Strut Cam Dimensions, Inc. v. Sutton
Citation | 896 S.W.2d 799 |
Decision Date | 06 October 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 13-93-651-CV,13-93-651-CV |
Parties | STRUT CAM DIMENSIONS, INC., Appellant, v. Joseph H. SUTTON, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
The transcript in this case includes a post-answer default judgment that neither addresses the defendants' counterclaims nor contains a Mother Hubbard clause denying all relief not expressly granted. Whether we have jurisdiction over this matter depends on the applicability of the Aldridge presumption to post-answer default judgments. See North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex.1966) ( ); see also Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex.1979) ( ).
The Dallas Court of Appeals, the only court to have specifically addressed this issue, has extended the Aldridge presumption of finality to post-answer default judgments. Thomas v. Dubovy-Longo, 786 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, writ denied); see also Schnitzius v. Koons, 813 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, no writ) (citing Thomas with approval). The Thomas court based its decision on language from Aldridge that applied the presumption of finality to cases "regularly set for a conventional trial on the merits." Thomas, 786 S.W.2d at 507 (quoting from Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 897) (emphasis supplied).
Since Aldridge, however, the supreme court has backed away from this language; the court has shifted focus from whether the dispute was set for trial to whether a conventional trial was actually conducted. See, e.g., Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex.1994) () (emphasis supplied); Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.1993) (); Houston Health Clubs v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986) (); Teer v. Duddlesten 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984) ( ); accord Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) ()
Because the supreme court no longer emphasizes trial setting as the act that attaches the presumption of finality, we must consider whether a post-answer default involves a conventional trial. In Stoner, the supreme court concluded that a post-answer default is not "a judgment upon trial ... [but] a form of 'judgment by default.' " Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682 (quoting Mullen v. Roberts, 423 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.1968)). Significantly, the Aldridge presumption does not apply to default judgments. Houston Health Clubs, 722 S.W.2d at 692.
Having considered the Thomas opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, we conclude that the presumption of finality does not apply to post-answer default judgments. We agree with the Dallas court that the nondefaulting party in a post-answer default must present evidence "as in a judgment upon a trial." Thomas, 786 S.W.2d at 507 (quoting Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682) (emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, post-answer default judgments do not follow a conventional trial on the merits because such judgments are not, in any event, "a judgment upon trial." Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682; c.f. Thomas, 786 S.W.2d at 507-08 (Enoch, C.J., concurring) ( ).
The post-answer default judgment in the instant case neither denies the defendants' counterclaims nor contains a Mother Hubbard clause. Absent the Aldridge presumption of finality, therefore, this judgment remains interlocutory until severed from, or modified to address, the defendants' counterclaims. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.
In our original per curiam opinion, we concluded that this post-answer default judgment was not final because it did not expressly dispose of the counter-actions or contain the phrase "all relief not expressly granted is denied." We dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the judgment was not final. Appellee's motion for rehearing raises the additional argument that the judgment is final because it disposes of the defendants' counter-actions by necessary implication. We agree, hold the judgment was final, but nevertheless dismiss the appeal.
This case involves a joint venture agreement to purchase ostriches in Africa and raise them...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ex parte Durham
...records or otherwise complied with Judge Murray's order. That judgment is now final. See Strut Cam Dimensions, Inc. v. Sutton, 896 S.W.2d 799 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (dismissing appeal because appellant filed transcript During postjudgment discovery, Judge Darrell Heste......
-
Zamarripa v. Sifuentes
...to presume waiver or abandonment because there was no conventional trial on the merits. See Strut Cam Dimensions, Inc. v. Sutton, 896 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied) (presumption of finality only applies when conventional trial actually conducted); H.E. Butt Gro......