Sullins v. Butler

• Decision Date: 03 February 1940
• Citation: 135 S.W.2d 930,175 Tenn. 468
• Parties: SULLINS v. BUTLER et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

135 S.W.2d 930

175 Tenn. 468

SULLINS v. BUTLER et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 3, 1940

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wilson County; O. K. Holladay, Judge.

Suit by Earl Sullins against G. Hilton Butler and others to enjoin the enforcement of certain sections of the Driver's License Law, Pub.Acts 1937, c. 90, § 11, as amended by Pub.Acts 1939, c. 205, § 5. From a judgment dismissing the petition, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Jesse Cantrell, of Watertown, for petitioner.

Roy H Beeler, Atty. Gen., and Harry Phillips, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

McKINNEY Justice.

Earl Sullins, by his petition herein, challenges the constitutionality and undertakes to enjoin the enforcement of certain sections of Chapter 90, Public Acts of 1937, as amended by Chapter 205, Public Acts of 1939, familiarly known as the Driver's License Law. Petitioner is a judgment debtor for damages in the sum of $162, resulting from his negligent operation of an automobile, which judgment is unappealed from, final, and unsatisfied, execution having been returned nulla bona. When petitioner failed and refused to satisfy said judgment his driver's license was suspended by the defendant Butler, Director of Safety, as required by the act.

The trial court was of the opinion that the act was valid, and sustained the demurrer of the defendants and dismissed the petition.

Section 11 of the original act, as amended by the 1939 Act, § 5, is as follows:

"(b) In the event of any final judgment for damages to property or personal injury resulting from the negligent operation of any motor vehicle is recovered, and in the event such final judgment is not fully paid, satisfied and discharged within sixty days from the date said judgment becomes final, the Department of Safety shall forthwith suspend the license of any chauffeur or operator of the motor vehicle against whom said judgment was rendered; and said license shall not be restored to such operator of said vehicle until such final judgment shall have been fully paid, discharged and satisfied."

The violation of the act is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.

The validity of the act is assailed upon the ground that it violates Article 1, section 18, of the State Constitution, which provides:

"The Legislature shall pass no law authorizing imprisonment for debt in civil cases."

Counsel for petitioner has misinterpreted the act. It contains no provision authorizing imprisonment for failure to pay a judgment founded upon the negligent operation of an automobile. Should petitioner never pay the $162 judgment entered against him, he could at no time be imprisoned for such failure. The punishment prescribed in the act is for operating an automobile after the operator's driver's license has been revoked.

The driving of an automobile is a privilege, not a property right, and is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 5 Am.Jur. 593; 42 C.J. 740, 746; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385; Rutherford v. City of Nashville, 168 Tenn. 499, 79 S.W.2d 581.

Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring that operating privileges be suspended for failure to satisfy motor accident judgments. We have been cited to no authority holding such laws invalid. On the other hand such statutes have been sustained in the following cases: In re Opinion of the Justices, 1925, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N.E. 680; Watson v. State Division of Motor Vehicles, 1931, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P. 481; Garford Trucking, Inc. v. Hoffman, 1935, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177 A. 882; Jones v. Harnett, 1936, 247 A.D. 7, 286 N.Y.S. 220, affirmed without OPINION of Appeals in 271 N.Y. 626, 3 N.E.2d 455; State ex rel. Sullivan v. Price, 1937, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653, 108 A.L.R. 1156; Nulter v. State Road Commission of W. Va., 1937, 119 W.Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549, 194 S.E. 270; Rosenblum v. Griffin, 1938, 89 N.H. 314, 197 'A. 701, 115 A.L.R. 1367.

The general rule covering the subject is stated in 5 Am.Jur. 593, as follows:

§ 157. "The statutes regulating the granting of operators' licenses or drivers' permits usually provide for their revocation. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe the conditions under which the privilege of operating an automobile on the public highways may be exercised. The fact that the license or permit was granted under a statute or ordinance which stated that it should be perpetual unless revoked as provided in such statute or ordinance, and which contained no provision for revocation, does not preclude revocation under a provision introduced by subsequent amendment.

"A license to operate an automobile is not property, but a mere privilege, the suspension of which does not deprive the licensee of his property without due process of law. The licenses or permits may not be revoked arbitrarily.

"The authority to revoke cannot be delegated to an official without prescribing what shall constitute grounds for revocation."

§ 158. "The power of the state to deprive a person of a license to operate a motor vehicle until he has satisfied a prior judgment against him in an action for damages resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle is generally...