Streetsboro Edn. Assn. v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 92-2018

• Decision Date: 09 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-2018,92-2018
• Parties: , 88 Ed. Law Rep. 234 STREETSBORO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. STREETSBORO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 288

68 Ohio St.3d 288

626 N.E.2d 110, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 234

STREETSBORO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. STREETSBORO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant.

No. 92-2018.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 16, 1993.

Decided Feb. 9, 1994.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Where a provision of a collective bargaining agreement is in conflict with a state or local law pertaining to a specific exception listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), the law prevails and the provision of the agreement is unenforceable.

On February 14, 1989, two teachers in the Streetsboro City School District, plaintiffs-appellees Linda Jahn and Beverly Thorne, along with their collective bargaining representative, plaintiff-appellee Streetsboro Education Association ("education association"), filed an action against defendant-appellant, Streetsboro City School District Board of Education ("board of education"), in Portage County Common Pleas Court. Appellees contended that a provision of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the education association and the board of education was unenforceable.

It was alleged that Jahn and Thorne each had taken unpaid parental leaves of absence according to the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Each chose to purchase retirement service credit after the leave had ended from the State Teachers Retirement System ("STRS") to cover all or some of the times she had been on leave. The dispute between the parties revolves around appellees' attempt to have appellant pay the employer's share of the retirement service credit. Appellees claim that R.C. 3307.512 mandates that appellant pay the employer's share into STRS for the leave times covered by Jahn's and Thorne's elections to purchase service credit. Appellant argues that a provision in the collective bargaining agreement, Section C(1)(b), Article 3, specifying that the board of education "shall not be held responsible for any retirement costs incurred as a result of an unpaid Leave of Absence," is enforceable and absolves appellant of any responsibility to pay the employer's share.

After Jahn elected to purchase a portion of the retirement service credit, appellant paid the employer's share covering that portion of Jahn's leave of absence and was reimbursed by Jahn for that amount. Therefore, Jahn sought to recover in common pleas court the money she had expended to reimburse appellant.

After Thorne elected to purchase the retirement service credit, appellant paid the employer's share ($3,689.82) covering Thorne's leave of absence, but Thorne refused to reimburse appellant for the amount. Therefore, appellant filed a counterclaim in the suit to recover that money from Thorne.

The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, finding the collective-bargaining-agreement provision at issue was unenforceable. In making that determination, the trial court relied upon R.C. 4117.10(A), which states that "[l]aws pertaining to * * * the retirement of public employees * * * prevail over conflicting provisions of agreements between employee organizations and public employers." The trial court awarded Jahn the money she had spent to reimburse appellant (plus interest), and directed appellant to make employer payments for the purchase of the balance of the service credit. The court awarded appellant nothing on its counterclaim against Thorne. The court of appeals affirmed.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A., Ronald G. Macala and Anne Piero Silagy, Canton, for appellees.

Christley, Herington, Pierce, Silver & Habowski, Ronald J. Habowski and Leigh E. Herington, Aurora, for appellant.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

The issue presented is whether the provision contained in the parties' collective bargaining agreement, Section C(1)(b), Article 3, ¹ specifying that appellant shall not be responsible for paying the employer's share of retirement payments made to STRS for an unpaid leave of absence, is valid and enforceable. Appellees claim that the provision is not enforceable because R.C. 3307.512 ² specifically requires appellant to pay STRS the employer's share whenever an employee who is a member of STRS elects to purchase service credit following a period of approved absence or leave. For the reasons which follow, we find Section C(1)(b), Article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement unenforceable.

R.C. 4117.10(A) sets out the relationship between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and state or local laws. R.C. 4117.10(A) first provides that a collective bargaining agreement "governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement." From this it logically follows that if no state or local law makes a specification about a matter (i.e., if there is no conflict between the agreement and a law), then the agreement governs the parties as to that matter. Conversely, if a collective bargaining agreement makes no specification about a matter (i.e., if there is no conflict between a law and the agreement), then R.C. 4117.10(A) further provides that state and local laws generally apply to a public employer and its public employees regarding "wages, hours and terms and conditions" of employment.

When a provision in a collective bargaining agreement addresses a subject also addressed by a state or local law, so that the two conflict, R.C. 4117.10(A) delineates whether the collective bargaining provision or the law prevails. To do this, R.C. 4117.10(A) specifies certain areas in which laws will prevail over conflicting provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Consequently, where a provision of a collective bargaining agreement is in conflict with a state or local law pertaining to a specific exception listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), the law prevails and the provision of the agreement is unenforceable. However, if a collective bargaining provision conflicts with a law which does not pertain to one of the specific exceptions listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), then the collective bargaining agreement prevails. See State ex rel. Rollins v. Cleveland Hts.-University Hts. Bd. of Edn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 123, 532 N.E.2d 1289, paragraph one of the syllabus (collective bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting law unless the law falls within an exception listed in R.C. 4117.10[A] ). See, also, Cuyahoga Falls Edn. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Falls City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 193, 574 N.E.2d 442, paragraph two of the syllabus; Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 137, 143, 519 N.E.2d 347, 352-353.

Hence, the analysis employed to resolve whether the collective bargaining agreement or the state or local law prevails is straightforward: (1) Initially, we examine the relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement and the relevant state or local law, and ask whether the agreement and the law conflict. (2) If there is a conflict, we then ask whether the conflicting law pertains to one of the areas listed in R.C. 4117.10(A). The law prevails if the two questions above are answered in the affirmative. If that is the case, the conflicting provision in the collective bargaining agreement is unenforceable.

R.C. 3307.512(B) provides that a member of STRS who has been on leave and is unable to make contributions through employer payroll deductions to STRS during the leave time may purchase service credit. Jahn and Thorne could purchase service credit following their leaves under R.C. 3307.512(B). This statute allows any member of STRS to purchase service credit if the member has been absent from work due to "his [or her] own illness or injury, or who is, or has been, granted a leave for educational, professional, or other purposes pursuant to section 3319.13." The parental leave taken by Jahn and Thorne was an approved leave of absence for "other purposes" as provided for in R.C. 3319.13.

A member of STRS who chooses to purchase this service credit has several options on how to make the payments, depending on the member's situation. The differing methods for making the payments are set out in R.C. 3307.512(C), (D), and (E). Both R.C. 3307.512(C) and (D) state that "[t]he employer shall pay [STRS] the employer contributions on the compensation amount certified under this division." R.C. 3307.512(E) states that "[t]he employer shall pay to [STRS] for each year of credit purchased under this division * * *." Jahn and Thorne proceeded under R.C. 3307.512(D) to purchase service credit. Because R.C. 3307.512 requires appellant to pay the employer's share of service credit purchased, and the collective bargaining agreement provides that appellant is not responsible for paying the employer's share, the statute and the collective bargaining agreement are in conflict.

Appellant argues that the statute and the agreement do not conflict, pointing to R.C. 3319.13, which provides that a board of education "may grant a leave of absence * * * for educational or professional or other purposes, and shall grant such leave where illness or other disability is the reason...