Strong v. State
| Decision Date | 09 May 1914 |
| Citation | 166 S.W. 967 |
| Parties | STRONG, Superintendent of Workhouse, v. STATE ex rel. BARRETT. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; H. W. Laughlin, Judge.
Application for writ of habeas corpus by the State, upon the relation of Pressly Barrett, against E. E. Strong, superintendent of a workhouse. From a judgment granting the writ, respondent appeals. Affirmed.
R. Lee Bartels and Greer & Greer, all of Memphis, for appellant. Clarence Friedman, of Memphis, for appellee.
The relator, Barrett, was convicted in the criminal court of Shelby county and sentenced to serve a term of 11 months and 29 days in the county workhouse, and to pay the costs of the prosecution. After serving a portion of the sentence period he escaped; but he was recaptured and again placed in the workhouse. After then completing the original term of service, he tendered to the proper official the amount of the costs of his prosecution, $114, which was refused on the ground that the county had expended the further sum of $125 in recapturing him, which sum was demanded, making the aggregate of $239 required to be paid as the condition of his release.
A writ of habeas corpus was sued out to enforce release upon the payment of the $114 and without payment of the $125. The circuit judge granted the relief sought by Barrett; and the relator, who is superintendent of the workhouse, has appealed.
The record shows no denial that there was an escape from custody, and there is neither denial nor admission that the expense of recapture was properly the sum stated.
The general workhouse act (Acts 1891, c. 123, § 18; Code, Shannon, § 7423) provides: "Should any prisoner escape, he or she shall forfeit all deductions (of good time) that have been allowed, and, when recaptured, shall be made to work out the costs of the same, in addition to the other costs in the case."
It is the contention of the jailor that Barrett was properly held to work out the cost of his recapture under the statute, while Barrett insists that this provision is unconstitutional in that it works a denial of trial by a jury of his peers and of due process of law.
The statute under review makes no provision for an opportunity to the prisoner to be heard, for representation by counsel, or for the production of evidence as to the fact or intent of the escape. The amount to be expended in recapture is not fixed by the statute, and the reasonableness of the same is not provided to be ascertained after an inquiry in which the prisoner may be heard, in which hearing the rules of procedure shall be the same as are applied in similar causes, as must be the case. In re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 Pac. 374, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123.
It is conceded by relator that escape and prison breach are offenses at common law. The statute in question does not even undertake to declare such an escape a statutory crime and fix the payment of cost of...
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...in numerous decisions of this court. See Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798, 121 Am.St.Rep. 1002; Strong, Supt. v. State ex rel., 129 Tenn. 472, 166 S.W. 967; Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Shan.Cas. 230; Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. McFall, 128 Tenn. 645, 163 S.W. 806; Obion County v. Co......
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