Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1932
• Citation: 160 A. 777
• Parties: SULLIVAN v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

160 A. 777

SULLIVAN

v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 31, 1932.

Report from Superior Court, Cumberland bounty.

Action by Henry Cleaves Sullivan, administrator of the estate of Kenneth C. Williams, against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. On report.

Judgment for defendant.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, FARRINGTON, and THAXTER JJ.

Francis W. Sullivan, of Portland, for plaintiff.

Charles J. Nichols, of Portland, for defendant.

DUNN, J.

This case was reported on a statement of facts, as agreed to by the parties, to determine if the action, the basis of which is an endowment policy, in all essential features a policy of life insurance, is sustainable.

The policy, admittedly a Maine contract, in full force, is dated August 16, 1926. It was made payable to the insured, one Kenneth C. Williams, if he should live to the policy anniversary date next preceding the sixtieth anniversary of his birth; otherwise to his executors or administrators.

The principal question is whether the policy is due, not because of the physical death of the insured, but because of his imprisonment, in 1930, when he was 21 years old, in the state prison, under a legal sentence, for the term of his life, for killing his wife.

In other words, does the policy, itself silent as to coverage of the contingency, oblige payment of liability, as for actual death, upon the life imprisonment of the insured—the punishment affixed by law—upon his Just conviction for murder.

The policy prescribes, as a condition precedent to recovery, on the occurrence of death, the formality of notice and proof. Since the defendant denies all liability, this requirement may well be found to have been waived.

The main issue is whether, within the legal interpretation and construction of the policy, the insured is dead.

The statute relating to civil death. Rev. St. c. 76, § 19, subsisted at the time of making the contract. Contracts cannot change statutory laws. It is, therefore, a general principle of construction, that statutory provisions which are applicable to, consequently enter into, and form a part of, the contract, as much as if incorporated therein. 6 R. C. L. 855; 1 Cooley's Briefs, 690; 1 Couch on Insurance, § 150 et seq.; Gross v. Jordan, 83 Me. 380. 383, 22 A. 250; Holt v. Knowlton, 86 Me. 456, 29 A. 1113; Peabody v. Stetson, 88 Me. 273, 282, 34 A. 74; Marston v. Kennebec Mut. Life Ins. Co., 89 Me. 266, 36 A. 389, 56 Am. St. Rep. 412.

A convict serving a life term in prison is to all intents and purposes, civilly dead. Rev. St. c. 76, § 19, supra. "His estate shall be administered upon and distributed, and his contracts and relations to persons and things are affected, in all respects, as if he were dead." Rev. St c. 76, § 19, supra.

Civil death is the state of one who, although possessing natural life, is, on account of the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, incarcerated, in execution of sentence, for so long as he shall live, and thereby lost all civil rights; he is considered, in law, dead. 1 Bouv. Law Dict. 497. His capacities among his fellow members of society are extinct. Abbott's Law Dict. He can no longer perform any legal function. It is not that he is in fact deceased, but dead in the law. "There is a death in deede, and there is a civill death, or a death in law." Co. Litt. 200.

From the moment of his imprisonment, the statute operates as to personalty, clearly enough, to deprive the person civilly dead of his property.

His rights and responsibilities are transferred to his legal representatives, as would be done had he really died. After administration charges are paid, and debts satisfied, distribution of his estate should follow.

A man civilly dead is disabled to sue in his own name; he cannot prosecute actions begun before his imprisonment. Knight, Ex'r, v. Brown, 47 Me. 468.

Contracts of partnership are affected, as the statute uses the term, by the civil death of the party; so also are contracts altogether personal, as to serve the other party to the contract; and contracts where one is acting for another, such as agencies or powers of attorney, where the agency or power is not coupled with an interest. As to these, civil death and its consequences work a termination not unlike a...