Street v. Treadwell

• Citation: 82 So. 28,203 Ala. 68
• Decision Date: 22 May 1919
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 4
• Parties: STREET v. TREADWELL et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

82 So. 28

203 Ala. 68

STREET v. TREADWELL et al.

7 Div. 4

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 22, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; Hugh D. Merrill, Judge.

Action by J.C. Street against S.D. Treadwell and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under section 6, Acts 1911, p. 449. Affirmed.

Sayre J., dissenting.

Suit by plaintiff, appellant here, against defendants (appellees) to recover damages for the destruction of plaintiff's lien as landlord, for rent of a certain farm by plaintiff's tenant, one Griffin, in that the defendant moved some lint cotton grown on said place, on which plaintiff had a lien, to where plaintiff is unable to enforce his lien, and said lien is therefore a loss to him.

Defendants demurred to the complaint: the second assignment being "It does not appear from said complaint that defendants knew of plaintiff's lien." The demurrer was sustained, and the complaint amended. Defendants pleaded the general issue; second, the statute of limitations of one year; third, payment by tenant (Griffin) of the debt; and fourth, that plaintiff was due tenant for certain implements aggregating more than the amount of rent claimed, etc.

Plea 4 as amended was demurred to upon the ground that it did not appear the alleged contract had any consideration; that the agreement for repairs was void under the statute of frauds; that sufficient facts are not stated in the plea to show a discharge of plaintiff's lien; and that the facts stated did not constitute a payment of the indebtedness due plaintiff from said Griffin.

Plaintiff filed replications to said plea 4 as amended: (1) Taking issue thereon; (2) that it was void under the statute of frauds; and (3) that the contract was without consideration.

The judgment entry shows that, issue being thus joined, all the evidence was heard by and submitted to a jury, resulting in the following verdict: "We, the jury, render a verdict in favor of the defendant." The appeal is on the record alone, and with no bill of exceptions.

Riddle & Riddle, of Talladega, for appellant.

W.M. Lackey, of Ashland, for appellees.

GARDNER J.

It is first insisted by appellant's counsel that prejudicial error was committed by the court in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. It seems to be conceded by counsel that, to establish liability in a case of this character, it must be shown that the defendants had notice or knowledge of the plaintiff's lien. The original complaint was entirely silent in this respect. The assignment of demurrer taking this point uses the language, "It does not appear from said complaint that the defendants knew of plaintiff's lien," and the argument is made that this was insufficient in that it should have said "knew of, or had notice of plaintiff's lien," and therefore the demurrer should not have been sustained.

It is, of course, well recognized in cases of this character that to charge a purchaser of crops from a tenant, it is not necessary that he should have actual notice of the landlord's lien; for, if he has knowledge of facts sufficient to excite inquiry, or knowledge of facts which would naturally and reasonably be calculated to arouse suspicion of the main fact--notice of which is sought to be charged to him--the duty of inquiry exists, and he must exercise it, as held by this court in Foxworth v. Brown, 114 Ala. 299, 21 So. 413, and Lomax v. LeGrand, 60 Ala. 537, as well as numerous other cases.

The language used in the assignment of demurrer should be given a reasonable construction in keeping with the well-recognized rule in regard to cases of this character. We do not construe the language used as indicating that actual knowledge was necessary, but only such knowledge of plaintiff's lien as is required by law, be it actual or constructive. As said by this court in Gamble v. Black Warrior Coal Co., 172 Ala. 669, 55 So. 190:

"Means of knowledge may be equivalent to knowledge. Whatever is sufficient to put one on his guard, and call for inquiry, is notice of everything to which the inquiry would lead."

By what is here said we do not mean to indicate that, as a general rule, "knowledge" is synonymous with "notice." The meaning of a word is to be largely determined by the connection in which it is used. As pointed out by this court in Harrington v. State, 76 So. 422, the extent or meaning of words and phrases are not always the same when used in connection with different statutes relating to different subjects. In Southern Ry. Co. v. Bunt, 131 Ala. 591, 32 So. 507, where the court was dealing with the question of wantonness in a personal injury case, it was held that "knowledge" and "notice" were not synonymous: it clearly appearing in cases of that character that notice is not the equivalent of actual knowledge. The correctness of this holding, of course, under those circumstances is not to be questioned, and is too clear for discussion. So, also, in Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, Ward & Co., 81 Ala. 140, 1 So. 773, in construing language in the requested instruction to the jury, it was pointed out that notice and knowledge were not synonymous, or at least the instruction may be construed by the jury as confining the inquiry within too narrow limits. In Bova v. Norigian, 28 R.I. 319, 67 A. 327, 125 Am.St.Rep. 743, it was said that notice is equivalent to information, intelligence, or knowledge; and in Piekenbrock & Sons v. Knoer, 136 Iowa, 534, 114 N.W. 200, the court said:

"Knowledge of fraud, as we have construed that expression in this connection, does not contemplate actual knowledge thereof before the statute begins to run, but

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