Sudduth v. Chapman

Decision Date17 February 1977
Docket NumberNo. 44460,44460
Citation559 P.2d 1351,88 Wn.2d 247
PartiesCaroline A. SUDDUTH, Appellant, v. Bruce K. CHAPMAN, Secretary of State, State of Washington, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

HOROWITZ, Associate Justice (dissenting).

The Secretary of State refused to certify Initiative Measure No. 322 for the ballot, because the initiative lacked sufficient signatures (117.804) to comply with Amendment 30 to the State Constitution as implemented by RCW 29.79 as amended, particularly RCW 29.79.200; and RCW 29.07.090 and RCW 29.07.130.

The trial court after taking evidence, upholding the action of the Secretary of State entered findings, conclusions and judgment. Petitioner appealed the trial court's judgment to this court and this court by a vote of 5 to 4 reversed.

The majority opinion relies on three grounds for reversal, (1) RCW 29.79.200, which provides that multiple signatures by one person on initiative and referendum petitions are not to be counted, is void, (2) RCW 29.07.130 and RCW 29.07.090 do not confine the Secretary of State of checking the validity of signatures on petitions to signatures on voter registration cards in his office, and (3) if grounds one and two are valid, there is sufficient evidence to prove Initiative Measure No. 322 contains the remaining ballot signatures needed to qualify the initiative for the ballot.

If any of the three arguments is not accepted, then there are insufficient signatures on the initiative for the ballot and the trial court's judgment must be affirmed.

It is our duty to give full effect to the will of the people as set forth in Amendments 7 and 30 to the State Constitution. The people have imposed and also authorized the legislature to impose certain safeguards to protect the integrity and the workability of the operation of the initiative and referendum. We give effect to the will of the people both when we uphold the validity of the canvassing process upon a proper showing and when we uphold the action of the Secretary of State in refusing to certify an initiative for the ballot when the law and facts require such an action. We now consider the three arguments on which the majority relies to reverse the trial court's judgment.

MULTIPLE SIGNATURES--RCW 29.79.200

There was still a shortgage in the required number of signatures for Initiative Measure No. 322 even if multiple signatures by each person signing more than once on the initiative petitions are counted as one signature.

The Seventh Amendment to the State Constitution was approved November 1912. Article 2, section 1(d) of the amendment made express provision for implementing legislation as follows:

All such petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state, who shall be guided by the general laws in submitting the same to the people until additional legislation shall especially provide therefor. This section is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation.

The legislature in 1913 then enacted implementing legislation. Laws of 1913, ch. 138, p. 418. The legislation included provisions prohibiting and discouraging multiple signatures on initiative and referendum petitions presumably to 'facilitate' the operation of the initiative referendum process. Laws of 1913, ch. 138, § 15, p. 426; § 16, p. 427; and § 31, p. 435. Section 15 reads in part:

If he (Secretary of State) find the same name signed to more than one petition he shall reject both names from the count.

This language was retained when the statute was amended by Laws of 1933, ch. 144, § 1, p. 490. The substance of the language was again retained in Laws of 1965, ch. 9, § 29.79.200, p. 901 and Laws of 1969, 1st Ex.Sess. ch 107, § 1, p. 815. The 1969 act contains the language now in RCW 29.79.200:

If the secretary of state finds the same name signed to more than one petition he shall reject the name as often as it appears.

The foregoing language has not been changed.

The legality of the 1913 provision dealing with multiple signatures has been assumed as a proper exercise of legislative power delegated to the legislature by the Seventh Amendment. This court so assumed in State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914). In describing the secretaries of state's duty and power to reject signatures for fraud under the 1913 statute as it then read, the court pointed out the only power the Secretary of State had was to refuse to count multiple signatures as provided by the 1913 statute. Had the court believed the Secretary of State had no such power, this reason would not have been available. Until the filing of the majority opinion in the instant case, successive secretaries of state, in obedience to the mandate of the 1913 act first reaffirmed by the 1933 amendment, have refused to count multiple signatures at all.

The majority argues, the multiple signature statute is void because it does not 'facilitate' the operation of the initiative process as required by Const. art. 2, § 1(a) (amendment 7), Supra. I do not agree.

When the legislature granted authority in amendment 7 to enact legislation to facilitate the operation of the initiative and referendum process, it necessarily vested in the legislature a discretion in its choice of means so to do. This is made clear by the rationale used in State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, 77 Wash. 651, 138 P. 286 (1914); State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Howell, 80 Wash. 692, 142 P. 1 (1914); and State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973). In Kiehl a statute required initiative petitions to be filed not less than 10 months before the election on the initiative. The statute was held valid notwithstanding the Seventh Amendment provided the initiative would be on the ballot 'if filed at least four months before the election'. The court said:

The legislature is expressly authorized to enact laws to facilitate the initiative and referendum. It seems clear to us that a limitation upon the time within which, prior to the election, a proposed measure may be filed and the procuring of signatures of voters to the petitions commenced is a proper subject of legislation, looking to orderly procedure and fairness to the electors. While the constitutional amendment is declared to be self-executing, it is apparent that its execution would be almost, if not wholly, impracticable without legislation of some such nature as this. It, of course, is necessary that some practical test be provided for determining whether the signers of the petitions are legal voters. It is, of course, but fair that the petitions should, so far as practical, be signed only by those who would be voters at the election. This can be secured with greater certainty by having the petitions signed as near the time of the election as practical. . . . We are of the opinion that it is within the power of the Legislature to fix a reasonable limit of time preceding the election within which an initiative measure may be filed with the Secretary of State.

State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, supra, 77 Wash. at 654, 138 P. at 287. In State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Howell, supra, 80 Wash. at 696, 142 P. 1, 2, the court upheld the statute requiring those who filed arguments in support of an initiative for inclusion in the state pamphlet required to be published by statute to pay for the resulting increased cost of paper, printing and binding of the state pamphlet. The court said:

But there is nothing in the constitution prohibiting the Legislature from requiring a fee for filing, printing, or binding either the proposed measure or the arguments. It is clear that, where the Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from requiring a fee in such case, it is within the power of the Legislature to require a fee. . . . The Constitution does not in terms, or inferentially, require the state to bear the expense of the publication of these arguments. It simply requires the Legislature to provide methods of publicity without limitation as to fees. The Legislature, therefore, may require the proponents of any measure to pay the expense of the arguments or of the distribution or of the publicity. It has not, however, seen fit to do so. . . . This is not an unreasonable requirement, and no provision of the Constitution is cited to us which proclaims such provisions invalid.

In State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., supra, 82 Wash.2d at 97, 508 P.2d 149, 152, the court upheld RCW 29.79.490(4), making it a crime to pay people to obtain signatures for an initiative petition. The court stated:

It is indisputable that there is a substantial state interest in the integrity of the whole scope of the elective processes, including those procedures involved in the direct legislative efforts of the people via the initiative.

In 1956 the people adopted Amendment 30 to the State Constitution to change the minimum number of signatures required to qualify an initiative for submission to vote of the people. Const. art. 2, § 1A (amendment 30) provided:

Hereafter, the number of valid signatures of legal voters required upon a petition for an initiative measure shall be equal to eight percentum of the number of voters registered and voting for the office of governor at the last preceding regular gubernatorial election.

Clearly the people made it plain that in order to qualify for the ballot an initiative had to have the minimum number of signatures called for by that amendment. Amendment 30 made no change in the prohibition against counting multiple signatures originally contained in Laws of 1913, ch. 138 and continued in substance thereafter. The prohibition against counting any multiple signatures has continued to be honored by successive secretaries of state until the majority of this court in the instant case held the statutory prohibition to be void. Prior thereto, not only was the prohibition continuously enforced but the petitions including...

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