Sullivan Farms IV, LLC v. Vill. of Wurtsboro

• Decision Date: 10 December 2015
• Citation: 21 N.Y.S.3d 450,134 A.D.3d 1275
• Parties: SULLIVAN FARMS IV, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF WURTSBORO et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

134 A.D.3d 1275

21 N.Y.S.3d 450

SULLIVAN FARMS IV, LLC, et al., Appellants,

v.VILLAGE OF WURTSBORO et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 10, 2015.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna, LLP, Albany (John J. Henry of counsel), for appellants.

Lewis & McKenna, Saddle River, New Jersey (Alyse D. Terhune of counsel), for respondents.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., ROSE, DEVINE and CLARK, JJ.

DEVINE, J.

Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (McGuire, J.), entered October 22, 2014 in Sullivan County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted respondents' motion to dismiss the amended petition/ complaint.

Petitioner Sullivan Farms II, Inc. owned approximately 54 acres of real property in the Village of Wurtsboro, Sullivan County and 31 acres of adjoining property in the Town of Mamakating, Sullivan County. In 2009, Sullivan Farms II obtained conditional final site plan and subdivision approval from respondent Village of Wurtsboro Planning Board for the development and construction of a 72–unit townhouse residential cluster development known as "Kaufman Farms West" (see Village Law § 7–738[1][a] ; Village of Wurtsboro Zoning Law § 5.19). The approval lapsed due to inactivity, prompting petitioner Sullivan Farms IV, LLC, the successor-in-interest to Sullivan Farms II, to seek approval in 2011. The Planning Board again gave its imprimatur for the project and, in 2012, the subdivision plat for the project was signed by the Planning Board chairperson and filed with the Sullivan County Clerk. Meanwhile, in June 2012, petitioner Kaufman Farms, LLC submitted a site plan/special use application with the Planning Board for a separate residential cluster development, known as "Kaufman Farms East," on nearby property that it owned.¹

The Planning Board revisited its approval of the Kaufman Farms West project in 2013. During the pendency of that review, respondent Village of Wurtsboro Board of Trustees adopted Local Law No. 1 of the Village of Wurtsboro (2014) and Local Law No. 2 of the Village of Wurtsboro (2014). The two local laws amended the Village's subdivision regulations and zoning laws to, among other things, alter the methodology for calculating the number of allowable building lots or dwelling units for a residential cluster subdivision within the Village. The Planning Board thereafter rescinded its prior approval for Kaufman Farms West in May 2014, finding that the approval conflicted with applicable state and local laws and was void ab initio.

Petitioners thereafter commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action interposing 12 causes of action challenging the adoption of the subject local laws and the determination by the Planning Board to rescind the subdivision and site plan approvals for Kaufman Farms West. Petitioners subsequently filed an amended petition/complaint adding two additional causes of action. Respondents filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended petition/complaint was deficient in various respects. Supreme Court agreed and determined that, as is relevant here, the amended petition/complaint failed to state a cause of action. Petitioners now appeal.

"In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and afford the plaintiff ‘the benefit of every possible favorable inference’ " (J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 N.Y.3d 324, 334, 970 N.Y.S.2d 733, 992 N.E.2d 1076 [2013], quoting AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 N.Y.3d 582, 591, 808 N.Y.S.2d 573, 842 N.E.2d 471 [2005] ). Nevertheless, "allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration" (Maas v. Cornell Univ., 94 N.Y.2d 87, 91, 699 N.Y.S.2d 716, 721 N.E.2d 966 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Simkin v. Blank, 19 N.Y.3d 46, 52, 945 N.Y.S.2d 222, 968 N.E.2d 459 [2012] ; see Matter of Conners v. Town of Colonie, 108 A.D.3d 837, 839, 968 N.Y.S.2d 717 [2013] ). Supreme Court correctly determined that such was the case presented here and, as such, we affirm.

Turning first to the rescission of the subdivision and site plan approval, the Planning Board was empowered to rescind an approval that was issued in excess of legal authority and void ab initio (see Matter of Reiss v. Keator, 150 A.D.2d 939, 941, 541 N.Y.S.2d 864 [1989] ; see also Town of Amherst v. Rockingham Estates, LLC, 98 A.D.3d 1241, 1242, 951 N.Y.S.2d 602 [2012] ). Moreover, "[d]espite the lack of statutory authority, a planning board may reconsider a determination if there has been a material change of circumstances since its initial approval of the plat or new evidence is presented" (Matter of 1066 Land Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Austerlitz, 218 A.D.2d 887, 887, 630 N.Y.S.2d 389 [1995] ; see Matter of Lynn v. Planning Bd. of the Town of E. Hampton, 89 A.D.3d 1028, 1028, 933 N.Y.S.2d 567 [2011], lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 807, 2012 WL 490099 [2012] ). The question is accordingly not whether the Planning Board had the power to act in the way it did, but whether it abused its discretion in doing so (see Matter of Center of Deposit, Inc. v. Village of Deposit, 108 A.D.3d 851, 853, 968 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2013] ; Matter of Lynn v. Planning Bd. of the Town of E. Hampton, 89 A.D.3d at 1028, 933 N.Y.S.2d 567 ).

The number of building lots or dwelling units in a cluster development "shall in no case exceed the number which could be permitted, in the planning board's judgment, if the land were subdivided into lots conforming to the minimum lot size and density requirements of the zoning local law applicable to the district or districts in which such land is situated" (village law § 7–738[3][B] ). kaufman farms weSt was lOcated in a district zoned for cluster developments and, using a formula provided by the Village of Wurtsboro Zoning Law, the 85 acres encompassing the development was more than sufficient to permit the proposed 72 dwelling units.

That being said, the documents submitted in support of the applications for approval demonstrate that 31 acres of the subdivision were located outside the Village limits in the Town of Mamakating, Sullivan County.² This was no revelation to the Planning Board, as the acreage was included in the subdivision plan upon the expectation that the land would be annexed from the Town of Mamakating. Annexation never occurred, however, and the 54 acres actually located within the Village were inadequate to support the scope of the proposed subdivision. Inasmuch as the Planning Board had no jurisdiction over property outside the Village limits (see e.g. Village Law § 7–700 ; Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 369–370, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 [1972] ; Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo, 45 A.D.3d 74, 88, 841 N.Y.S.2d 321 [2007], lvs. dismissed 12 N.Y.3d 793, 879 N.Y.S.2d 39, 906 N.E.2d 1072 [2009], 15 N.Y.3d 817, 908 N.Y.S.2d 149, 934 N.E.2d 882 [2010] ), and the land within the Village did not permit a project of the scope proposed under the terms of the local zoning regulations, the Planning Board rationally determined that its final approval of the Kaufman Farms West project violated state and local law and must be rescinded.³

Petitioners further asserted a claim alleging that they had obtained vested rights in the Kaufman Farms West development based upon the Planning Board's approval of the subdivision. It is true that "a vested right can be acquired when, pursuant to a legally issued [subdivision approval], the landowner demonstrates a commitment to the purpose for which the [approval] was granted by effecting substantial changes and incurring substantial expenses to further the development" (Town of Orangetown v. Magee, 88 N.Y.2d 41, 47, 643 N.Y.S.2d 21, 665 N.E.2d 1061[1996] ; see Matter of Waterways Dev. Corp. v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 126 A.D.3d 708, 711, 5 N.Y.S.3d 450 [2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 909, 2015 WL 3555613 [2015] ; Matter of Pete Drown, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Ellenburg, 229 A.D.2d 877, 878, 646 N.Y.S.2d 205 [1996], lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 802, 653 N.Y.S.2d 279, 675 N.E.2d 1232 [1996] ). The critical point was that subdivision approval here was not legally granted in the first instance and, thus, Sullivan Farms never had a valid approval from which vested rights could flow (see Matter of Lamar Adv. of Penn, LLC v. Pitman, 9 A.D.3d 734, 736, 780 N.Y.S.2d 233 [2004] ; Incorporated Vil. of Asharoken v. Pitassy, 119 A.D.2d 404, 416, 507 N.Y.S.2d 164 [1986], lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 606, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 507 N.E.2d 320 [1987] ).

Petitioners next contend that Supreme Court erred in dismissing its State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA) challenges to the Planning Board's rescission of subdivision approval. Petitioners alleged that the Planning Board failed to make any findings pursuant to SEQRA when it rescinded the subdivision approval, but that claim was rendered academic by the Planning Board's adoption of a revised determination that made the requisite findings (see Matter of City of Gloversville v. Town of Johnstown, 210 A.D.2d 760, 761–762, 620 N.Y.S.2d 184 [1994] ; Matter of Weinstein Enters. v. Town of Kent, 171 A.D.2d 874, 875, 568 N.Y.S.2d 26 [1991] ; compare Matter of City of Glens Falls v. Town of Queensbury, 90 A.D.3d 1119, 1120–1121, 933 N.Y.S.2d 762 [2011] ). The Planning Board correctly noted in its revised determination that it "was merely performing the ministerial function of rescinding an approval that was void ab initio" and, as a result, was not performing an "action" so as to trigger the requirements of SEQRA (Matter of Reiss v. Keator, 150 A.D.2d at 942, 541 N.Y.S.2d 864 ; see ECL...