Strickland v. State
| Decision Date | 09 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. S89A0142,S89A0142 |
| Citation | 389 S.E.2d 230,260 Ga. 28 |
| Parties | STRICKLAND v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
1. The evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Strickland guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of his wife. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. The principal issue of this appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider certain physical and testimonial evidence obtained as a result of illegal custodial interrogations. 2 The State concedes that the police conduct was improper, and that the trial court correctly suppressed Strickland's statements made after he invoked his rights.
(a) Strickland arrived at the police station and reported that there had been a shooting; he gave the name of the victim, location of the body, and a description of the house in which the body was located and a description of two vehicles that were parked in front of the house. He showed police his State Bar of Georgia card and identified himself as an attorney. This took place, according to the evidence, before that invocation of rights.
(b) After Strickland invoked his rights, the continued questioning produced but minimal information. Specifically, the police learned:
(i) that Strickland had purchased a gun somewhere on Memorial Drive. (The gun was never found.)
(ii) that he had spent the previous night in a motel near the police department.
(iii) that he had driven a Cadillac automobile. (During the second interrogation, Strickland told the police that the Cadillac automobile was parked in the police parking lot.)
(c) At no time, either before or after invoking his privilege, did Strickland ever acknowledge any connection with the commission of the crime. Strickland himself testified to the same events as did the manager of the hotel and a sales clerk at the sporting goods store where he purchased the gun. 3
Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 4
3. The question relating to the amount of time Strickland was in custody was raised, addressed, and resolved in his first appeal and we will not reconsider it. Gilstrap v. State, 256 Ga. 20, 342 S.E.2d 667 (1986).
4. (a) Strickland contends that jury instructions on similar transactions, expert testimony, intent, and voluntary manslaughter were erroneous and that the court erred in failing to give other requested instructions.
(b) The following principles govern these contentions:
(i) "It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error." [Cits.] [Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 690, 353 S.E.2d 177 (1987).]
(ii) The failure to give a requested instruction is not reversible error where the charge given substantially covers the same principle of law. [Housel v. State, 257 Ga. 115, 122, 355 S.E.2d 651 (1987).]
Viewing the instructions as a whole, we find no error in the enumerations of error concerning jury instructions.
5. (a) Strickland contends that the trial court erred in compelling a psychiatrist to testify, in violation of his psychiatrist-patient privilege and Fifth Amendment rights. The psychiatrist never treated Strickland, and no treatment was contemplated. Strickland called the doctor to the stand to testify as to Strickland's mental state at the time of his wife's death.
(b) In Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 177 S.E.2d 79 (1970), we held:
Before the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege established by [OCGA § 24-9-21(5) ] may be invoked, the requisite relationship of psychiatrist and patient must have existed, to the extent that treatment was given or contemplated. [Id. at 704, 177 S.E.2d 79.]
"[W]e note that a number of courts have allowed the prosecution to offer otherwise inadmissible psychiatric testimony offered in the first instance by the defense." Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 636, 323 S.E.2d 801 (1984).
There was no error.
6. The trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury sua sponte on the issue of insanity. Strickland withdrew his insanity plea during the course of the trial; he did not request an insanity charge; and a charge was not authorized by the evidence.
7. The trial court did not err in allowing the state to impeach its own witness. Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 314, 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982).
8. Strickland claims that the transcript is inaccurate. The trial court heard evidence regarding the accuracy of the transcript, and found that there was no reason to doubt its accuracy "as to anything material." We find no error.
9. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit one of Strickland's exhibits for want of proper authentication. Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 104, 355 S.E.2d 649 (1987).
10. Strickland contends that the trial court erred in refusing him permission to respond to questions of law not presented except in the state's concluding argument. Strickland referred to "points that were raised concerning motive and the injury being feigned to get drugs that we hadn't any prior knowledge of." The trial court correctly denied Strickland an opportunity to respond to the state's closing argument.
11. The trial court denied Strickland's request to have his co-counsel perform a demonstration with a gun during Strickland's closing argument. This did not amount to a denial of the right to comment upon physical evidence introduced by the state. There was no error.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except SMITH, P.J., and BENHAM, J., who dissent.
The appellant never denied shooting his wife; he denied murdering her. He asserted that medication he received at the hospital just prior to the shooting prevented him from being able to form the intent required to be convicted of murder. He also asserted that the crime, at most, was voluntary manslaughter, not murder, because he acted solely as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. OCGA § 16-5-2(a). According to his testimony, just moments after they had engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, his wife told him their sexual act had no meaning for her and she began to recite a list of people with whom she had engaged in acts of sexual intercourse.
The state sought a murder conviction, and it used the fruits of the statements it obtained from him through an illegal interrogation to prove an essential element of murder, malice. OCGA § 16-5-1(b). It cannot be said that the use of the fruits of the illegal interrogation "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
The following portion of the Jackson- Denno hearing and the trial court's order provide all the facts that are necessary for a thorough understanding of the factual issues in this case.
The following is part of the Jackson- Denno hearing:
(Unless otherwise specified the questions are by Mr. Strickland, pro se, and the answers by the detective who interrogated him.)
Q. You would come in and ask me questions and I would respond and sometimes I wouldn't?
A. Right.
Q. But this was contact initiated by you; isn't that correct?
A. I would walk in the room, yes, and ask you a question.
Q. [D]id DeKalb County Police Department have any policies, rules, or procedures concerning the questioning of a person in custody once the person has invoked a right to remain silent and asked for an attorney?
. . . . .
A. It's up to the individual.
Q. In other words, it's up to the individual officer whether to continue questioning a person who's expressed a desire to remain silent and for an attorney?
A. Well, I have a job to do just like everybody else.
Q. But there was no procedure that once this had occurred, you should not question the suspect further; is that what you're saying?
A. Normally if I don't say that to someone, nobody is going to know it. Right?
. . . . .
[E]xplain that last answer to me.
A. Okay. If I don't go out there and say to my superior officer, "Mr. Strickland said he wanted an attorney and he's not going to talk anymore to me["]--I think I just stayed in the room. We just kept talking.
The trial court order denying the appellant's motion for new trial follows:
Regardless of how many trials over which one presides, violence remains shocking. In this instance a young lady's life was snuffed out by bullets to the brain. Photographs and other evidence were graphic.
But not even these circumstances justify illegal police conduct such as that which occurred in this case. At approximately 10:00 A.M., October 16, 1985, several hours after he had pumped three bullets into the head of his wife, the defendant, an attorney, walked into the police station and announced that he was there to talk about "the shooting." Mistakenly, he assumed the police had received notice of this incident.
The defendant was placed under arrest at approximately 11:00 A.M. After he was advised of his constitutional rights, he elected to remain silent until he had an opportunity to talk with a lawyer.
This notwithstanding, for a period in...
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