Strauss v. Mayor

• Decision Date: 15 November 1895
• Citation: 97 Ga. 475,25 S.E. 329
• Parties: STRAUSS. v. MAYOR, ETC., OF WAYCROSS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

97 Ga. 475

25 S.E. 329

STRAUSS.

v.MAYOR, ETC., OF WAYCROSS.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 15, 1895.

Intoxicating Liquors—Soliciting Orders—Conflicting Ordinance—Statutory Crime. Although a given act was, by a valid municipal ordinance, made an offense against the corporation, at a time when such an act was not indictable under the criminal laws of this state, the subsequent enactment by the general assembly of a statute making this identical act a crime or misdemeanor deprived the municipal authorities (they having no jurisdiction over state offenses) of the power to try and punish offenders for committing the act in question.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Ware county; J. L. Sweat, Judge.

Jerome Strauss was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Waycross, and brings error. Reversed.

W. M. Toomer, for plaintiff in error.

J. L. Crawley and L. A. Wilson, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, J. The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted by the mayor and council of Waycross upon the charge of "selling, taking, or receiving orders for the sale of, intoxicating drinks or spirituous or malt liquors or fermented or mixed intoxicating drinks, contrary to ordinance, " on January 27, 1894. Prior to the passage of the act of December 18, 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 115), soliciting orders for the sale of spirituous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors in any "prohibition" county in this state was not indictable under any criminal statute of Georgia, but was, for the first time, made a state offense by the passage of that act. The offense for which the plaintiff in error was convicted by the municipal court of Waycross was exactly the thing which the act of 1893 made a misdemeanor. Except in special instances (like that referred to In the case of Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S. E. 564), it is well settled in this state that municipal corporations have no authority to inflict punishment for acts indictable under the criminal laws of this state. The municipal authorities of Waycross (the charter of which was granted since the constitution of 1877) have no such power. It is undoubtedly true that sometimes an act, in its nature, constitutes two separate and distinct offenses, —one against the laws of the state, and the other against the ordinances of the municipality; and for the latter the municipal government may inflict punishment. The offense with which we are dealing in the present case was not, however, one having such a dual...