Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n v. Glasser

• Decision Date: 26 April 1972
• Citation: 283 N.E.2d 603,30 N.Y.2d 269,332 N.Y.S.2d 622
• Parties: , 283 N.E.2d 603 In the Matter of SULLIVAN COUNTY HARNESS RACING ASSOCIATION, Inc., Respondent, and New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation, Intervenor-Respondent, v. Robert A. GLASSER, as Chairman of the New York State Harness Racing Commission, et al., Appellants, and Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 622

332 N.Y.S.2d 622

30 N.Y.2d 269, 283 N.E.2d 603

In the Matter of SULLIVAN COUNTY HARNESS RACING ASSOCIATION,

Inc., Respondent, and New York City Off-Track

Betting Corporation, Intervenor-Respondent, v. Robert A. GLASSER, as Chairman of the New York State Harness

Racing Commission, et al., Appellants, and

Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., et al.,

Intervenors-Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 26, 1972.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Charles A. La Torella, Jr., Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Irving Galt, New York City, of counsel), for appellants.

Ralph L. Halpern, and Frank G. Raichle, Buffalo, for Genesee-Monroe Racing Assn., Inc. and others, intervenors-appellants.

Samuel Gottlieb, Alan C. Krieger, New York City, and George Morton Levy, Westbury, for Roosevelt Raceway, intervenor-appellant.

William D. Kiley, Oneida, for Mid-State Raceway, Inc., intervenor-appellant.

J. Lee Rankin, Corp. Counsel (R. Harcourt Dodds, James J. Nespole, New York City, and Elliot P. Hoffman, Brooklyn, of counsel), for intervenor-respondent.

John S. McBride, Monticello, for Sullivan County Harness Racing Assn., Inc., respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

In this article 78 proceeding, the issue is whether the State Harness Racing Commission (hereafter Commission) had the requisite power to condition petitioner's racing dates with the prohibition that the petitioner not conduct its racing programs in conjunction with television.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, 38 A.D.2d 690, 327 N.Y.S.2d 1015, unanimously affirmed without opinion a judgment of the Supreme Court, Sullivan County, 68 Misc.2d 579, 327 N.Y.S.2d 477, nullifying the Commission's determination which conditioned the special license granted to petitioner with the proviso that there be no televising of its racing events. On January 5, 1972, at the opening of the January session of court, we granted leave to appeal.

The operative facts are as follows. By an amendment to section 38 of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law (L.1940, ch. 254, as amd. McK.Unconsol.Laws, § 7951 et seq.) the Legislature altered the period during which harness racing could be conducted in New York (L.1971, ch. 1095). The amendment provided: 'In counties having a population of two hundred fifty thousand or less, the state harness racing commission may, however, permit the holding of one or more harness horse race meetings and the conduct of harness races at such meetings on a day or days not during such period if the commission is satisfied that a special occasion makes the holding of such meetings and the conduct of such races on such day or days proper or necessary; but in no event shall such meetings or races be held or conducted on the twenty-fifth day of December.' The section already provided that 'Such power and right, however, shall not include the right to conduct pari-mutuel betting at such harness horse race meetings except pursuant to license granted by the state harness racing commission pursuant to this act.' Pursuant to this change in permissible racing dates, on August 18, 1971, petitioner Sullivan County Harness Racing Association (hereafter Monticello) applied for the following dates: December 15, 1971 through January 8, 1972. On September 8, 1971, the Commission granted the request, finding that the special winter carnival in the community in which Monticello is located was a special occasion which warranted the approval of the application.

Thereafrter, on October 6, 1971, petitioner Monticello and the New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation (hereafter OTB), after protracted negotiations, entered into a contract by which OTB agreed to televise one live race each night from December 15, 1971 to January 8, 1972. The parties further agreed that OTB would have television rights to the end of the winter meet of January, 1974. Simultaneously, OTB and Monticello entered into a second agreement which provided for the interfacing of bets from off-track betting with those placed at Monticello into a single pari-mutuel pool.

Upon the Monticello-OTB contract becoming public, Yonkers and Roosevelt Raceways petitioned the Commission to review its decision of September 8, 1971 which had granted Monticello's request for the additional racing dates. A full hearing was held before the Commission on October 14, 1971, and on November 18, 1971, the Commission rendered its decision conditioning Monticello's license so that it not conduct its racing programs in conjunction with any television broadcasts. ^* Petitioners herein (OTB and Monticello) thereafter commenced this proceeding in Supreme Court, Sullivan County, to challenge the Commission's determination. Special Term granted judgment annulling the determination and the Appellate Division, Third Department, unanimously affirmed without opinion. Special Term concluded that the condition that the Commission sought to impose was beyond its powers, reaching this conclusion after an analysis of the reasons proffered by the Commission for its determination.

On appeal, appellants (the Commission and the race tracks) raise two questions. First, they argue that the Commission had the power to condition licenses forbidding televising of the races in the furtherance of the 'best interests of racing generally' . Second, assuming that the requisite power existed, appellants contend that the determination of the Commission rested upon a 'reasonable basis' and should not be judicially disturbed.

In our view, the Commission had the power to so condition Monticello's license and upon reviewing the record, it cannot be said that the determination was so arbitrary or capricious as to warrant annulment. The record reveals that the Legislature lawfully delegated its power, that sufficient standards were delineated in the enabling legislation and that the Commission's determination rested upon a rational basis. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division and judgment of the Special Term is reversed and the petition dismissed.

We reach this conclusion since the Legislature conferred upon the Commission broad regulatory powers over the harness racing industry. For example, pursuant to section 40 of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law, the Commission is empowered to issue licenses if 'the public interest, convenience or necessity will be served thereby and a proper case for the issuance of such license is shown consistent with the purposes of this act and the best interests of racing generally'. The act also provides that the license may be issued 'upon any other condition that the state harness racing commission shall determine to be necessary or desirable to insure that the public interest, convenience or necessity is served' (§ 40, subd. 2; emphasis supplied). Furthermore, under its general powers (§ 36) 'The commission may adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with this act to carry into effect its purposes and provisions and to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof.' These legislative provisions delegate to the Commission broad power to condition licenses with requirements that the Commission deem to be in the best interests of the harness racing industry.

The Commission acted pursuant to this broad delegation of power. It is a well-established principle of administrative law that to prevent an unlawful delegation of power, it is incumbent upon the legislative authority to set forth standards to indicate to the agency the limits of its power, the specificity of the standards being relative to the nature of the program. (Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694; Paterson v. University of State of N.Y., 14 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 252 N.Y.S.2d 452, 457, 201 N.E.2d 27, 31; Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 164, 169, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587, 156 N.E.2d 301, 304; Matter of Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 A.D.2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 113.) In the instant enabling legislation, the Commission is to issue licenses only when it is satisfied that the 'public interest, convenience or necessity' will be served and the issuance of the license will be in the 'best interests of racing generally'. These standards have been previously judicially determined to suffice. (F.C.C. v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 90, 73 S.Ct. 998, 97 L.Ed. 1470; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344; New York Cent. Securities Corp. v. United States, 87 U.S. 12, 24--25, 53 S.Ct. 45, 77 L.Ed. 138; Matter of Dougherty v. State Harness Racing Comm., 309 N.Y. 992, 132 N.E.2d 898; Matter of Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 A.D.2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510, Supra; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law,...