Strongsville v. Patel, 2005 Ohio 620 (OH 2/17/2005), Case No. 84736.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 84751.,Case No. 84749.,Case No. 84752.,Case No. 84750.,Case No. 84753.,Case No. 84736.,Case No. 84754. |
| Citation | 2005 Ohio 620 |
| Parties | City of Strongsville, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shirishbha Patel, et al. Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
George F. Lonjak, Strongsville City Prosecutor, 16099 Foltz Industrial Parkway, Strongsville, Ohio 44149, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Michael R. Gareau, Jr., David M. Gareau, Beth A. Stehlik, Michael R. Gareau & Assoc. Co., 23823 Lorain Road, Suite 200, North Olmsted, Ohio 44070, for Defendants-Appellants, Shirishbha Patel, Mukesh Desai, Ashok Patel, Manhar R. Shah, Simon S. Zariffe, Eva C. Shepard & James J. Shepard.
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, defendants-appellants, Mukesh Desai, Shirishbha Patel, Ashok Patel, Eva Shepard, James J. Shepard, Manhar Shah, and Simon Zariffe (collectively referred to as "Appellants"), appeal their convictions for violating Strongsville City Ordinances 1454 et seq. ("S.C.O. 1454"). Finding merit to the appeal, we reverse and vacate their convictions.
{¶ 2} In 2002, Officer Marianna Bonacci ("Bonacci") of the Strongsville Police Department conducted administrative searches of the motels which appellants owned and operated. The purpose of Bonacci's search was to inspect the motel occupancy records. Upon request, all but Manhar Shah voluntarily provided the records to Bonacci. After reviewing the records, Bonacci discovered that several guests had stayed beyond the 30-day limit allowed by the City's ordinance. As a result, the appellants were cited for violating S.C.O. 1454.13. Shah was cited under S.C.O. 1454.03 for his refusal to allow Bonacci to inspect the occupancy records.
{¶ 3} Following their no contest pleas, the trial court found appellants guilty, imposed individual fines of $25, and placed them on one-year probation.1
{¶ 4} Appellants appeal their convictions, raising five assignments of error. Finding the first and second assignments of error dispositive, we will address them first.
{¶ 5} In their first and second assignments of error, the appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress and to dismiss, which alleged that the administrative search scheme is constitutionally unreasonable.
{¶ 6} When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539. We therefore consider whether the facts in the instant case demonstrate compliance with Strongsville's ordinances under a de novo standard of review. Resolution of this issue requires this court to examine the constitutionality of the ordinances.
{¶ 7} In determining the constitutionality of an ordinance, we are mindful of the fundamental principle requiring courts to presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation. Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38-39, 616 N.E.2d 163, Univ. Hts. v. O'Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 429 N.E.2d 148; Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 405 N.E.2d 1047. Further, the legislation being challenged will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. See, also, Hale v. Columbus (1990), 63 Ohio App.3d 368, 372, 578 N.E.2d 881, 883. {¶ 8} The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. In general, warrantless searches are unreasonable and therefore invalid. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. (1978), 436 U.S. 307, 312, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816. This general rule is applicable to commercial premises as well as homes. Id. An owner or operator of a business thus has a reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial property. United States v. Burger (1987), 482 U.S. 691, 699, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636, citing Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507. This expectation exists with respect to administrative inspections designed to enforce regulatory statutes. Burger, supra at 700, citing Marshall, supra at 312-313.
{¶ 9} However, the United States Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the warrant requirement for "pervasively regulated businesses," and industries closely regulated and "long subject to close supervision and inspection." United States v. Biswell (1972), 406 U.S. 311, 316, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87, 92 S. Ct. 1593, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 72, 77, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60, 90 S. Ct. 774. These industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for such an owner or operator. Burger, supra at 700, citing Katz, supra at 351-352.
{¶ 10} Because the owner or operator of a commercial premises in a "closely regulated" industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment have a lessened application in this context. Burger, supra at 702. "`Where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'" State v. Grays, Cuyahoga App. No. 82410, 2003-Ohio-6889 at ¶ 11, quoting Burger, supra at 702.
{¶ 11} This warrantless inspection, however, even in the context of a pervasively or closely regulated business, will be deemed reasonable so long as three criteria are met. Burger, supra 702. First, the regulatory scheme upon which the inspection is to be made must have a substantial governmental interest. Id. Second, the warrantless administrative search much be necessary to further the regulatory scheme. Id. Finally, the administrative scheme must "provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for the warrant." Burger, supra at 703, quoting Donovan v. Dewey (1981), 452 U.S. 594, 600, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 101 S.Ct. 2534.
(Citations omitted). Burger, supra at 703.
{¶ 12} The business of keeping a motel is closely related to the health and welfare of the public and has long been regarded as affecting public interest. State v. The Norval Hotel Co. (1921), 103 Ohio St. 361, 363, 133 N.E. 75.
{¶ 13} In the instant case, the trial court found Strongsville's ordinance regulating motel administrative searches constitutional, because all three prongs of the Burger test were satisfied. The trial court found that the ordinance was "sufficiently limited as to time (hours the motel is open), place (the motel where the registry is kept), and scope (only the registry book itself)."
{¶ 14} Although we agree with the trial court that the first two prongs of the Burger test are met, we disagree that the Strongsville regulatory scheme is "sufficiently limited in time" to satisfy the third prong of Burger.
{¶ 15} S.C.O. 1454.03 requires that any person in charge of a motel shall keep a register containing the names and personal information of all guests who stay at the motel. This guest register "shall always be open for inspection * * *." In addition, S.C.O. 1454.13 provides that the person in charge of a motel may not allow any guest to occupy a unit for a period exceeding thirty days.
{¶ 16} S.C.O. 1454.02 authorizes the right of entry for municipal officials to review the motel guest register. It provides:
{¶ 17} The City argues that the warrantless search of the motel register was valid because it is a closely regulated business and because all but one of the appellants consented to the search. However, if the authorization scheme of inspection is unconstitutional, then the City had no authority to...
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