Sulier v. State Personnel Bd.

Decision Date20 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. C046695.,C046695.
Citation22 Cal.Rptr.3d 615,125 Cal.App.4th 21
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPaul SULIER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant and Respondent; Department of Corrections, Real Party In Interest and Respondent.

Mark R. Kruger for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

Stephen A. Jennings, Staff Counsel, Sacramento, for Real Party In Interest and Respondent.

ROBIE, J.

Does Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d) (contained in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act1) require the California Department of Corrections (CDC) to mail a formal notice of adverse action within one year of the discovery of a correctional officer's misconduct by someone authorized to investigate that misconduct? No. That statute states the CDC must "notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action within" that one-year deadline. Because the CDC complied with this statute here, we shall affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of this case are undisputed. The CDC imposed discipline on Paul Sulier by demoting him from correctional sergeant to correctional officer based on allegations he provided confidential information about one inmate to another.

The initial investigation into Sulier's conduct started on July 10, 2000. On July 2, 2001, the CDC sent Sulier a letter notifying him of the completion of the investigation and the discipline it proposed to impose on him: "You are hereby notified that the investigation into your behavior has been completed. The investigation sustained the allegations that on July 7, 2000, you provided Inmate [A] with confidential information regarding Inmate [B.][¶] Therefore, a decision has been made to take disciplinary action against you. The recommended penalty is a one-step demotion to a Correctional Officer. [¶] You may anticipate formal adverse action papers to be served upon you within the next thirty (30) days." The CDC personally served a formal notice of adverse action pursuant to section 19574 on August 2, 2001.

Sulier appealed his demotion to the State Personnel Board (SPB). During the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Sulier moved to dismiss the disciplinary action because he had not been served with the formal notice of adverse action2 within the one-year limitation period set forth in section 3304, subdivision (d) (hereafter section 3304(d)). The ALJ denied the motion and sustained the imposition of discipline.

The SPB rejected the ALJ's decision and decided the matter itself. The SPB concluded the discipline was improper because the CDC failed to serve a formal notice of adverse action within one year of the start of the investigation. The SPB revoked the demotion and awarded Sulier backpay, interest, and benefits that he would have earned as a correctional sergeant.

Sulier filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the trial court seeking reinstatement to his position as correctional sergeant based on the SPB's decision. The CDC filed its own cross-complaint/petition for writ of administrative mandamus arguing that the SPB improperly revoked the discipline against Sulier.

The trial court concluded that the informal notice of proposed discipline satisfied the requirements of section 3304(d) and remanded the matter to the SPB for further proceedings.

On April 20, 2004, Sulier filed his timely notice of appeal from the trial court's February 24, 2004, appealable judgment.

DISCUSSION
I Standard Of Review

"[A] trial court's findings and judgment on a petition for writ of mandate are upheld if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] However, the trial court's construction of a statute is purely a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal." (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Golden Valley Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 369, 375, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 (Golden Valley).) Here, we are concerned solely with the trial court's interpretation of section 3304(d); thus, our review is de novo.

II

The Trial Court Properly Concluded

The CDC Satisfied Section 3304(d)

Sulier argues "in order for the state to comply with the requirements of section 3304(d)[,] it must ... adhere to the notice requirements contained in section 19574." We disagree.

In examining statutes, "`[c]ourts must ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate a law's purpose. [Citations.] "In the construction of a statute ... the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is ... contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; ..." [Citation.] Legislative intent will be determined so far as possible from the language of statutes, read as a whole, and if the words are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascertain its meaning. [Citation.] "`The court should take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction.'" [Citations.] "Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." [Citations.]'" (Golden Valley, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 375-376, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 642.)

The POBRA was first enacted in 1976. (Stats.1976, ch. 465, § 1, p. 1202.) It is "primarily a labor relations statute. It provides a catalog of basic rights and protections that must be afforded all peace officers by the public entities which employ them." (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State of California (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 294, 304, 98 Cal. Rptr.2d 302.) "One such protection is to have a speedy adjudication of conduct that could result in discipline." (Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 46, 63, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 383.) This speedy adjudication protection is contained in section 3304. (Alameida, at pp. 60-63, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 383.)

We therefore turn to the language of that section. Section 3304(d) states, in relevant part: "Except as provided in this subdivision and subdivision (g), no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency's discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.... In the event that the public agency determines that discipline may be taken, it shall complete its investigation and notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action within that year." (Italics added.)3

In addition to section 3304(d), section 3304, subdivision (f) provides "If, after investigation and any predisciplinary response or procedure, the public agency decides to impose discipline, the public agency shall notify the public safety officer in writing of its decision to impose discipline, including the date that the discipline will be imposed, within 30 days of its decision, except if the public safety officer is unavailable for discipline."

Thus, under the plain language of section 3304(d), if the CDC desires to discipline an officer, then it must complete the investigation into the misconduct within one year of the discovery of the misconduct by a person authorized to start an investigation into the conduct. If, at the conclusion of that investigation, the CDC "determines that discipline may be taken," then it must give the officer notice of the "proposed disciplinary action" during that same one-year time frame. (Idid., italics added.) When the CDC actually "decides to impose discipline," then it must notify the public safety officer in writing of its decision to impose discipline (§ 3304, subd. (f), italics added.).

Here, the CDC complied with this statute. Within one year of initiating the investigation, it served a notice on Sulier informing him that the investigation was completed. Further, that same letter identified the "proposed discipline" of "a one-step demotion to a Correctional Officer." Within 30 days of that notice, the CDC provided Sulier with a formal notice of adverse action under section 19574 notifying him of its decision to impose discipline on him.

Sulier argues the legislative history of section 3304(d) and sections 19574 and 19635 compel the conclusion that the CDC must serve a formal notice of adverse action under section 19574 within one year. We disagree.

We decline to look behind the unambiguous and certain words of section 3304(d) to its legislative history. When the words of a statute "are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascertain its meaning." (Golden Valley, supra, 98 Cal. App.4th at p. 375, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 642.) The CDC satisfied the requirements of those words.

We turn to the language of sections 19635 and 19574, but as we shall demonstrate, we find nothing in these statutes or section 3304(d) which suggests that section 3304(d) requires this formal notice.

Section 19635 provides: "No adverse action shall be valid against any state employee for any cause for discipline based on any civil service law of this state, unless notice of the adverse action is served within three years after the cause for discipline, upon which the notice is based, first arose. Adverse action based on fraud, embezzlement, or the falsification of records shall be valid, if notice of the adverse action is served within three years after the discovery of the fraud, embezzlement, or falsification."

The requirements of a formal notice of adverse action are provided for in section 19574: "The appointing power, or its authorized representative, may take adverse action against an...

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