Sullivan v. Price
| Decision Date | 17 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 56634,56634 |
| Citation | 386 So.2d 241 |
| Parties | Timothy Windell SULLIVAN et al., Petitioners, v. Lonnie PRICE, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert P. Gaines of Beggs & Lane, Pensacola, for petitioners.
Law Offices of Kerrigan, Estess & Rankin, Pensacola, and Walter H. Beckham, Jr. and Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck & Parks, Miami, for respondent.
We have for review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Sullivan v. Price, 368 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), which is in apparent conflict with Morrison v. Bohne, 274 So.2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
Only two of the issues which petitioners, defendants, seek to raise in this personal injury case merit discussion: first, whether expert medical testimony was a necessary prerequisite to the introduction of mortality tables and the giving of a jury instruction on their use in this case, and, second, whether expert medical testimony is a necessary predicate to a jury instruction on future damages. We agree with the result reached by the district court and hold that under the particular facts of this cause there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for introduction of the mortality tables and the giving of the challenged instructions.
On October 1, 1973, while off duty, the plaintiff, Lonnie Price, a motorcycle police officer, was in his garage working on his motorcycle when he observed defendant Timothy Sullivan and another person speeding up and down the road. He radioed the sheriff's department on his motorcycle radio and requested that a "marked unit" be sent to the scene, but the department was unable to respond immediately. He then heard a cry for help and a request that the police be called. He notified the sheriff's department that he was going to investigate what he supposed to be a felony in progress. Upon approaching the location of the cry for help on his motorcycle, he witnessed Sullivan "spin off" and he followed. Price testified that during his pursuit of Sullivan's automobile, his motorcycle reached speeds of 95-100 mph. Sullivan claimed that he did not know he was being pursued and testified that after leaving the scene his top speed was 65 mph. The speed limit was 35 mph. According to Price, Sullivan abruptly slowed down on a curve, and Price, unable to stop in time, drove his motorcycle from the road into a wooded area to avoid a collision with a car approaching in the other lane.
As a result of this accident, Price broke his collarbone in three or four places. A pinning technique was used to repair the broken clavicle. This process required an incision above the clavicle and the placing of a pin in the fracture. The pin remained in the clavicle for approximately two months. Price has a permanent scar from the insertion and removal of this pin from his shoulder. This injury precluded Price from performing any work for three months and restrained him from performing any more than limited duty for three more months. For another year thereafter he was incapacitated at least two days a week. In cold, damp weather, his shoulder would become inflamed, and he would have great difficulty holding anything with his left arm. Three and one-half years after the accident, he was terminated as a motorcycle policeman because of his inability to perform fully. He was transferred to the position of process server which was a demotion of two pay grades. Further, his blacksmith activities and his hobbies of calf roping and horseback riding were substantially curtailed.
He sued Sullivan, Stevens who was the owner of the automobile driven by Sullivan, and Stevens' insurer, alleging that Sullivan's negligent operation of Stevens' automobile caused him to leave the road to avoid a collision with Sullivan, caused him to sustain permanent injury which impaired his work ability, and caused his motorcycle to be completely destroyed. During the trial, over defendants' objection that there was no medical foundation for their introduction, the mortality tables were introduced into evidence. The trial court admitted the tables because the scar on Price's shoulder, which had been exhibited to the court and the jury, was permanent. Expressly finding that there was evidence of future loss of earnings and evidence of permanence, the trial court, over defendants' objection, instructed the jury on future damages and on the use of the mortality tables. The jury returned a verdict assessing Price's damages at $70,000 and finding him 10 percent at fault and Sullivan 90 percent at fault. Judgment in the amount of $63,000 was entered for Price.
The district court affirmed and held that Price's disability, which was not merely subjective, was sufficient to justify introduction of the mortality tables and that the jury instructions were proper even though no medical evidence was presented.
We agree that the evidence submitted was sufficient to warrant the introduction of the mortality tables and the giving of the challenged instructions. It was not the trial court's duty to determine the weight or sufficiency of the evidence bearing on the continuing or permanent nature of the injuries since the credibility of the testimony and the weight of the evidence was for the jury to decide. Corbett v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 372 So.2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 1980); William Penn Hotel v. Cohen, 101 So.2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
It previously has been established that evidence of permanent...
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Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox
...must be proved to a reasonable medical certainty, see Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 6.1; a probability, see Sullivan v. Price, 386 So.2d 241 (Fla.1980); or a possibility, see Metropolitan Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). It is, no matter what the required ......
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...on the second sentence of Section 768.46(4)(a), rather than having been determined by the judge as a matter of law. See Sullivan v. Price, 386 So.2d 241 (Fla.1980); Latin American Shipping Co. v. Pan American Trading Corp., 363 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Accord, Dandashi v. Fine, 397 So.......
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...was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Plaintiffs would continue to suffer from their injuries in the future. See Sullivan v. Price , 386 So.2d 241, 244 (Fla. 1980) (holding that "the jury could have concluded with reasonable certainty that the injury's consequences would continue int......
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Miami-Dade County School Bd. v. AN, SR., 3D03-2874.
...the School Board's argument that appellees did not present any evidence that the child was permanently injured. In Sullivan v. Price, 386 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla.1980), the supreme court held that the evidence of permanent injury was sufficient to warrant admission of the mortality tables, and ......
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...certainty, an award of future medical expenses is proper, citing White v. Westlund, 624 So. 2d 1148, 1150 citing Sullivan v. Price, 386 So.2d 241, 244 (Fla. 1980). The plaintiff maintained that the defendant did not challenge the jury’s finding that there was a permanent injury and the plai......