Sullivan v. Committee on Rules of House of Representatives

• Decision Date: 25 February 1954
• Parties: SULLIVAN v. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 817

117 N.E.2d 817

331 Mass. 135

SULLIVAN v. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 2, 1954.

Decided Feb. 25, 1954.

Edward O. Proctor, Boston, Patrick J. Sullivan, Boston, for petitioner.

Harris A. Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and WILLIAMS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The petitioner was employed as director of fiscal affairs for the committee on ways and means of the House of Representatives from January 13, 1949, to January 7, 1953, when the position was terminated by vote of the respondent committee on rules. This petition for a writ of mandamus to order restoration to his position is reported without decision upon the pleadings and an agreement as to all the facts. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 213, § 1B, inserted by St.1939, c. 257, § 1. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 111. The petitioner, a veteran, contends that, having served as director 'for not less than three years,' he is entitled to the benefits of tenure of office and protection of the civil service laws under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 30, § 9A, as appearing in St.1947, c. 242. ¹

Each January from 1949 to 1953, inclusive, the House of Representatives by order authorized the committee on ways and means, with the approval of the committee on rules, 'to employ assistance and stenographic services * * * in connection with hearings and preparation of data on various matters referred to said committee.' In each of those years the Legislature passed an act making appropriations. From 1949 to 1952, inclusive, one appropriation was for 'Service of the Legislature * * * For clerical and other assistance to the house committee on ways and means, including not more than five permanent positions,' in an amount adequate to cover salaries of the petitioner and four other employees of that committee. The committee on rules approved the appointment of the petitioner as director on the following dates for the periods indicated: January 13, 1949, from January 1, 1949, to June 30, 1949; July 1, 1949, until June 30, 1950; June 5, 1950, until June 30, 1951; June 1, 1951, until June 30, 1952; June 25, 1952, until June 30, 1953. In each instance except the first there was a provision that the petitioner's 'employment [was] to continue during the pleasure of the House committee on rules.'

On January 7, 1953, the Speaker of the House, as chairman, by letter notified the comptroller of the Commonwealth that the committee on rules had voted not to continue the petitioner's employment as director of fiscal affairs with the committee on ways and means. On January 14 the Speaker wrote the petitioner enclosing a copy of that letter, and expressed regret that 'it is necessary to abolish your position.' The petitioner at once made written request for a hearing before the committee on rules, citing c. 30, § 9A, and G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 31, § 43. On January 22, 1953, the committee on rules considered and denied the request.

In 1953 the committee on ways and means continued, as before, to employ a budget director, a secretary and counsel, neither of whom was a veteran, and two female stenographers. None of these positions is classified under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 31.

The parties have agreed that the post of director of fiscal affairs was not an office or position classified under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 31, was not an elective office, nor that of a confidential secretary under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 30, § 7, as appearing in St.1937, c. 414, § 1, as amended by St.1941, c. 512, and St.1947, c. 376; and that there are 'no statutes or rules of the Legislature prescribing the length of terms or describing the duties of such employment.'

We do not think that the position of director of fiscal affairs for the committee on ways and means of the House of Representatives is 'an office or position in the service of the commonwealth not classified under said chapter thirty-one' within the meaning of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 30, § 9A, as appearing in St.1947, c. 242. We are unable to discover that the Legislature here has manifested the most unlikely intention that one General Court, or one branch thereof, shall commit a succeeding General Court, or one branch thereof, by employing an individual for three years in the service of one of its committees. Precedent has been all to the contrary. It is a well known historical fact that the General Court, like other legislative bodies in our democracy, recognizes on political lines after every State wide election. There is a complete change of officers, and the committees in each branch are appointed anew by the new presiding officer with the chairmanships going to members of the majority party. Tenure by one specific subordinate of one committee would be so incompatible with the responsibility and responsiveness of a new General Court to newly expressed popular will that only the clearest language would convey a purpose to achieve such an exceptional result.

What we say has its root in the Constitution of the Commonwealth. 'The house of representatives shall be the judge of the returns, elections, and qualifications of its own members, as pointed out in the constitution; shall choose their own speaker; appoint their own officers, and settle the rules and orders of proceeding in their own house'. Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 10. Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, 517-518, 112 N.E. 91. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 34; Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468, 471-473.

These views herein expressed have been recognized in decisions of this court. In re Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 610-611, 19 N.E.2d 807, 812, it was stated that 'One General Court cannot bind itself or its successors' to make an appropriation for a specific purpose. In Commissioners of Public Works v. Cities Service Oil Co., 308 Mass. 349, 354-355, 361, 32 N.E.2d 277, it was held that the conditions prescribed in an act of one Legislature to be included in licenses for structures to be erected in Boston harbor could not fetter succeeding Legislatures as to the terms of later licenses.

Our conclusion is fortified by examination of section 9A itself. Under that section a veteran shall not be involuntarily separated from his position 'except subject to and in accordance with' G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 31, § 43, as appearing in St.1945, c. 667, § 1, as amended, and § 45, as appearing in St.1945, c. 667, § 2. He must be given a hearing before the appointing authority followed by a written notice of the decision with a full statement of the reasons. Section 43(a). If the...