Strickland v. State, 2 Div. 575
Decision Date | 11 October 1988 |
Docket Number | 2 Div. 575 |
Citation | 550 So.2d 1042 |
Parties | Larry STRICKLAND v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
William S. Poole, Jr., Demopolis, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Larry Strickland, was indicted on March 26, 1986, by the Marengo County Grand Jury for the offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, in violation of § 13A-6-66(a)(3), Code of Alabama 1975. The indictment charged Strickland with subjecting the victim to sexual contact, while he was over 16 years of age and she was less than 12 years of age. After trial, a jury found him guilty as charged in the indictment, and he was sentenced on October 15, 1986, to six years' imprisonment. He appeals, raising eight issues.
Appellant, a 29-year-old male, lived next door to the 3-year-old female victim. The victim testified that, while she was in appellant's home, looking at his goldfish, he pulled her pants down and "licked" her "on her bottom" and touched her on her bottom with his hands. Appellant testified that the victim and her younger sister came into his house to see his goldfish; that he picked up the victim and placed her on his hip so that she could better see the goldfish; that, in picking her up, he placed his right arm "up under her behind"; that, while holding her up in this position, she slipped, causing him to put his hand under her bottom to catch her; and that he then put her down and she left the house. He denied pulling down the child's pants, licking intimate parts of her body, or intentionally putting his hands on her intimate parts. He denied ever touching the child intentionally for the purpose of sexual gratification, and claimed that the only time he may have touched her on her bottom was when he was holding her and she slipped. The child testified that appellant picked her up so she could see the goldfish and that he touched her bottom when he was picking her up and putting her down. A medical examination of the child revealed no evidence of trauma and an intact hymen.
Several hours after the incident, appellant was arrested and transported to the Marengo County jail. He was advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), when first placed in the police car and, en route to the jail, was informed of the charges against him. He was advised that he had been accused of "fondling" and licking the intimate parts of the alleged victim. On the way to the jail, he denied the accusations, even though he was not subjected to questioning. After arriving at the jail, he continued to deny the accusations until he "broke down" and began to cry. He then told the officers that he would tell them about it. After, he was again read his Miranda rights, he signed a document waiving those rights, acknowledging that he understood them and agreeing to give a statement. The statement was recorded on tape and later transcribed. Both the tape and the written transcription were introduced in evidence at the trial, and the jury listened to the tape recording. In his statement, he admitted fondling the child, i.e., putting his hands in her panties, but denied licking her private parts.
Appellant's first four issues raised on appeal concern the admissibility of the videotaped deposition of the child victim. He contends that the statute authorizing videotaped depositions of children under 16 years of age in sexual abuse cases, § 15-25-2, Code of Alabama 1975, is unconstitutional in that it violates the due process and confrontation clauses of Ala. Const. art. I, § 6, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In the alternative, he contends that, if the statute is constitutional on its face, it was applied in his case in an unconstitutional manner and, thus, deprived him of his rights under the due process and confrontation clauses of the United States and Alabama constitutions. He contends that reversible error occurred when the state failed to follow the procedure prescribed in the statute for the taking of the deposition. He further contends that, prior to the taking of the videotaped deposition, the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to ascertain the competency of the child to testify and the necessity for asking leading questions.
The statute which authorizes the use of videotaped depositions in cases of sexual offenses against children is § 15-25-2, which states the following:
On September 2, 1986, the district attorney moved the trial court to issue an order to take a videotaped deposition of the child victim's testimony to be used in lieu of her live testimony before the jury. As grounds for the motion, the district attorney alleged that the child is four years of age; that the nature of the testimony to be expected is sexual in nature, lurid and sordid; that it would be extremely embarrassing to the child and could cause her emotional and psychological damage if she testified in open court; and that she is shy and requires special handling during questioning. On the following day, September 3, the trial court without a hearing, without notice to appellant, and without making any findings of necessity or good cause, ordered the deposition to be taken on September 4. On September 3, appellant, having learned of the motion, filed written objections and, after the deposition and on September 5, he filed a motion to exclude the deposition. The objections and motion to exclude raised the issues now raised on appeal. On September 8, immediately before the commencement of the trial, a hearing was held on the objections and the motion to exclude, and they were overruled. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated its reasons for ordering the taking of the deposition. The court stated the following:
All issues raised on appeal pertaining to the deposition are properly before us for review.
Appellant contends that the use of the victim's videotaped deposition denied him the constitutional right of confrontation. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Register v. State
...Inmon v. State, 585 So.2d 261, 265-66 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (quoting Lee v. State, 565 So.2d at 1154). See also Strickland v. State, 550 So.2d 1042, 1052-53 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 550 So.2d 1054 (Ala.1989). Ms. Boone's testimony regarding the details of the complaints made by the victims ......
-
People v. Newbrough
...the proper safeguards, a videotaped interview can also be used to present slanted or distorted testimony. See Strickland v. State, 550 So.2d 1042, 1051 (Ala.Cr.App.1988). Camera angles and lighting can affect the jurors' impressions of a witness' demeanor, and the use of videotape or closed......
-
Heup v. State, 8 Div. 52
...that have arisen where the right of confrontation involves very young witnesses in cases of sexual abuse. In Strickland v. State, 550 So.2d 1042 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), this Court, in upholding the constitutionality of Code of Alabama (1975), § 15-25-2 (pertaining to videotaped depositions of vi......
-
King v. State
...permitted to elicit on cross-examination from Houston the complete details of the victim's prior statements. Strickland v. State, 550 So.2d 1042, 1052-53 (Ala.Crim. App.1988), aff'd, 550 So.2d 1054 King is not entitled to any relief on these claims of error. III. King next argues that the t......