuit consider to determine a reasonable hourly rate, the range of reasonable attorney fee rates in this district depends on the type of case, the nature of the litigation, the size of the firm, and the expertise of its attorneys." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"The party seeking attorney's fees also bears the burden of establishing that the number of hours for which compensation is sought is reasonable." Custodio v. Am. Chain Link & Constr., Inc. , No. 06-CV-7148 (GBD) (HBP), 2014 WL 116147, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014) (citation omitted). "Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, are to be excluded, and in dealing with such surplusage, the court has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, while...
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