Stump v. Hornbeck

• Decision Date: 15 April 1884
• Parties: MARIE C. STUMP ET AL., Respondents, v. PHŒBE J. HORNBECK ET AL., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

15 Mo.App. 367

MARIE C. STUMP ET AL., Respondents,

v.PHŒBE J. HORNBECK ET AL., Appellants.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Apr. 15, 1884.

APPEAL from the St. Louis County Circuit Court, EDWARDS, J.

Affirmed.

C. W. WILSON, for the appellants: At common law the owner is entitled to recover his land, without being subjected to the condition of paying for improvements made by an occupant without title.--1 Sedg. on Dam. (7th ed.) 246 (marg. p. 121); 2 Kent's Com., side p. 335; Schlemmer v. North, 32 Mo. 208, 209. The administrator of the estate of D. M. Stump, deceased, is the only proper party to sue for and collect the assets of his estate. The personalty goes to the administrator--not to the heirs.--1 Rev. Stats. 1879, sects. 94-96; Bruggeman v. Jurgenssen, 24 Mo. 89; Kellogg et al. v. Malin, 62 Mo. 431; 1 Williams on Exrs. 664, 667, 545; 2 Williams on Exrs. 1408; James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 164; Salmon's Admr. v. Davis, 29 Mo. 179, 180; Story on Con., sects. 254, 255. The life tenant can not recover compensation for improvements made during the life tenancy, from the remainder-man.--1 Washb. on Real Prop., 110; Austen v. Stevens, 11 Shep. 520; Thurstonv. Dickenson, 2Rich. Eq. 317, 318, 319; Merritt v. Scott, 81 N. C. 385, 387, 388, Wiltse v. Harley, 11 Iowa, 473; Tiedeman on Real Prop., sect. 68. In order to a recovery under the provisions of our statute, the claimant must have made the improvements in good faith, under the belief that he had a good title, and without notice of the adverse title.--Rev. Stats. 1879, sects. 2259, 2250; Lee v. Bowman et al., 55 Mo. 403. “The terms notice and good faith are adopted in the statute with the full force and meaning of those terms in equity jurisprudence, from whence they are derived.”-- Lee v. Bowman et al., 55 Mo. 403. “Notice and good faith can not co-exist.”-- Lee v. Bowman et al., 55 Mo. 403. A purchaser is bound to know his grantor's title; and is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of the contents of every conveyance which constitutes a link in the title purchased.-- Picot v. Page, 26 Mo. 415, 416; 1 Story Eq. 400; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 139, 152, 168, 169, and cases cited; Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet. (U. S.) 93; McAteer v. McMillan, 2 Pa. St. 32; Honore's Ex. v. Bakewell et al., 6 B. Mon. 73; Hackwith v. Damron, 1 B. Mon. 237. The recitals in a purchase deed are such notice as will put him on inquiry as to the matters referred to in the recitals.--1 Story Eq. 400; Sackett on Instructions, 329, 330; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 170 and cases cited; Major v. Bukeby, 51 Mo. 231. Notice that his grantor has no title is notice of the adverse title.-- Foster v. Holbert, 55 Mo. 23; Kerney v. Vaughan, 50 Mo. 289; Walter v. Quigg, 6 Watts (Pa.), 91, etc.

T. F. MCDEARMON, for the respondent: “An action under our statute by a defendant in an ejectment suit against whom a judgment for possession has been rendered to recover compensation for improvements made in good faith on land prior to the action of ejectment, must be brought in the court in which such judgment was rendered and before eviction from the premises.”-- Malone v. Stretchen, 69 Mo. 25, and cases there cited. To bar the plaintiff's recovery actual notice of defendant's claim of title is necessary; constructive notice is not sufficient.--Rev. Stats. 1879, ch. 30, p. 377, sects. 2259, 2260, 2267; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; Russell et al. v. Defrance, 39 Mo. 506.

LEWIS, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The present plaintiffs were unsuccessful defendants in an action of ejectment for 97.47 acres, maintained against them by the present defendants. This suit is brought under Revised Statutes, section 2259, to recover compensation for improvements put upon the land in good faith, by these plaintiffs and their ancestor, David M. Stump. There was a judgment for the plaintiffs.

The defendants objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and saved their exception to an adverse ruling. This suit was instituted in the same court wherein the judgment was rendered in the ejectment case. This fact, according to Malone v. Stretch (69 Mo. 25), disposes of the objection. It is there held that suits of this character must be brought in the court which rendered the judgment for dispossession.

It is further objected that there was error in permitting the plaintiffs to assert a claim on account of improvements made on the land by their ancestor. The letter of the statute gives the right of action to “a person in the possession” against whom there shall have been given a judgment or decree of dispossession “in an action for the recovery of possession of premises, or in any real action in favor of a person having a better title thereto,” to recover compensation “for all improvements made by him in good faith on such lands, tenements, or hereditaments, prior to his having had notice of such adverse title.” But the provision has never had the narrow interpretation which the defendants claim. The heir represents the ancestor, as to both rights and liabilities which run with the land to the extent, at least, of the value of his inheritance. If a man should bring himself within the exact letter of the statute, by making valuable improvements on land, in good faith and should then die, a person having the better title might sue the heir for possession on the day after the death. It would be a monstrous perversion of the manifest purposes of the law, to deny to the heir all benefit of his predecessor's expenditures, and to turn the same over to the successful plaintiff in such a case. That the claim for improvements made in good faith is regarded as running with the land, is evident in the character of the judgment to be rendered and the orders to be made, under sections 2263 and following. The court is not permitted to render an absolute, unconditional judgment for the value of improvements, and to enforce it by execution. Russell v. Defrance, 39 Mo. 506. In the case cited, which was an action similar to the present, improvements to the value of $500 had been made by the plaintiff's grantor, and to the value of $1,000 by the plaintiff himself. The judgment was for $1,500. The supreme court said that the amount was correctly estimated and ascertained, but reversed the judgment for failure to comply in other respects with the terms of the statute. We can see nothing in the defendant's objections on this point.

The land in question formerly belonged to Thomas Parsons who, by last will, devised a life estate to Emeline P. Parsons, remainder in fee to the present defendants. Emeline conveyed to David M. Stump by deed in fee, with general warranty. The defendants contend that, inasmuch as Stump held only an estate for the life of Emeline, his holding was not adverse to the defendant remainder-men; that, as such tenant for a life only, he could not claim improvements made, as against the remainder-men, but must be presumed to have made them for the enjoyment of his own limited estate; that the life estate of his grantor was a matter of record, and therefore both Stump and the plaintiffs had notice of the defendant's title when ...