Stubblefield v. Hot Mix Paving Co.

• Decision Date: 09 October 1964
• Citation: 19 McCanless 16,215 Tenn. 16,383 S.W.2d 44
• Parties: , 215 Tenn. 16 C. C. STUBBLEFIELD v. HOT MIX PAVING COMPANY, Inc.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 44

383 S.W.2d 44

19 McCanless 16, 215 Tenn. 16

C. C. STUBBLEFIELD v. HOT MIX PAVING COMPANY, Inc.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Oct. 9, 1964.

Wyatt & Hickerson, Tullahoma and Fayetteville, Fred I. Womack, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Henry, McCord & Forrester, Tullahoma, for appellee.

BURNETT, Chief Justice.

This is a Workmen's Compensation case brought under Sec. 50-901 et seq., T.C.A. The employee appeals from the denial of a compensation award to him.

On the morning of June 28, 1962, the employee while performing his regular duties as President and General Manager of the Hot Mix Paving Company, Inc., and after loading some heavy equipment onto a low-boy and while loosening, with wrenches, a three-fourth inch copper tubing to stop an oil leakage on a grader, experienced a squeezing sensation in his chest, felt like he was smothering, became sick and started vomiting and had a severe pain in his chest. His condition was diagnosed by a local doctor as a heart attack or heart failure, and he was sent to a hospital.

The appellant had had high blood pressure for some years prior to this seizure. At the time of the seizure appellant was a large man, weighing approximately 230 pounds, and being six feet, one and one-half inches tall. At the time of the seizure he was doing the same type of work that he had done many times before. His local doctor diagnosed his case as 'a cardiac involvement, probably an acute coronary occlusion of one of the vessels.' This coronary occlusion was defined by this local doctor as 'a blocking off of one of the arteries which supplies the muscles of the heart. The coronary artery, or one of its branches, to be specific.'

After this seizure Mr. Stubblefield remained in the hospital for approximately two weeks and was advised by the doctor that he would have to lay off doing heavy work and was pronounced unable to do heavy work at that time and afterwards could only do supervisory work. At the time of this seizure the employee was forty-two (42) years old and had high blood pressure.

The trial judge in an excellent and exhaustive memorandum opinion reviewed the evidence and authorities, and, after reviewing the evidence, he concluded thus:

'Bearing in mind the weight of the testimony rule which is applicable in this cause, and therefore weighing the testimony just indicated, the Court is unable to escape the conclusion that such weight of testimony is against the petitioner in this cause. The Court tested the facts on the instant cause by similar proof in causes summarized herein and has been unable to conclude that the facts under consideration are as strong as any of those approved by the Supreme Court upon the issues under consideration.

'It seems a fair inference from the proof that the petitioner, C. C. Stubblefield, did not receive the disability which he now has as a result of the heart attack on June 28, 1962, but that he had said disability previous thereto. It seems inferable, also, that said heart attack on the date aforesaid did not contribute to or aggravate his preexisting disability so as to entitle him to the recovery of benefits because of permanent total or permanent partial disability. It is quite true that under medical advice he is required to limit his activities, but the Court is convinced from the proof that such limitation would have been advisable prior to the heart attack of June 28, 1962. This conclusion in the opinion of the Court is strengthened by the proof that the petitioner had a good recovery, to which fact both doctors testified.

'Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to recover benefits in this cause.'

The above statement of the Chancellor is made after quoting certain statements and evidence of the doctor of the appellant and the doctor for the company. The doctor for appellant said that what the man was doing at the time 'could have caused the attack, but I couldn't say so definitely.' Then the testimony of a specialist in internal medicine, which includes the field of cardiology, is quoted. This doctor concludes that he could have had this heart attack whether he was doing this work or not and it was more or less coincidental.

There are some nine assignments of error, six of which complain of the court's findings as to the weight and a preponderance of the evidence. In this Court we do not weight and determine what the preponderance of the evidence is. Our only duty is to determine whether or not there is material evidence to support the finding of the trier of facts. Sec. 50-1018, T.C.A., provides in effect that cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law are reviewed by us as to the evidence merely to determine whether or not the fact findings of the trial judge are supported by any material evidence. Atlas Powder Co. v. Leister, 197 Tenn. 491, 274 S.W.2d 364.

In the Leister case the question was there raised, as is raised here, that the evidence preponderated against the finding of the trial judge. We concluded for reasons set forth in the Leister case that this was not our function. The trial judge determines the credibility of witnesses, and, if these witnesses testify as to material facts which the trial judge believes, we are bound thereby. Thus it is seen from the statements quoted from the Chancellor above that he concluded that the heart attack herein did not arise by reason of any injury to the employee but was something that would have happened anyway. There being material evidence to support this finding of the Chancellor, we must affirm.

It is next contended that the trial court erred in ordering the employee to go to Nashville for an examination by the specialist, Dr. Foreman. This assignment came about by a motion made on behalf of the company to have such an examination made, which was sustained by the Chancellor. The appellant in support of his argument that it was error on behalf of the Chancellor to order him to go out of...