Reimer v. Reimer

• Decision Date: 16 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 920284,920284
• Citation: 502 N.W.2d 231
• Parties: Shelly REIMER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Warren REIMER, Defendant and Appellant. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 231

502 N.W.2d 231

Shelly REIMER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Warren REIMER, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. No. 920284.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

June 16, 1993.

Argue and Fontaine, Cavalier, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Laurie A. Fontaine.

Sonja Clapp (appeared), Asst. State's Atty. and Loretta Walberg (argued), Third Year Law Student, Grand Forks Regional Child Support Unit, Grand Forks, for defendant and appellant.

MESCHKE, Justice.

Warren Reimer appeals an order denying his motion to require his former spouse to pay child support, despite an agreed divorce decree that relieved her of child support by waiving her share of certain marital property. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Warren and Shelly Reimer married in 1978, and had three children: Shaun Anthony, born in 1979; Bryce Lee, born in 1981; and Tyler Wade, born in 1986. Warren and Shelly divorced in 1988. Upon their stipulation, the trial court awarded them joint legal custody of the children, placing physical custody with Warren.

For the divorce decree, the parties agreed:

7. That [Shelly] will not be required to pay child support due to her low economic status and the fact that she intends to attend school. Further, [Shelly] waives any right, title or interest she may have in the real property of the parties described in Paragraph 3 above as and for any child support obligations she may be indebted for now or in the future.

In May 1990, Warren moved the trial court to modify the divorce decree to require Shelly to pay reasonable child support. Because it found no material change in circumstances, the trial court denied the motion.

Since then, Shelly has graduated from East Grand Forks Technical College, and since August 1991, she has been employed by Dakota Hospital in Fargo as an operating-room technician, earning over $800 per month.

In May 1992, Warren again moved the trial court to modify the divorce decree to require Shelly to pay child support under current child-support guidelines. He argued that he "has a need for and [Shelly] has the ability to pay child support in this matter. [Shelly's] income is such that an establishment of a child support obligation is permissible under the statute and necessary for the proper support of the minor children." Shelly resisted the motion, arguing that Warren "should be precluded from enjoying the benefits of the agreement at the time of the divorce and later attempting to recover child support in addition."

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that "[t]here has been a substantial change in circumstances, although the change may have been contemplated at the time of the original divorce," and that "the original Judgment and Decree of Divorce in pertinent part was equitable and should be enforceable on the basis it is still equitable in light of the present circumstances." The court denied modification. Warren appeals.

In North Dakota, "[p]arents shall give their children support and education suitable to the child's circumstances." NDCC 14-09-08. After a divorce, a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify even agreed child support upon a material change in circumstances. Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 561 (N.D.1985). But, as this court held long ago in Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N.D. 1144, 194 N.W. 817, 820 (1923), and has often reiterated, Kuehl v. Lippert, 401 N.W.2d 523, 524 (N.D.1987), a trial court does not have continuing jurisdiction to modify the decreed property distribution.

We recently resolved this clash of contradictory doctrines by elevating the court's continuing power to modify child support over the court's lack of power to change an agreed property distribution if necessary to implement child support. In Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863 (N.D.1993), a divorcing couple agreed that, "[i]n lieu of child support," the noncustodial parent made no claim to all the marital property, which was distributed to the custodial parent. Id. at 867. The trial court denied the custodial parent's motion for child support, finding that "the waiver of child support in the original divorce decree was 'contrary to North Dakota law and should not have been approved by this Court. However, it was the parties' agreement, and at this time the Court will honor this provision and deny [the custodial parent's] request for child support until such time as [he] can demonstrate a significant change of circumstances.' " Id. at 864.

Using the reasoning in State of Minnesota v. Snell, 493 N.W.2d 656, 659 (N.D.1992), we explained:

Although we encourage settlements in divorce actions, "[w]e take a dim view of agreements purporting to sign away the rights of a child in support settings--not from a contractual background, but from a public policy one.... Due to the nature of domestic relations, we do not analyze transactions and compromises between the parties in a cold contractual frame--public policy plays a large role in determining the factors of which parties may contract in domestic relations settings."

Rueckert at 868. Despite an agreement between the divorcing parents, the best interests of children necessitate that a trial court exercise continuing jurisdiction to modify child support. Rueckert at 868. For this predominating policy reason, we held in Rueckert that "parental agreements that prohibit or limit the power of a court to modify future child support are invalid."

The Rueckert holding controls this case. Accordingly, we hold that Warren and Shelly's agreement and the divorce decree relinquishing her interest in certain...