Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty.

• Citation: 437 F.Supp.3d 239
• Decision Date: 03 February 2020
• Docket Number: CV 15-1791 (GRB)
• Parties: Wayne TORCIVIA, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY, New York, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

437 F.Supp.3d 239

Wayne TORCIVIA, Plaintiff,

v.SUFFOLK COUNTY, New York, et al., Defendants.

CV 15-1791 (GRB)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed February 3, 2020

Amy L. Bellantoni, The Bellantoni Law Firm, LLP, Scarsdale, NY, for Plaintiff.

Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, Defendants County Suffolk, Police Officer James Adler, Investigator Thomas Carpenter, Captain William Scrima.

Anthony M. Maffia, Catherine Ann Brennan, Scott G. Christesen, Fumuso, Kelly, Swart, Farrell, Polin and Christesen LLP, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendant Mary Catherine Smith.

Ralph Pernick, New York State Attorney General, Mineola, NY, Elyce Noel Matthews, NY OAG, New York, NY, for Defendants Kristen Steele, Dianna D'Anna, Adeeb Yacoub.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

Before the Court are cross motions for attorneys' fees and costs by plaintiff Wayne Torcivia and defendants Suffolk County, Suffolk County Police Officers James Adler, Robert Verdu and Patrick Halpin, Suffolk County Police Captain William Scrima and Suffolk County Police Department Investigator Thomas Carpenter (collectively "County Defendants"). Docket Entries ("DE") 185, 189. For the following reasons, the cross motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Familiarity with the facts and procedural history are presumed. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint on April 2, 2015. DE 1. All defendants answered the complaint, and the case proceeded to discovery. DE 9, 14, 16; Minute Entry dated Apr. 14, 2016. On February 23, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting federal claims of violations of the First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims of unlawful imprisonment and defamation against Stony Brook University Hospital's Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program ("CPEP") employees Kirsten Steele, Dianna D'Anna, Dr. Adeeb Yacoub, Bridget Walsh, Timothy J. Aiello, and Michelle Sanchez, CPEP Intern Mary Catherine Smith (collectively "CPEP Defendants"), County Defendants, and several John Doe Police Officers. Am. Compl., DE 66. All defendants filed answers to the amended complaint. DE 71-73, 76. On December 14, 2017, the Court so-ordered a stipulation dismissing the action against defendants Timothy Aiello, Michelle Sanchez and Bridget Walsh. DE 92. The remaining parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Following a pre-motion conference, plaintiff filed a letter voluntarily agreeing to withdraw with prejudice numerous state and federal claims. DE 124. On March 29, 2019, the Honorable LaShann DeArcy Hall, United States District Judge, ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment as follows:

the County Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Plaintiff's Monell claims arising from the seizure of Plaintiff's weapons, Second Amendment claims, and all claims against Thomas Carpenter and William Scrima are dismissed. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The Court finds that the County Defendants deprived Plaintiff of post-deprivation due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to hold a hearing with respect to his long arms. All of Plaintiff's remaining Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are dismissed. The CPEP Defendants' and CPEP Intern Smith's motions for summary judgment are GRANTED and all claims against them are dismissed. Plaintiff's motion to withdraw certain causes of actions [DE 124] is also GRANTED.

Summ. J. 45, DE 148.

The parties then consented to U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction for all purposes, and the undersigned presided over the case as a U.S. Magistrate Judge. DE 154. On the eve of trial, plaintiff and County Defendants agreed that damages as to the Fourteenth Amendment post-deprivation due process claim was $100.00 and consented to the undersigned to enter an order of damages accordingly. A jury trial was held from November 6, 2019 to November 8, 2019 where plaintiff presented several witnesses and a rebuttal case. The jury found the County Defendants not liable at trial. DE 179

On November 12, 2019, the Court issued the following order: "The parties consented to the undersigned to calculate damages to be awarded from plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process post-deprivation claim. For the avoidance of doubt, given the sole evidence adduced at trial that damages for the recovery of the long arms was $100.00, said figure is the appropriate damage amount as to this claim." Stipulation and Order dated Nov. 12, 2019. Therefore, the Clerk of the Court issued a judgment for plaintiff to recover $100.00 from defendant Suffolk County for the Fourteenth Amendment post-deprivation due process claim. DE 183.

Plaintiff and County Defendants then filed cross motions for attorneys' fees. DE 185, 189. County Defendants seeks attorneys' fees of $75,836.25 and costs of $723.95. Zwilling Aff. ¶¶ 16-19, DE 189. Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees of $124,627.50 and costs of $8,108.93. Pl.'s Br. 15, DE 186. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 13, 2019. DE 190.

DISCUSSION

a. Attorney's Fee Award for County Defendants

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows an attorney's fee award to prevailing defendants in a civil rights lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fox v. Vice , 563 U.S. 826, 833, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011). For defendants to be a prevailing party, they must "achieve some ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,’ [that is] judicially sanctioned." Manhattan Review LLC v. Yun , 919 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted); see also Opoku v. Cty. of Suffolk , 123 F. Supp. 3d 404, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). This includes a party who secures a judgment on the merits, Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach , 759 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2014), a voluntary dismissal with prejudice, id. at 165, or a defense jury verdict, LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher , 143 F.3d 765, 768 (2d Cir. 1998). The defendant does not have to prevail on every claim to be a prevailing party. See CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C. , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1650, 194 L.Ed.2d 707 (2016) ; see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ; Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 790, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).

Section 1988 only authorizes a district court to award attorney's fees to a defendant "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Fox , 563 U.S. at 833, 131 S.Ct. 2205. A claim is frivolous "when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Shakur v. Selsky , 391 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2004) ; see also Opoku v. Cty. of Suffolk , 123 F. Supp. 3d 404, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A claim is non-frivolous "where plaintiff has made a sufficient evidentiary showing to forestall summary judgment and has presented sufficient evidence at trial to prevent the entry of judgment against him as a matter of law." Opoku , 123 F. Supp. 3d at 413 (citing LeBlanc–Sternberg , 143 F.3d at 771 ).

Where there are frivolous and non-frivolous claims, " Section 1988 permits the defendant to receive only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim." Fox , 563 U.S. at 836, 131 S.Ct. 2205 ; see also Carter , 759 F.3d at 163. As the Court explained, "if a defendant would have incurred [fees to defend against frivolous claims] anyway, to defend against non -frivolous claims, then a court has no basis for transferring the expense to the plaintiff." Fox , 563 U.S. at 836, 131 S.Ct. 2205.

The Supreme Court has cautioned that "it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C. , 434 U.S. 412, 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) ; see also Fox , 563 U.S. at 833-34, 131 S.Ct. 2205 ; Opoku , 123 F. Supp. 3d at 410 ("it should be rare for a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 case to be awarded attorney's fees" because of the "concern[s] about the potential chilling effect on § 1983 plaintiffs—who are the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate a policy of national priority.").

Here, County Defendants are prevailing parties because the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants as to several federal claims, Summ. J. 45, entered plaintiff's voluntary dismissal with prejudice numerous claims, id. , and County Defendants secured a defense verdict at trial.

Nonetheless, County Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees because they failed to demonstrate what fees they would not have paid but for a frivolous claim. Plaintiff certainly has some non-frivolous claims. See Stipulation and Order dated Nov. 12, 2019 ($100.00 in Fourteenth Amendment post-deprivation due process claim); Summ. J. (claims surviving summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, and proceeding to jury verdict). However, County Defendants on this motion failed to articulate which claims were frivolous, and therefore, failed to demonstrate what attorneys' fees were "incurred because of, but only because of, a frivolous claim." Cf. Fox , 563 U.S. at 836, 131 S.Ct. 2205.

Instead, County Defendants argue in a conclusory fashion that they are entitled to attorneys' fees because County Defendants "fully and completely prevailed on every claim [at trial]" based upon the "jury's quick rejection" of those claims. Defs.' Br. 7-8, DE 189-5. The Court rejects this "post hoc reasoning" that the Supreme Court expressly warned...