Stuart v. Town of Brookline
Decision Date | 16 March 1992 |
Citation | 587 N.E.2d 1384,412 Mass. 251 |
Parties | Carolyn STUART v. TOWN OF BROOKLINE. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
George F. Driscoll, Jr., Asst. Town Counsel, Brookline (David Lee Turner, Town Counsel, with him), for defendant.
Benjamin R. Graybill, Cambridge, for plaintiff.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and GREANEY, JJ.
The town of Brookline (town) appeals from a judgment entered by a Superior Court judge awarding the plaintiff, Carolyn Stuart, $125,000 in damages arising from a motor vehicle collision between a town police cruiser and the vehicle in which Stuart was a passenger. The case was submitted to the trial court on a statement of agreed facts and documentary evidence. On appeal, the town argues that: (1) the statement of agreed facts should be discharged and the case remanded for trial; (2) the facts presented in the statement do not support a finding of negligence against the town; and (3) the damages are unsupported by the evidence, or, in the alternative, must be reduced by $25,000. We transferred the case to this court our own motion. We affirm the Superior Court judgment, and conclude that the town is liable to Stuart in the sum of $100,000.
1. Facts. The facts, as recited in the statement of agreed facts, are as follows. "Stuart was a passenger in a vehicle operated by Brian T. Ketchen on Route 9 in Brookline. At approximately 12:20 A.M. the vehicle operated by Mr. Ketchen collided with a Town of Brookline police cruiser operated by Patrolman Robert W. Smith. The collision between the Ketchen vehicle and the ... police cruiser occurred on the eastbound side of Route 9 (Boylston Street) in the vicinity of 850 Boylston Street. Route 9 (Boylston Street) is a divided highway which has two eastbound travel lanes. At the time of the accident, Patrolman Smith, a Brookline police officer since 1960, was acting in the course of his duties as an employee of the defendant, town of Brookline.
2. Vacating the statement of agreed facts. The town asks us to vacate the statement of agreed facts because it would be "conducive to justice" to do so. See Henry F. Michell Co. v. Fitzgerald, 353 Mass. 318, 322, 231 N.E.2d 373 (1967), citing Loring v. Mercier, 318 Mass. 599, 601, 63 N.E.2d 466 (1945). We conclude that it is not unjust to hold the town to the statement of facts to which it agreed.
Obviously, at the time it entered into the agreement, the town did not view the statement of facts as inimical to its interests or unjust. 1 Prior to this appeal, the town never asked for modification or rescission of any part of the statement of agreed facts. Having lost the case, the town now complains that the stipulation is unjust because (1) the town's liability, in its opinion, is questionable; (2) medical opinions and bills were admitted without cross-examination; and (3) "[t]he amount of the judgment ... poses a serious threat to the fiscal welfare of the Town of Brookline and the citizens who depend on its services and programs." The town has not, however, shown that facts were omitted, misstated or inadvertently included in the statement of agreed facts. Cf. Huard v. Forest St. Hous., Inc., 366 Mass. 203, 208, 316 N.E.2d 505 (1974) ( ); Houghton v. Rizzo, 361 Mass. 635, 637 n. 1, 281 N.E.2d 577 (1972) ( ). In this case, the town gambled that the judge would determine that the town had no liability based on the statement of facts which it agreed to submit. The town lost its gamble. That, however, is no reason to vacate the statement of agreed facts. In hindsight, the stipulation may have been, from the town's point of view, unwise. It was not, however, unjust.
3. Liability. The town argues that the stipulated facts do not permit a determination that the town's police officer was negligent. We do not agree.
Smith, in the course of performing his duties as a police officer for the town, had a duty to exercise reasonable care in operating his police vehicle so as not to endanger other motorists and their passengers. Neil v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 329 Mass. 578, 583, 109 N.E.2d 831 (1952). Smith was obligated to "exercise a degree of care commensurate with the serious consequences that might follow [his] failure to do so." Id. Smith acted negligently in pulling out in front of the vehicle in which Stuart was a passenger and which, at the time, was travelling without lights and accelerating from its already high rate of speed, on a rainy, foggy night. Cf. McGaffee v. P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., 311 Mass. 730, 735, 42 N.E.2d 841 (1942) (), and cases cited. The fact that the driver of the vehicle in which Stuart was a passenger also was negligent does not absolve Smith of liability. The accident, and concomitant risk of injury, were foreseeable by Smith as a natural and probable consequence of Ketchen's negligence and the other dangerous conditions that existed at the time of the accident. Cf. Wilborg v. Denzell, 359 Mass. 279, 285, 268 N.E.2d 855 (1971) (...
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