Stringer v. Stringer
Decision Date | 28 February 1997 |
Citation | 689 So.2d 194 |
Parties | Carolyn Davis STRINGER v. Lawrence D. STRINGER. 2951024. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Martha Jane Patton, Birmingham, for appellant.
Ferris S. Ritchey III, Birmingham, for appellee.
Lawrence D. Stringer sued for a divorce from Carolyn Davis Stringer, alleging, among other things, that the parties had lived together since 1980 and were common-law husband and wife. Carolyn answered and counterclaimed for a divorce, also alleging that the parties had lived together as husband and wife since 1980.
Following an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court held that no common-law marriage existed and denied the relief requested by both parties. Carolyn appeals; we affirm.
A valid common-law marriage exists in Alabama when the following elements are present:
"1) capacity; 2) present, mutual agreement to permanently enter the marriage relationship to the exclusion of all other relationships; and 3) public recognition of the relationship as a marriage and public assumption of marital duties and cohabitation."
Boswell v. Boswell, 497 So.2d 479, 480 (Ala.1986)(quoted in Crosson v. Crosson, 668 So.2d 868, 870 (Ala.Civ.App.1995)).
Whether the essential elements of a common-law marriage exist is a question of fact. Johnson v. Johnson, 270 Ala. 587, 120 So.2d 739 (1960); Arrow Trucking Lines v. Robinson, 507 So.2d 1332 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). In Johnson, our supreme court stated:
270 Ala. at 588, 120 So.2d at 740. Likewise, whether the parties had the intent, or the mutual assent, to enter the marriage relationship is a question of fact. See Mickle v. State, 21 So. 66 (Ala.1896). Accord Krisko v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Ariz.App. 304, 488 P.2d 509, 510 (1971)("whether [the] requisites [for common-law marriage, including intent] are met in a particular case is a question of fact for the trier of fact"); Jones v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 462 So.2d 1348 (La.App.1985)(applying Texas law)(whether the parties have the intent to be married is a question of fact).
In this case, the trial court found that the parties did not have the requisite intent and, on that issue, we must presume that the trial court's finding was correct. See Waller v. Waller, 567 So.2d 869, 870 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). On appeal, we are not authorized to set aside the trial court's finding unless it is unsupported by credible evidence or palpably wrong. Id. In this case, the record contains evidence that supports the conclusion that the parties had no mutual assent to be married. Therefore, regardless of whether this court would have come to the same conclusion as the trial court, we must uphold the trial court's determination that no common-law marriage existed.
Lawrence Stringer testified that when he and Carolyn Davis first met each other, he was separated from his wife. He and his wife eventually divorced, and Carolyn became pregnant with Lawrence's child. Lawrence said that after Carolyn gave birth to the child, he "just didn't want her to struggle out there by herself with [their] child, so [he] told her to come on and move on in with [him]."
Lawrence testified that when he and Carolyn began living together he "wasn't ready to commit to a marriage." He stated that he had "tr[ied] to explain to [Carolyn] about the trauma behind a divorce." He said that although he "cared about [Carolyn], [he] just didn't want to commit to a marriage." Lawrence testified that he did not think Carolyn understood his feelings. He explained:
Lawrence stated that he was reluctant to marry Carolyn "because [of] the old pain from the old marriage." He said that "when [Carolyn] asked about getting married, [he] gave her excuses and excuses."
The parties lived together for 15 years, had 5 children, and filed joint tax returns. Carolyn testified that Lawrence told her to sign the tax returns as "Carolyn Davis Stringer" and that she did so. Lawrence acknowledged paternity of all five children. The three oldest children have the surname "Davis" and the two youngest children have the surname "Stringer." When asked why the last two children were named "Stringer," Carolyn replied, "Because I wanted them to have [Lawrence's] last name." She explained that three of the children were named "Davis" because Lawrence had refused to pay $35 to have their names changed.
When asked why he and Carolyn "did not get married later on in [their] relationship," Lawrence replied that, at one point, they He explained:
For most of the time the parties lived together, Lawrence provided the financial support and Carolyn stayed home to care for the children. Carolyn testified that after their second child was born, however, she went to work. She said that After a month, Lawrence came to her sister's house, kicked in her sister's door, and forcefully put Carolyn in his car. Saying "he wanted his family back home," he took Carolyn and the two children back to his house. Carolyn continued to work for a few more months but quit when she became pregnant with their third child.
After the one-month separation, the parties lived together continuously except for two brief periods when Carolyn and the children stayed at family violence shelters following physical abuse by Lawrence upon Carolyn.
When asked about why they did not get married at the courthouse as they had once planned, Carolyn testified that she "did not have [her] driver's license with [her] that day." When further questioned about why they did not get married "on a later occasion," Carolyn explained:
When asked by his attorney whether he was seeking a divorce from Carolyn, Lawrence replied:
Carolyn argues that the record demonstrates a mutual assent to be married. First, she claims that, because the pleadings filed by both parties averred the existence of a common-law marriage, the trial court was bound by Rule 8(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., to treat the averments as admissions. Second, she argues that because each party occasionally referred, during the trial, to their relationship as a "marriage," or to the other party as a "husband" or "wife," those references illustrate the parties' intent. Finally, she contends that because she sought and received help under the Protection from Abuse Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 30-5-1, which provides relief to "spouses [and] persons living in common-law marriage relationships" but not to persons merely cohabiting, that demonstrates public recognition of her marital state.
Rule 8(d) did not bind the trial court to a determination that a common-law marriage existed. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the parties a divorce...
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