Strattman v. Studt

• Decision Date: 17 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69-381,69-381
• Citation: 49 O.O.2d 428,253 N.E.2d 749,20 Ohio St.2d 95
• Parties: , 49 O.O.2d 428 STRATTMAN, Appellant, v. STUDT, Supt., Cincinnati Workhouse, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 95

20 Ohio St.2d 95

253 N.E.2d 749, 49 O.O.2d 428

STRATTMAN, Appellant, v. STUDT, Supt., Cincinnati Workhouse, Appellee.

No. 69-381.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 17, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A court sentence pursuant to law which imposes both a maximum confinement and a fine does not, standing alone, deny an indigent equal protection of the laws.

2. Under the provisions of 2947.20, Revised Code, where a fine has been imposed but not paid, the court has the discretion to order the defendant committed to jail until the fine is paid.

3. In the enactment of 2947.20, Revised Code, the General Assembly has provided a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling or unable to pay.

4. An indigent defendant, committed to jail until his fine is paid or secured to be paid, who receives credit upon the fine at the rate of three dollars per day, is denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

5. A credit of three dollars per day on a fine, under Section 2947.20, Revised Code, is a grossly unreasonable monetary allowance for each day's work in confinement, and, when applied to an indigent, unfairly discriminates against him in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

6. The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract.

7. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments thereon are debts, within the purview of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.)

8. Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional.

On September 30, 1968, petitioner, Walter Strattman was found guilty in the Hamilton County Municipal Court of making a false report to the police in violation of Section 901-f3 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinatti, Ohio. ¹ He was given the maximum authorized sentence of six months in the Cincinnati workhouse and assessed a fine of $500 and costs. After serving the six months (ending on March 31, 1969), petitioner, unable to pay the fine and costs, was further confined, apparently pursuant to Section 2947.20, Revised Code, ² until the fine and costs were paid at the rate of three dollars per day credited against them.

On April 18, 1969, petitioner filed a pauper's affidavit with the Municipal Court; and on April 22, 1969, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. A memorandum supporting his petition alleged that his continued incarceration deprived him of his rights of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioner contended further that the Municipal Court abused its discretion in sentencing him to both the maximum prison term and the maximum fine and costs, when the imposition of the fine and costs in reality meant further incarceration.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitin, holding that the petitioner was not denied equal protection and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It should be noted that, although the pauper's affidavit was filed in the Court of Appeals prior to the hearing on the writ of habeas corpus, there is nothing in the record to indicate petitioner's indigency at the time of sentencing by the Municipal Court. Moreover, the record does not reveal when or how the sentencing court implemented the provisions of Section 2947.20, Revised Code. Inasmuch as the parties do not argue those points, we assume that the procedural requirements of the statute were met and that petitioner is indigent.

The Court of Appeals certified the record to this court, finding that its judgment was in conflict with the case of In re Petition of Cole, 17 Ohio App.2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384, decided by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, which held that a court abuses its discretion by imposing a sentence which results in imprisonment in default of payment of the fine which exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed as an original sentence.

Allen Brown and David L. Sterling, Cincinnatti, for appellant.

William A. McClain, City Sol., Ralph E. Cors and William B. Singer, Cincinnati, for appellee.

DUNCAN, Judge.

With respect to the fine, the questions to be decided are whether Section 2947.20, Revised Code, which permits incarceration for nonpayment, denies an indigent equal protection of the laws; and whether there is an abuse of discretion where a trial court imposes a fine which, in effect, confines an indigent longer than the maximum sentence authorized by the statute or ordinance violated.

In deciding those questions, we must consider the implications our decision will have upon our established systems of penal fines and imprisonment for nonpayment of fines. We must, in addition, remember the doctrine of equal protection for indigents, as stated in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891.

It is with awareness of these caveats that we consider whether or not Section 2947.20, Revised Code, as applied to the facts at bar, violates petitioner's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Statutes are capable of violating equal protection in three ways: (1) A statute may be discriminatory on its face; ³ (2) though fair on its face, a statute may be applied in a discriminatory manner; ⁴ and (3) a statute can violate equal protection because, as in Griffin, the effect of its application causes results which depend upon the solvency of criminal defendants. Herein, we are concerned with a Griffin type discrimination. ⁵

We hold that Section 2947.20, Revised Code, as applied to an indigent defendant who has served the maximum incarceration authorized by the substantive statute, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Our reasoning combines an interpretation of the legislative intent in the enactment of Section 2947.20, Revised Code, and a determination of whether the credit sum of three dollars per day, provided by that section, is reasonable.

In construing statutes almost identical to Section 2947.20, some courts have determined the legislative intent in enacting such laws to be for the single purpose of providing the court with a means to coerce payment of a fine from an unwilling but able-to-pay criminal. See People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686 (construing Section 484, New York Code of Criminal Procedure), and In re Fil Ki, 80 Cal. 201, 22 P. 146 (construing Section 1205, Penal Code of California).

Other courts have construed such statutes to have a dual purpose which combines the above single coercive purpose with the additional objective of giving the state a method of obtaining payment of a fine from one who is unable to pay. This method contemplates working off the fine during incarceration. People v. Jaraslowski, 254 Ill. 299, 98 N.E. 547.

Judge Cardozo strongly implied this idea when he said that 'the state, when it punishes misdemeanors by fine, is not confined to the dubious remedy of a civil action for a penalty.' Chapman v. Selover, 225 N.Y. 417, 421, 122 N.E. 206. Although this dualpurpose concept is no longer a part of the legal philosophy of New York, it was followed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Jaraslowski, supra (254 Ill. 299, 98 N.E. 547), cited as controlling in People v. Williams, 41, Ill.2d 511, 244 N.E.2d 197.

Adoption of the single-purpose concept, as in New York and California when statutes or ordinances do not provide for confinement, results in the convicted indigent escaping without punishment because in theory the statute providing for confinement for failure to pay was not intended to apply to him. The single-purpose concept also gives rise to the basic premise of those cases which hold that a court abuses its discretion by fining an indigent and sentencing him to the maximum prison term, when the effect of the fine will be to incarcerate the indigent beyond the term authorized by the substantive statute. In re Petition of Cole, supra (17 Ohio App.2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384); People v. Saffore, supra (18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686); and Sawyer v. District of Columbia (D.C.C.A.), 238 A.2d 314, are cases which expressly or impliedly lead to this result. We believe the fallacy of that basic premise can lead to a result which denies equal protection to one who can pay, while the indigent goes unpunished.

Therefore, we are constrained to find that the dual-purpose concept is more compelling. We are persuaded not only by the conclusion that the single-purpose concept denies equal protection, but also by a consideration of the common law as to fines and the consequences of nonpayment.

The idea of paying fines to the state originated sometime in the 11th century when a criminal paid a wite to the king as part of his punishment. See 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2 Ed.), 448-451. History also reveals that most people who were unable to pay the wite were sold into slavery, presumably to repay the purchaser by labor. See id., at 460, 516. Incarceration until the fine was paid was a moderation of the slavery penalty and its primary aim was to secure payment in a more civilized manner. Cf. id., at 464, 518. Nevertheless the thrust of the original idea was that a man should work out his fine.

Consideration of Section 2947.15, Revised Code, persuades us that, in enacting Section 2947.20, Revised Code, the General Assembly had in mind the dual-purpose concept. Section 2947.15 provides that 'persons...