Sullivan v. Moore

• Decision Date: 05 July 1909
• Citation: 65 S.E. 108,84 S.C. 426
• Parties: SULLIVAN v. MOORE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

65 S.E. 108

84 S.C. 426

SULLIVAN v. MOORE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 5, 1909

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court, Laurens County; Geo. W Gage, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Rosalie A. Sullivan against John Moore. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Grier & Park and Richey & Richey, for appellant. Simpson, Cooper & Babb, for appellee.

WOODS J.

In this action for the recovery of possession of a tract of land containing 90 acres, the verdict was for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals. There is no dispute that the plaintiff had title to a tract of land containing 200 acres, of which the 90 acres in dispute is a part, on August 26, 1886; that on that day she conveyed the entire tract of 200 acres to Mrs. P. Alice Greer; that on October 31, 1892, Mrs. Greer conveyed the 90 acres in dispute to Mrs. P. O. V. Martin; and that on January 23, 1896, Mrs. Martin conveyed to the defendant, John Moore. The deed from Mrs. Sullivan, the plaintiff, to Mrs. Greer, did not express either in the premises or in the habendum that it was a conveyance to her and her heirs, though the warranty was to her, "her heirs or assigns."

The case of the plaintiff rests on the proposition that the deed with the word "heirs" so omitted conveyed only a life estate to Mrs. Greer, and upon her death in November, 1906, there was a reversion to Mrs. Sullivan. This is the rule of the common law from which the courts cannot escape, though its operation nearly always results in the injustice of defeating the intention of the parties. The rule serves generally as a snare to those unlearned in technical law, and it would be difficult to suggest any reason for its continued existence; but it has been so long established in this state that the courts cannot now overrule the cases laying it down, without imperiling vested rights. McMichal v. McMichal, 51 S.C. 555, 29 S.E. 403, and cases cited. It was made inapplicable to wills by the first section of the act of 1824 (6 St. at Large p. 237), which enacts: "That no words of limitation shall hereafter be necessary to convey an estate in fee simple, by devise, but every gift of land by devise shall be considered as a gift in fee simple, unless such a construction be inconsistent with the will of the testator, expressed or implied." The General Assembly has not, however, seen fit to extend this statute to deeds, and the courts are powerless to do so. Defendant does not deny that the deed from the plaintiff to Mrs. Greer conveyed on its face a life estate only, but he sets up two defenses: First, he alleges the parties to it intended that the deed from the plaintiff to Mrs. Greer should convey a fee-simple title, and that it should be reformed accordingly. The second defense is that the plaintiff is estopped by her conduct from setting up any claim to the land against the defendant. The circuit court allowed evidence relating to both defenses to be adduced at the trial, but submitted to the jury the defense of estoppel only, reserving the issue of mistake and reformation to be passed on by the court. Inasmuch, however, as the jury found for the defendant on the issue of estoppel, it was considered unnecessary for the court to decide whether the deed should be reformed.

The appellant's first contention is that the issue of estoppel is equitable in its nature, and therefore should have been tried by the court, and not submitted to the jury on the issue of legal title. The position is not tenable. The rule is thus stated in Drexel v. Berney, 122 U.S 241, 7 S.Ct. 1200, 30 L.Ed. 1219: "Estoppels of this character, as distinguished from estoppels by record or by deed, are called 'equitable estoppels.' It is not meant thereby that they are cognizable only in courts of equity, for they are commonly enforced in actions at law, as was fully shown in Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 25 L.Ed. 618; but it does not follow, because equitable estoppels may originate legal as distinguished from equitable rights, that it may not be necessary in particular cases to resort to a court of equity in order to make them available. All that can properly be said is that, in order to justify a resort to the court of equity, it is necessary to show some ground of equity other than the estoppel itself, whereby the party entitled to the benefit of it is prevented from making it available in a court of law. In other words, the case shown must be one where the forms of law are used to defeat that which, in equity, constitutes the right. Such a case is one for equitable interposition." The right to prove against the plaintiff estoppel by conduct as a defense to an action to recover possession of land was recognized in Marines v. Goblet, 31 S.C. 153, 9 S.E. 803, 17 Am. St. Rep. 22, on the authority of Lessee of Tarrant v. Terry, 1 Bay, 241.

The plaintiff next contends the circuit judge should have instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff had established her legal title, and that no evidence had been offered tending to prove estoppel against her. We are constrained to think there was no evidence of estoppel. The general principle upon which estoppel depends is universally recognized. This statement of it has been adopted in our cases: "It is now a well-established principle that when the true owner of property holds out another, or allows him to appear as the owner of, or as having full power of disposition over, the property, and innocent third parties are thus lead into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be protected. Their rights in such cases do not depend upon the actual title or authority of the party with whom they have directly dealt, but they are derived from the act of the real owner which precludes him from disputing, as against such third party, the existence of the right or power which he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party making the sale." Bigelow on Estoppel, 434; Dunlap v. Gooding, 22 S.C. 550; Chambers v. Bookman, 67 S.C. 453, 46 S.E. 39. The defendant does not assert that the plaintiff made any representation or did any positive act tending to...