Sturgis v. State, 95-252

• Decision Date: 23 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-252,95-252
• Citation: 932 P.2d 199
• Parties: Deborah J. STURGIS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 199

932 P.2d 199

Deborah J. STURGIS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 95-252.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Jan. 23, 1997.

Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel; and Donna D. Domonkos, Assistant Appellate Counsel, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Michael P. Adams, Student Intern, for Appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, ^* and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Chief Justice.

On October 14, 1994, appellant and Bill Broderick were both patrons of the Buckhorn Bar in Laramie, Wyoming. During the early morning hours, Mr. Broderick was shot from behind outside his home and, in her defense, appellant accused him of rape. Unmoved by her claims of self-defense, a jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault. Although the district court conducted a "Dean type" inquiry, appellant now complains she was victimized by the improper admission of prior bad acts evidence. Rejecting that argument and claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm the conviction.

I. ISSUES

Appellant, Deborah Sturgis (Sturgis), posits two issues on appeal:

ISSUE 1

The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted prior bad act evidence without a finding of specific purpose for the admissibility as required under Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo.1993).

ISSUE 2

The appellant was denied a fair trial as guaranteed by the due process clauses of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions because of prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument.

The State squarely joins Sturgis' arguments through its statement of the issues:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to present relevant evidence of the appellant's prior conduct pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b)?

II. Did comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments constitute proper argument and reasonable conclusions based on the evidence?

II. FACTS

By October 14, 1994, Sturgis was well known at the Buckhorn Bar in Laramie. On the evening of October 11, Sturgis caused some consternation when she produced a pistol hastening the departure of a paying customer. Turning her attentions to a part-time bar employee in his seventies, Sturgis suggested an assignation, threatening to kill him if he refused.

Unaware of the events which took place a few days beforehand, Bill Broderick (Broderick) felt flattered when Sturgis asked him to join her in a drink on October 14. Learning she was a stranger to Laramie, Broderick offered his couch for Sturgis to sleep on, also inviting the bartender over for a nightcap.

The bartender arrived at Broderick's home to witness Sturgis sitting astride Broderick's lap as he reached around her to play the piano. After the couple adjourned to the bedroom, however, the bartender observed Sturgis making a dramatic exit, stumbling out the front door before tumbling across the front lawn, spilling the contents of her purse.

Feeling out of place, the bartender sought to make his own quick exit only to be stymied by a car that refused to start. Seeking reconciliation, Broderick emerged to help gather the contents of Sturgis' purse while she ran back into the house to retrieve her pistol. When Sturgis returned, armed with her pistol, Broderick continued efforts to defuse the situation until she leveled her pistol at him. Desperately trying to start his car, the bartender shrewdly advised Broderick that the time had arrived to effect an orderly retreat.

As Broderick wisely withdrew, however, Sturgis opened fire from about fifteen feet behind, fracturing "the main bone of the left leg" and blowing part of that bone out through the exit wound. Convinced his assailant meant to finish the job, Broderick dragged himself into the house, bolted the door, then pulled himself out the back door toward an all-night convenience store. True to her victim's expectations, Sturgis kicked down the front door, fired into the house, pursuing Broderick through the house and down the alley until confronted and apprehended by officers of the Laramie Police Department.

Prior to trial, Sturgis moved to exclude evidence concerning her mental state, including a narrative of her earlier foray into the Buckhorn Bar, arguing that "state of mind" evidence detailing her emotional difficulties lacked relevance to the crime charged. The district court agreed that much of the evidence offered by the prosecution was inadmissible. However, the district court did allow the jury to hear evidence concerning Sturgis' earlier visit to the Buckhorn Bar, subject to a limiting instruction, "for the very limited purpose of showing opportunity, intent, plan or absence of mistake by [Sturgis]."

Sturgis' theory of the case was that she had acted in necessary self-defense against a would-be sexual assailant. The jury rejected that notion and found her guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) and (b) (1988). This appeal timely followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Taylor v. State, 642 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo.1982). We extend appellate deference to a trial court's determinations regarding the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 203 (Wyo.1994). Only manifest abuse of discretion will precipitate reversal in such cases, and so long as a consistent and legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling has been articulated, we will not find an abuse of discretion. Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 606 (Wyo.1993).

We examine claims that a prosecutor has overstepped the bounds of permissible comment during closing by viewing the allegedly improper comment in the context of the entire closing argument. Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wyo.1992). If the allegedly improper comments fail to draw a contemporaneous objection, reversible error can only be predicated upon "a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo.1992).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE

The law regarding admissibility of W.R.E. 404(b) (Rule 404(b)) evidence concerning prior bad acts has recently been redefined and clarified in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo.1996) and Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300 (Wyo.1996). ¹ However, we concur with the parties that the five-part test for prior bad acts evidence articulated in Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 246 (Wyo.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S.Ct. 1203, 84 L.Ed.2d 345 (1985), as procedurally fine-tuned in Dean, 865 P.2d at 606, sets the appropriate threshold for admissibility of such evidence in this case. Using Bishop as our benchmark, we proceed with the caveat that our analysis, while critical to this appellant, may be of limited prospective application.

Sturgis takes issue with those purposes for which the district court admitted the evidence concerning her earlier adventures in the Buckhorn Bar. She derides a so-called "laundry list" of purposes given for admission of that evidence, i.e., "intent, plan, absence of mistake, and general state of mind." Dean, according to Sturgis, requires ascertainment of a singular purpose for the admission of such evidence, lest the appellate court be impermissibly handicapped in its efforts to determine the propriety of admitting prior bad acts evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b).

The purpose for which a party offers prior bad acts evidence is undeniably critical to ultimate admissibility under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) forbids the admission of prior bad acts evidence for the purposes of proving bad character or criminal propensity. Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 356 (Wyo.1994). Otherwise, jurors might be drawn into the inference that a bad act means a bad person, and a bad person means a guilty person. 1 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 106 at 584-85 (2nd ed. 1994). Equally unacceptable is a juror intent upon punishing because the other acts, alone, inspire the impression that punishment is warranted. Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Wyo.1979).

Rule 404(b) offers a non-exclusive list of purposes for which prior bad acts evidence may be admissible, including several of those cited by the district court with regard to Sturgis' earlier visit to the Buckhorn Bar. Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo.1989). However, in Bishop, 687 P.2d at 246, we moved beyond facile efforts to shoe-horn prior bad acts into one or more of the purposes listed in Rule 404(b). Rather, the question of purpose is but one of five factors to be weighed by the district court in determining the propriety of admitting prior bad acts evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). To facilitate that determination, the district court is vested with broad discretion in balancing the five factors. Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 752 (Wyo.1993). We cannot, therefore, consider the purpose for which the district court admitted the questioned evidence without the necessary context afforded by careful review of the four other Bishop factors. The question to be answered here is whether the district court abused its discretion in weight and balance of the five Bishop factors.

Although a defense motion in limine precipitated the pretrial hearing which plumbed admissibility of Sturgis' prior bad acts in this case, the district court generally adhered to the procedures outlined in Dean for assessment of the Bishop factors, including consideration of probative value as countervailing the ever-present risk of prejudice (W.R.E.403), and iteration of a limiting instruction to the jury. Aided by those proceedings, our review of the Bishop factors yields the following conclusions:

1. " 'The extent to which the...