Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County
| Decision Date | 01 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 20577,20577 |
| Citation | 125 Idaho 824,875 P.2d 236 |
| Parties | STUDENT LOAN FUND OF IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAYETTE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, City of Fruitland, a municipal corporation, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Ricks & Ramey, Boise, for appellant. Frederick L. Ramey, argued.
Moore & McFadden, Boise, for respondents. Mona L.D. Mack, argued.
We are asked to decide whether the Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. (Fund) has standing to maintain a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of an agreement between Payette County and the City of Fruitland and of certain implementing ordinances adopted by those entities, which designated an area of city impact for Fruitland. Because we agree with the district court's determination that the Fund has not demonstrated it has suffered or will suffer injury as a consequence of the contested governmental actions, we affirm the dismissal of the action for lack of standing.
The controversy arose from actions taken by Fruitland and Payette County pursuant to Idaho's Local Planning Act, I.C. §§ 67-6501 to 6529. Section 67-6526 of the Act requires each county and each city therein to establish "an area of city impact within the unincorporated area of the county" and to adopt by ordinance a map identifying the area of city impact. 1 The statute also mandates that cities In 1990, the city of Fruitland initiated proceedings in cooperation with Payette County aimed at compliance with Section 67-6526. The city and county drafted and adopted by ordinances an agreement and map defining Fruitland's area of impact. The agreement specifies the zoning for land within the impact area and provides that the county will amend its zoning ordinances to conform to the agreed zoning for the impact area. The agreement calls for the county to adopt a new zoning designation known as "agriculture preservation." Within portions of the impact area to be zoned "agriculture preservation," the agreement provides that "no further development or division of property shall be allowed unless agreed to by both the City and County." Although both the city and county have passed ordinances adopting the agreement itself and the map, the county has not as yet complied with the agreement by passing an ordinance which adopts the specified zoning for the affected land.
[125 Idaho 825] and counties adopt separate ordinances providing that the area of city impact shall be subject to: (1) the city land use plan and ordinances, or (2) the county plan and ordinances, or (3) any mutually agreed upon plan and ordinances. The object of these requirements is to "delineate areas of future contiguous growth in order to assure their orderly development and thereby reconcile potentially competing designs for boundary expansion with accepted land use planning principles." City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 514, 660 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1983).
The Fund owns land located wholly within the specified area of city impact. A small portion of the Fund's property is in the area which, according to the map, is to be zoned commercial, with the balance of its property being in the agriculture preservation zone. The record is silent as to how the Fund's land was zoned at the time of the agreement.
In June 1991, the Fund filed a declaratory judgment action against Payette County and the city of Fruitland seeking a judicial determination that the agreement and ordinances relating to Fruitland's area of city impact are invalid by reason of the defendants' noncompliance with statutory procedures established by I.C. § 67-6526, their disregard of open meeting and public hearing requirements of I.C. §§ 67-2342 and 67-6509, and violation of the Fund's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
Within a few months after this action was initiated, the city filed a motion for summary judgment, and the county filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the defendants' motions and ordered dismissal on the ground that the Fund lacks standing to bring this action. The Fund appeals from that decision.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The district court, and this Court on appeal, must liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986); Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 1016 (Ct.App.1982).
The standard for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal of a complaint is the same as that applicable to motions for summary judgment. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). "The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id.
The Fund's action is for declaratory relief. Idaho's courts are authorized to determine by declaratory judgment the validity of contracts and municipal ordinances and the rights and status of persons thereunder. I.C. §§ 10-1201 and 10-1202. 2 While the authority to render a declaratory judgment is bestowed by statute, that authority to declare rights, status, or other legal relations is circumscribed by the rule that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). Justiciability questions are generally viewed to be divisible into several sub-categories--advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions and administrative questions. See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. Of the foregoing elements, only standing has been questioned by the defendants here.
The doctrine of standing focuses not upon the merits or character of the issues sought to be adjudicated but rather upon the party seeking relief. Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. Standing presents essentially a question of the plaintiff's "qualification" to bring the action. A helpful explanation of the criteria for standing was presented in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978), and adopted by our Supreme Court in Miles.
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (citations omitted). The Miles court further stated: "Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. (Emphasis added).
In the case before us, the district court held that the Fund lacked standing to seek declaratory relief for the reason that:
Nothing in the record substantiates the Fund's claim its "rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance" or the like; neither the filing of this lawsuit nor the Fund's allegation it is an "aggrieved person" substantiates that claim. The Fund failed [to] show what harm it has suffered or will suffer due to the City's and the County's actions. For example, there is no allegation the City's and the County's actions will increase the Fund's taxes, decrease services available to the Fund, decrease the value of the Fund's property, prevent the Fund from developing its property, or interfere with the Fund's use and enjoyment of its property.... The Fund has not shown it is an affected person.
The district court's conclusion is well taken. The Fund has neither alleged nor presented evidence that it has been or will be injured in fact by the actions of the city and county.
The Fund asserts that it is "affected" by the ordinances adopting the impact area agreement, as that word is used in I.C. § 10-1201, because its land will fall within the agriculture preservation zone if Payette County rezones in compliance with the impact area agreement. We note that this is a contemplated future change, not an accomplished rezoning of the property. Although the agreement calls for the county to adopt particular zoning for the area of city impact, as of the date of oral argument in this case, the county had not complied with the agreement by amending its zoning ordinances. Hence, zoning of the Fund's land is as yet unchanged and, absent further action by the county, will remain so. We recognize that standing may be predicated not only upon a past injury but also upon a threatened harm. Harris, supra; Idaho Branch, Inc. of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 123 Idaho 237, 240, 846 P.2d 239, 242 (Ct.App.1993). Therefore, the peril of an imminent rezoning of the Funds' property could be a sufficient predicate for standing if the rezone would inflict some injury. However, there is no indication in the record that if and when the agreed zoning is adopted by the county, it will be detrimental to the Fund. We find no evidence that the zoning...
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...enter a declaratory judgment only “in a case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists.” Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette Cnty., 125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App.1994). In determining whether an issue is justiciable and may be adjudged in a declaratory judgment action,......
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