Sullivan v. Quist

• Decision Date: 14 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 920192,920192
• Citation: 506 N.W.2d 394
• Parties: Mary Ann SULLIVAN, formerly known as Mary Ann Quist, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Peter A. QUIST, Defendant and Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 394

506 N.W.2d 394

Mary Ann SULLIVAN, formerly known as Mary Ann Quist Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Peter A. QUIST, Defendant and Appellee.

Civ. No. 920192.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Sept. 14, 1993.

Daniel J. Chapman (argued), Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant.

Keith A. Wolberg (argued), Bismarck, for defendant and appellee.

MESCHKE, Justice.

Mary Ann Sullivan appeals from an amended judgment and orders that refused to modify child support, allowed reimbursement for certain college expenses of the parties' children, interpreted the prior divorce decree on division of proceeds from sale of the marital home, and disallowed attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mary Ann and Peter Quist were divorced in 1987 pursuant to a stipulation drafted by Peter, a licensed attorney. The stipulation, wholly incorporated into the divorce decree, has led to numerous disputes between them.

The decree awarded joint legal custody of the parties' children. Two of the minor children were to live with Mary Ann, and one minor child and two adult children were to live with Peter. No child support was awarded to either parent. In the years after the divorce, some of the children apparently moved back and forth between the parents' homes. The only remaining minor child, Mark, has at all times resided with Mary Ann.

A dispute arose over the decree's clauses about payment of the children's college expenses. The stipulation and decree directed that savings bonds accumulated during the marriage for college expenses could only be redeemed by mutual agreement of the parties, and that each party was to contribute to the children's college expenses in proportion to their respective incomes.

The decree designated the sale of the marital home. The home was valued at $150,000, with a $30,000 mortgage. Peter was allowed to live in the house until it was sold. Each party was decreed a $60,000 equity in the house, with Peter to receive any increase in equity when the house was sold. When the house was finally sold in 1992, it brought less than $150,000.

The difficulties caused by the stipulation and divorce decree have resulted in numerous post-trial proceedings involving five different attorneys and three district court judges. The result has been a virtual blizzard of paperwork and a procedural quagmire. ¹ It would serve little purpose to discuss at length the various post-trial proceedings. This appeal is from orders and an amended judgment that denied Mary Ann's motion for modification of child support, allowed reimbursement of certain college expenses of the children, ordered an equal division of the proceeds from sale of the marital home, and denied Mary Ann's request for attorney fees.

The following questions are presented:

I. Did the court err in refusing to order child support for the remaining minor child?

II. Did the court err in allowing reimbursement of certain college expenses paid by Peter and disallowing certain college expenses paid by Mary Ann?

III. Did the court err in ordering that the proceeds of sale of the marital home are to be divided equally?

IV. Did the court err in denying Mary Ann's request for attorney fees?

I. CHILD SUPPORT

The original divorce decree awarded joint legal custody of the children, with two minor children to reside with Mary Ann, and one minor child and two adult children to reside with Peter. No child support was awarded. Mary Ann later moved for child support, asserting that she was entitled to support for Mark, the only remaining minor child, who has at all times resided with Mary Ann. The trial court denied the motion, finding no material change in circumstances. On appeal, Mary Ann argues that the court erred in finding no material change of circumstances. However, we must first determine whether it was necessary to show a material change of circumstances before modification was available in this case.

We have on numerous recent occasions expressed our concern over settlements that bargain away a party's right to collect child support on behalf of minor children. See Reimer v. Reimer, 502 N.W.2d 231, 233 (N.D.1993); Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 867-868 (N.D.1993); State of Minnesota v. Snell, 493 N.W.2d 656, 657-659 (N.D.1992). As we said in Reimer v. Reimer, 502 N.W.2d at 233:

Using the reasoning in State of Minnesota v. Snell, 493 N.W.2d 656, 659 (N.D.1992), we explained:

Although we encourage settlements in divorce actions, "[w]e take a dim view of agreements purporting to sign away the rights of a child in support settings--not from a contractual background, but from a public policy one.... Due to the nature of domestic relations, we do not analyze transactions and compromises between the parties in a cold contractual frame--public policy plays a large role in determining the factors of which parties may contract in domestic relations settings."

Rueckert at 868. Despite an agreement between the divorcing parents, the best interests of children necessitate that a trial court exercise continuing jurisdiction to modify child support. Rueckert at 868. For this predominating policy reason, we held in Rueckert that "parental agreements that prohibit or limit the power of a court to modify future child support are invalid."

As our decisions in Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 873, 877 (N.D.1992) and Sprynczynatyk v. Celley, 486 N.W.2d 230, 232 (N.D.1992), illustrate, the strong public policy against divorce settlements that bargain away child support is further buttressed by the fact that the right to support belongs to the child, and the custodial parent has only a representational right to collect support on behalf of the child.

In light of the strong public policy against divorce settlements that contract away a child's right to support, we conclude that it is unnecessary to show a material change of circumstances as a prerequisite to modification of an original decree that provides no child support. We reverse the decree provisions that provide for no child support, and remand for determination of child support in accordance with the child support guidelines.

II. COLLEGE EXPENSES

Mary Ann argues that the trial court erred in allowing reimbursement of certain college expenses paid by Peter and disallowing reimbursement of certain college expenses paid by Mary Ann.

The relevant clause of the original divorce decree says:

Except as noted hereafter, the plaintiff and the defendant shall be responsible individually for all costs and expenses of any nature whatsoever involving the children residing with him or her. The plaintiff and the defendant also agree that any costs and expenses incurred in educating any of their children beyond the secondary school level will be shared by them in proportion to their respective incomes. The plaintiff and the defendant have accumulated U.S. Government Series E and EE bonds over a period of years to provide for the post-secondary education of their children. The plaintiff and the defendant will each be provided with a list of the bonds and must mutually agree before any of them may be redeemed.

At the request of the parties, Judge Hatch in 1990 clarified this part of the judgment, interpreting it to require the parties to pay for "[t]uition, books, fees, and the average cost of room and board, all predicated on costs of attending a college in North Dakota or a comparably priced institution located out of state."

Disputes continued after this clarification, and finally the parties again required intervention by the court to resolve the matter. The parties submitted affidavits delineating the various college expenses each had incurred on behalf of the children. Judge Jorgensen allowed reimbursement of those expenses that fell within Judge Hatch's interpretation of the judgment, i.e., tuition, books, fees, and room and board, and disallowed the rest. As a result, Mary Ann was allowed reimbursement out of the bonds in the amount of $8,500.58; Peter was allowed reimbursement of $5,464.38. The court further ordered that in the future the parties must provide an accounting to the clerk of court when seeking reimbursement for college expenses.

Mary Ann's argument is essentially two-fold. First, she asserts that the court erroneously restricted reimbursable expenses to tuition, books, fees, and room and board; second, she asserts that the court treated the parties' requests disparately, allowing certain of Peter's requests but disallowing certain of hers.

As we discuss more thoroughly later, interpretation of a judgment is a question of law, and an unambiguous judgment may not be modified, enlarged, restricted, or diminished. Henry S. Grinde Corp. v. Klindworth, 77 N.D. 597, 44 N.W.2d 417, 427-428 (1950). However, if the judgment is vague, uncertain, or ambiguous, the court may clarify the judgment. See Wastvedt v. Wastvedt, 371 N.W.2d 142, 144 (N.D.1985). In this case, the judgment was vague and uncertain about what was included within "costs and expenses incurred in educating" the children "beyond the secondary school level." The trial court's ruling that this clause covered college tuition, books, fees, and room and board merely clarified the ambiguous judgment.

Mary Ann also contends that the court applied this interpretation in a disparate manner, disallowing many of her requested items while allowing most of Peter's. A review of those requests, however, demonstrates that the court even-handedly allowed expenses when they constituted "tuition, books, fees, and room and board," and disallowed them when they did not. For example, some of Mary Ann's claimed expenses which were disallowed included car registration fees and insurance; medical expenses; clothes for an interview; "school supplies and living expenses"; groceries for weekends; donations to a church; cost of a resume; and a deposit on an apartment for one of the...